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Choice of the applicable law and equal treatment in 
the European Union 
by 
Rufat Babayev 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to provide a different perspective to the study of the scope and 
functioning of the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality and 
movement laid down in Article 18 TFEU and in the Treaty free movement 
provisions. It examines the scope and functioning of the principle of equal 
treatment in the context of the determination of the law applicable to a cross-
border (or inter-State) relationship. In particular, the question this thesis addresses 
is whether and, if yes, how the principle of equal treatment affects the choice of 
the law governing cross-border contractual, non-contractual or other civil law 
relationships in the European Union. 
In this respect, it is demonstrated that the principle of equal treatment functions as 
an additional check on the operation of, on the one hand, the national substantive 
law applicable pursuant to a national or Union choice-of-law rule or chosen by 
private parties to a contract and, on the other hand, national and Union choice-of-
law rules themselves. The national substantive law governing a cross-border 
relationship falls within the scope of the principle of equal treatment and is 
required to comply with it, irrespective of the fact that it is applicable in 
accordance with a choice-of-law rule or a choice-of-law clause agreed by private 
parties. Similarly, regardless of their specific nature and objective, national and 
Union choice-of-law rules also come within the scope of the principle of equal 
treatment.  
However, it is emphasised that the functioning of the principle of equal treatment 
is not comparable to that of a choice-of-law rule. The requirement that only non-
discriminatory rules can be applied in the Union under it does not, even indirectly, 
determine the applicable law in the sense understood from a choice-of-law 
perspective. This is because, unlike a choice-of-law rule, the principle of equal 
treatment does not contain even an implicit reference to a particular national law 
that always applies in light of it. 
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Introduction 
 
Those who exercise the Treaty free movement rights can find themselves involved 
in contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships that are linked to 
the law of two or more Member States. Such an inter-State relationship between 
private parties or, in the jargon of EU Law, a cross-border relationship between 
private parties would fall within the scope of the law of each Member State to 
which it is linked. This, in turn, raises the question of to which national legal 
system the private cross-border relationship at issue would be subject. Choice-of-
law rules are rules that aim to solve this problem. Based on nationality or 
territoriality as a connecting factor, choice-of-law rules determine the law 
governing cross-border relationships.  In addition, private parties engaged in a 
cross-border relationship are free to choose the national law that would regulate, 
for instance, their contractual and non-contractual rights and obligations.  
 
Due to its inter-State or cross-border nature, such a relationship would also come 
within the scope of the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality and 
movement laid down in Article 18 TFEU and in the Treaty free movement 
provisions (hereafter ‘principle of equal treatment’).1 In light of the principle of 
equal treatment, any rules applied in the context of a cross-border relationship in 
the Union must be non-discriminatory both on grounds of nationality and 
movement. Considering the far-reaching scope of the principle of equal treatment, 
                                                 
1 Unless stated otherwise, the term ‘principle of equal treatment’ will be used in order to refer to 
the principle of equal treatment (or non-discrimination principle) enshrined in Article 18 TFEU 
and in the Treaty free movement provisions.  This term seems to better reflect the fact that the 
principle of equal treatment under these Treaty provisions is not confined to discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, but also deals with national rules that put at a disadvantage those who have 
exercised the Treaty free movement rights. 
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the question this thesis aims to address is whether and, if yes, how it affects the 
determination of the law applicable to cross-border contractual, non-contractual or 
other civil law relationships in the Union. 
 
Setting the problem 
 
To begin with, both the principle of equal treatment and choice-of-law rules deal 
with cross-border relationships.2 They both have an impact on what rules are 
applicable in the context of a cross-border relationship. In particular, in light of 
the principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free 
movement provisions, applicable rules must not discriminate on grounds of 
nationality or put at a disadvantage those who have exercised the Treaty free 
movement rights.3 Unless there are objective justifications, rules cannot be 
applied, if they produce such effects. From a choice-of-law perspective, in turn, a 
cross-border relationship could theoretically be subject to each of the national 
legal systems it is linked to. However, since their simultaneous application is 
often impossible due to substantive differences between them,4 choice-of-law 
rules determine what national legislation governs the cross-border relationship at 
issue. 
                                                 
2 Ulrich Klinke, ‘European Company Law and the ECJ: The Court’s Judgments in the Years 2001 
to 2004’ (2005) 2 European Company and Financial Law Review 270, 272-273. 
3 The principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement 
provisions also prohibits discrimination on grounds of movement. In this respect, see eg Case C-
419/92 Ingetraut Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda [1994] ECR I-
505, para  12; Case C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR I-3089, 
para 32; Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D'Hoop v Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191, 
para 30; Case C-464/02 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929, para 50; Joined 
Cases C-151/04 and C-152/04 Criminal proceedings against Claude Nadin and Others [2005] 
ECR I-11203, para 34; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R.A. Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de 
Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451, para 31; Case C-544/07 Uwe Rüffler v 
Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wrocławiu Ośrodek Zamiejscowy w Wałbrzychu [2009] ECR I-3389, 
para 73. 
4 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and the 
Exception of Mutual Recognition’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 46. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that both the principle of equal treatment and choice-of-
law rules promote private activities across borders, they differ substantially, 
particularly in terms of the objectives they pursue.5 Prior to the introduction of 
Union citizenship, the principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the 
Treaty free movement provisions mainly aimed to ensure free movement of those 
engaged in an economic activity. In this way, the principle of equal treatment 
supplemented the objective of unifying the fragmented national markets into a 
single market,6 in which economic factors such as goods, persons and capital 
could move freely across national borders. However, with the introduction of 
Union citizenship and the right to move and reside under Article 21 TFEU, the 
equal treatment requirement enshrined in Article 18 TFEU is no longer confined 
to those who are engaged in an economic activity, but also applies to 
economically inactive Union citizens.7 Thus, the principle of equal treatment 
under Article 18 TFEU also ensures free movement of economically inactive 
Union citizens. 
 
In contrast, choice-of-law rules aim to guarantee ‘an efficient and just solution’ 
for a conflict of national substantive laws.8 By doing so, choice-of-law rules are 
intended to provide certainty over the applicable law and predictability of 
litigation, which are crucial for private parties engaged in cross-border 
                                                 
5 Ulrich Klinke (n 2) 273. 
6 Gillian More, ‘The principle of equal treatment: from market unifier to fundamental right’ in 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EULaw (Oxford University Press 1999) 
520. 
7 See eg Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-
184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193; Case C-209/03 The Queen (on the application of Dany Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing 
and Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119. 
8 Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in copyright and related rights: Alternatives to the Lex 
Protectionis (Kluwer Law International 2003) 16. 
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contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships. This aim, however, 
better ascribes to unified choice-of-law rules that are enshrined in Union 
secondary legislation, because of the differences existing between national choice-
of-law rules. The application of divergent national choice-of-law rules could lead 
to the substance of a cross-border relationship to be regulated according to 
divergent national substantive rules. In comparison, Union choice-of-law rules 
guarantee that the same national substantive law is applied to a cross-border 
relationship, irrespective of the national court seised with it. 
 
A possible conflict between the principle of equal treatment and choice-of-law 
rules could not be excluded, considering the fact that they both deal with cross-
border relationships, but have divergent objectives. All rules applicable in the 
context of a cross-border relationship are subject to scrutiny under the principle of 
equal treatment and cannot be applied if they impose discriminatory treatment, 
unless there are objective justifications for doing so. A rule is caught because of 
its effect on free movement in the Union regardless of its nature, origin or 
domestic classification.9 In light of this, the national substantive law designated as 
applicable as regards a given cross-border relationship by a choice-of-law rule 
might be subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. In this respect, 
it is necessary to clarify whether the fact that the national substantive law at issue 
is applied pursuant to a national or Union choice-of-law rule could have any effect 
on the scrutiny of that law under the principle of equal treatment. Furthermore, it 
is possible that the designated national substantive law per se is not 
                                                 
9 See Case C-20/92 Anthony Hubbard (Testamentvollstrecker) v Peter Hamburger [1993] ECR I-
3777, para 19; Case 82/71 Ministère public de Italian Republic v Società agricola industria latter 
(SAIL) [1972] ECR I-119, para 5. This also finds support in Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629, para 17. 
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discriminatory, but its mere application to a cross-border relationship pursuant to 
a choice-of-law rule results in an outcome contrary to the principle of equal 
treatment. In this context, two issues need to be addressed. First, one could query 
whether the specific nature of choice-of-law rules, i.e. the fact that they only 
designate the applicable law without dealing with any matters of substance, could 
play any role in the scrutiny of these rules under the principle of equal treatment. 
Second, more importantly, since national or Union choice-of-law rules only 
designate the law applicable to cross-border relationships in the Union, it is 
questionable whether they could also be caught by the principle of equal 
treatment. 
 
In addition to national and Union choice-of-law rules that determine the 
applicable law, private parties are free to choose the law governing the cross-
border contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships they are 
involved in. This freedom, which is also referred to as the principle of party 
autonomy, is inherently linked to the principle of contractual freedom. The 
principle of party autonomy is enshrined not only in national law, but also in 
Union secondary legislation. In particular, under the Rome I, Rome II and Rome 
III Regulations,10 private parties can choose the national law regulating, for 
instance, their contractual and non-contractual obligations as well as matters 
related to divorce and separation arising in a cross-border context.  
 
                                                 
10 Regulation 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II Regulation’) [2007] OJ L 199/40; Regulation 
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (‘Rome I Regulation’) [2008] OJ L 177/6; Regulation 4/2009 of 18 
December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ L7/1. 
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Taking into account the fact that the principle of party autonomy is firmly 
established in the Union legal order, one could question whether it could have any 
effect on the scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment of the law chosen by 
private parties to a cross-border relationship. The proponents of the ordo-liberal 
ideas on the European integration process point out that the Treaty free movement 
provisions guarantee and extend contractual freedom and the freedom to choose 
the governing law across borders. On this basis, they argue that scrutiny under the 
Treaty free movement provisions vary depending on the extent of the discretion 
available to private parties to a cross-border contractual relationship. In particular, 
according to them, only national rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context, 
the scope of which private parties cannot escape by choosing the law of another 
Member State as the governing law, could be caught by the Treaty free movement 
provisions. Other rules that are not mandatory in an inter-State context and private 
parties can escape their scope by opting for the law of another Member State are 
less likely to be caught by the Treaty free movement provisions.  
 
The exercise of the Treaty free movement rights is certainly interlinked with the 
exercise of contractual freedom and the freedom to choose the governing law. It is 
hardly possible, for instance, to supply goods or provide services without the 
freedom to decide whether to enter into a contractual relationship or agree specific 
contractual clauses and terms. Any limitations of contractual freedom and the 
freedom to choose the governing law could impede cross-border activities in the 
Union. In this regard, however, it is questionable whether the principle of party 
autonomy, in particular, the discretion available to private parties to avoid the 
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scope of certain national rules by choosing the governing law, could affect the 
scrutiny of these rules under the principle of equal treatment.  
 
In the present context, on a more general and theoretical note, one could also 
wonder whether the effect of the principle of equal treatment can go beyond than 
merely subjecting applicable substantive or choice-of-law rules to scrutiny.11 In 
particular, the question, here, is whether the principle of equal treatment under 
Article 18 TFEU and Treaty free movement provisions could be understood as an 
implicit rule that itself designates the national law applicable a cross-border 
relationship in the Union. In this respect, it is necessary to mention that due to 
their aim in promoting cross-border activities across borders the possible effect of 
the Treaty free movement provisions on the choice of the applicable law has been 
subject to a debate in the academic literature.12 Among others, for instance, 
Michaels13 has examined the country of origin principle in light of the vested right 
theory.14 The author is of the opinion that ‘the country-of-origin principle is a 
                                                 
11 Here, by the term ‘applicable substantive rules’ I also refer to the law chosen by private parties 
in the context of cross-border relationships. 
12 See Apostolos Gkoutzinis, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EC Treaty and the Law of 
Contractual Obligations Relating to Banking and Financial Services’ (2004) 41 Common Market 
Law Review 119; Michel Tison, ‘Unravelling the General Good Exception: The Case of Financial 
Services’ in Mads Andenas and Wulf-Henning Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law 
(Oxford University Press 2002); Ralf Michaels, ‘EU Law as Private International Law? 
Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory’ (2006) 2 Journal of 
Private International Law 195; Jona Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation: a 
Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings in light of a Paradigm of Co-operation 
and a Comitas Europaea (Intersentia 2005); Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen (n 4) 37; Johan 
Meeusen, ‘Instrumentalisation of Private International Law in the European Union: Towards a 
European Conflicts Revolution?’(2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 287; Jan 
Wouters, ‘Choice-of-law and the Single Market for Financial Services’ (1997) 4 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 161; Francois Rigaux, ‘New Problems of Private 
International Law in the Single Market’ (1993-1994) 4 King’s College Law Journal 23. 
13 Ralf Michaels, ‘EU Law as Private International Law?’ (n 12). 
14 Vested rights theory is a traditional choice-of-law doctrine promulgated by A.V. Dicey in 
England and J. H. Beale in the United States. According to Dicey’s interpretation of this doctrine, 
for instance, every right duly acquired under the law of any country was recognised and enforced 
by English courts, even though the only applicable law in the latter was always English law. The 
enforcement of the right acquired under the law of another country could be rejected, if it was 
contrary to English public policy or moral rules. See in this respect Albert Venn Dicey, ‘On 
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choice-of-law principle, albeit not one according to classic conflict of laws but a 
new form of vested-rights principle’.15 Similarly, Fallon and Meeusen have 
analysed the possible choice-of-law effect of the mutual recognition principle.16 
The authors argue that the mutual recognition principle is neutral as to the choice 
of the applicable law in the sense that it does not incorporate a hidden or fast 
choice of the applicable law referring to the law of the Member State of origin.17  
 
Both the country of origin and the mutual recognition principles are inherently 
linked to and are arguably even derived from the principle of equal treatment laid 
down in the Treaty free movement provisions. Taking this into consideration, it is 
necessary to establish how the principle of equal treatment itself, in turn, operates 
from a choice-of-law perspective. In particular, the question that needs to be 
addressed here is whether the functioning of the principle of equal treatment could 
be in any way compared to that of a choice-of-law rule. 
 
In summary, this thesis seeks to examine the scope and functioning of the 
principle of equal treatment from a choice-of-law perspective. In particular, on the 
one hand, it looks at the possible scrutiny of the applicable substantive and 
choice-of-law rules under the principle of equal treatment. On the other hand, it 
discusses whether the effect of the principle of equal treatment is confined to that 
or whether it could also be understood as itself implicitly operating similar to a 
choice-of-law rule. 
                                                                                                                                     
Private International Law as a Branch of the Law of England’ (1890) 6 Law Quarterly Review 1; 
Joseph H. Beale, ‘Dicey’s “Choice-of-law” (1896) 10 Harvard Law Review 887. 
15 Ralf Michaels, ‘The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution: Lessons for the United States?’ 
(2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607, 1628. According to the author, the possible role of the 
country of origin principle in the context of the choice of the applicable law can be best 
understood by analogising it to the vested right theory. 
16 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen (n 4). 
17 ibid 52. 
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Solving the problem 
 
In addressing the issues raised above, this thesis is intended to offer a different 
perspective to the study of the scope and functioning of the principle of equal 
treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions. The 
main claim of this thesis is that in the context of the determination of the law 
applicable to a cross-border relationship the principle of equal treatment only 
functions as an additional check on the operation of otherwise applicable 
substantive and choice-of-law rules.18 In other words, the effect of the principle of 
equal treatment on the applicable law is best described from a qualitative point of 
view. Even though in light of the principle of equal treatment only rules that are 
non-discriminatory on grounds of nationality and movement can be applied to a 
cross-border relationship in the Union, the principle of equal treatment itself, 
however, does not explicitly or implicitly determine the applicable law in the 
sense understood from a choice-of-law perspective. In contrast to a choice-of-law 
rule, the principle of equal treatment does not embody a reference to a particular 
national law that always becomes applicable whenever one has recourse to it. 
Although this might seem obvious to an EU scholar, it is necessary to emphasise 
that the mere requirement under the principle of equal treatment that only rules 
non-discriminatory in nature and effect can be applicable in the Union does not, 
even indirectly, address the question of what law is governing a given cross-
border relationship. Instead, looking at how it operates in practice, the principle of 
                                                 
18 The term ‘check on the operation of rules’ is borrowed from Joost Blom, ‘Public Policy in 
Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time’ (2003) 50 Netherlands International Law 
Review 373, 374. 
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equal treatment is confined to the scrutiny of rules the applicability of which is 
already known or has already been determined.  
 
In this respect, it is argued that the national substantive law applicable pursuant to 
a choice-of-law rule or a choice-of-law clause agreed by private parties could be 
subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. Unless it is objective 
justified, the otherwise applicable national substantive law would not be applied if 
found to be discriminatory in nature or effect. The fact that it is applicable in 
accordance with a choice-of-law rule or a choice-of-law clause agreed by private 
parties is hardly likely to play any role in the justification process.  
 
As far as national choice-of-law rules are concerned, I point out that any possible 
difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law imposed in light of them is 
not contrary to principle of equal treatment, if nationality or territoriality they are 
usually based upon is merely used as a neutral connecting factor to determine the 
governing law. Otherwise, a national choice-of-law rule based on either of these 
connecting factors could be found to be incompatible with the principle of equal 
treatment and, therefore, would require objective justification. 
 
As regards Union choice-of-law rules, in particular those adopted under Article 81 
TFEU, any possible difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law 
imposed in light of them is more likely to trigger the principle of equal treatment 
on grounds of movement rather than nationality. This is because of the single 
neutral connecting factors they are based upon. Those who have exercised the 
Treaty free movement rights, for instance, might be put at a disadvantage in light 
11 
 
of the law applicable pursuant to these choice-of-law rules. In this respect, 
however, it is argued that the aim of Union choice-of-law rules adopted under 
Article 81 TFEU in ensuring certainty over the applicable law and predictability 
of litigation in the context of cross-border relationships between private parties 
should be considered if not given effect as a sufficient ground for objective 
justification.  
 
Laying out the structure 
 
This thesis is structured in four chapters.  
 
Chapter I – Applicable national substantive law 
 
In the first chapter, I start with a brief overview of choice-of-law rules applicable 
in the Union context. This part primarily serves the aim of establishing the basis 
for the subsequent analysis of the interaction between choice-of-law rules and the 
principle of equal treatment.  
 
I then examine the scrutiny of the designated national substantive law under the 
principle of equal treatment. In this respect, I argue that if that law imposes 
discriminatory treatment, it cannot be applied in light of the principle of equal 
treatment, unless it is objectively justified. The fact that the national substantive 
law is designated by a national or Union choice-of-law rule would not make any 
difference in this respect. This is because the issue in the present context concerns 
the compliance of the national substantive law itself with the principle of equal 
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treatment. A national or Union choice-of-law rule declares a particular national 
substantive law as applicable, but it does not ensure its automatic compliance with 
the principle of equal treatment.  In other words, it does not provide immunity of 
the designated national substantive law from scrutiny under the principle of equal 
treatment. 
 
Further, I consider the possible ground a forum-court could rely upon to invoke 
the principle of equal treatment against the application of the designated national 
substantive rule. In this respect, I first compare the effect of the principle of equal 
treatment with that of mandatory rules and the public policy exception. The aim, 
here, is to find out whether the principle of equal treatment could be applied by a 
forum court as being either of them. 
 
From a choice-of-law perspective, mandatory rules and the public policy 
exception are known as principles that provide grounds to deviate from the 
traditional method of identifying the law governing a cross-border relationship. 
Even though similar to the principle of equal treatment they also confront the 
application of the designated national substantive law, I argue that mandatory 
rules and the public policy exception, in essence, produce different outcomes. 
Mandatory rules replace or override the rules of the law applicable by virtue of a 
choice-of-law rule or chosen by private parties. In this regard, they provide 
different substantive solutions that reflect state policies or certain social, 
economic and political interests inherent in them. In case of the public policy 
exception, rejecting the otherwise applicable national substantive law, in turn, 
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usually leads to the application of the law of the forum (lex fori). None of these, 
however, could be said about the principle of equal treatment. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact the principle of equal treatment cannot be compared to 
mandatory rules or the public policy exception, I argue that a forum court may 
and is even obliged to give effect to it pursuant to the Union public policy 
exception. The latter, though not distinctly, is enshrined in Union secondary 
legislation unifying choice-of-law rules under Article 81 TFEU and essentially 
derives from the obligation of loyal cooperation under Article 4 TEU. In this way, 
thus, not only the law of the forum, but also that of another Member State could 
be scrutinised by a forum court in light of the principle of equal treatment. Having 
said that, I also point out that the possible assessment of the compatibility of the 
law of a Member State by a forum court sitting in another Member State does not 
seem straightforward enough. In particular, in as much as this ensures the 
compliance with Union law and aims to provide justice in the context of cross-
border relationships between private parties, this could be problematic considering 
the possible lack of knowledge and expertise of a forum court in the law of that 
Member State. A probable solution in this respect appears to be the possibility of 
a forum court to initiate a preliminary ruling procedure. However, as I point out, 
this only seems to be effective, if the Court adopts a less restrictive and more 
lenient approach. 
Chapter II - Choice-of-law rules 
 
In the second chapter, I explore the relationship between the principle of equal 
treatment and choice-of-law rules themselves. I first argue that choice-of-law 
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rules also fall within the scope of the principle of equal treatment. I demonstrate 
that the specific nature and objective of these rules do not play a role in this 
respect, since rules are scrutinised in light of the principle of equal treatment 
essentially because of their effect on free movement in the Union. 
 
National choice-of-law rules 
 
I then turn to the question whether the application of choice-of-law rules could 
actually be caught by the principle of equal treatment. I start with national choice-
of-law rules with first focusing on those that are based on nationality as a 
connecting factor. Here, my main argument is that a difference in treatment in 
terms of the applicable law imposed on grounds of nationality would not be 
incompatible with the principle of equal treatment and, therefore, require 
objective justification, as long as nationality is merely used as a neutral 
connecting factor to determine the applicable law. This, for instance, would not be 
the case in two situations. First, as the careful analysis of Garcia Avello, 
Boukhalfa and Hoorn demonstrates, this is when the use of nationality, in fact, 
leads to a preference given to one nationality over the other. Unless it is 
objectively justified, any possible difference in treatment in terms of the 
applicable law in this context is likely to be caught by the principle of equal 
treatment. Second, it also seems to be discriminatory, if a Member State, where 
nationality is used as a primary connecting factor, for instance, refuses as regards 
the same matter to give effect to habitual residence, which in turn is used as a 
primary connecting factor in another Member State. In this context, I agree with 
the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Grunkin Paul that in light of the 
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principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement, in certain circumstances 
falling within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions, Member States 
are required to give equal weight to nationality and habitual residence as 
connecting factors to determine the law applicable to the same matter.19 
 
In a similar way, I then examine whether national choice-of-law rules that are 
based on territoriality as a connecting factor could be caught by the principle of 
equal treatment. In this respect, I focus on the use of a company’s ‘real seat’ as a 
connecting factor, which was at issue, for instance, in Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art. According to this connecting factor, the law applicable to a company, 
in particular the matters related to its existence and legal status, is the law of the 
place where its head office or central management is located.20 Relying on the 
Court’s rulings, on the one hand, in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, and in 
Daily Mail and Cartesio, on the other hand, I first point out that it is compatible 
with Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, if a Member State merely uses ‘real seat’ as a 
connecting factor to determine whether a company is established under its law. 
Second, based on this connecting factor, a Member State can also refuse to permit 
a company to retain the status of being established under its law, if it intends to 
move its seat to another Member State. I argue, however, that it is discriminatory 
contrary to Articles 49 and 54 TFEU if a Member State refuses to recognise the 
legal capacity of a company established under the law of another Member State 
based on the place of incorporation as a connecting factor. Similarly, in light of 
Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, a Member State cannot impose any additional 
requirements on such a company, if it has its seat or branch on its territory, unless 
                                                 
19 Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR 
I-7639, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston. 
20 Robert R Drury, ‘Migrating Companies’ (1999) 24 European Law Review 354, 356. 
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there are objectively justified. Similar to the previous part, I conclude that in 
circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, a Member 
State should give equal weight to the place of incorporation and ‘real seat’ as 
connecting factors in the determination of the legal capacity of a company. 
 
Union choice-of-law rules 
 
Further, in this chapter, I look at whether the application of Union choice-of-law 
rules could also be in conflict with the principle of equal treatment. My analysis, 
here, is centred on Bosmann, where the Court found that the lex loci laboris rule, 
the main choice-of-law rule under Regulation 1408/71,21 could not be applied if it 
put migrant workers at a disadvantage by depriving them the right to social 
security benefits or having the amount of these benefits reduced. One could 
certainly be sceptical about any general impact of this finding on the role of the 
lex loci laboris rule. At the same time, however, I argue that Bosmann seems to 
extend the requirement of equal treatment on grounds of movement and the 
‘binary’22 approach with regard to choice-of-law rules under Regulation 1408/71 
(now Regulation 883/2004). 
 
                                                 
21 Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-
employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 
149/2. It has been replaced and repealed Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
22 Eleanor Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union -Barriers to movement in 
their constitutional context (Kluwer Law International 2007) 140. See also Eleanor Spaventa, ‘The 
impact of Articles 12, 18, 39 and 43 of the EC Treaty on the coordination of social security 
system’ in Yves Jorens (ed.), 50 years of Social Security Coordination Past – Present – Future 
(Report of the conference celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the European Coordination of Social 
Security, European Commission, 2009), 118 <ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5338&Lang 
Id=en> accessed 19 September 2011. It has so far been applied in the context of Union citizenship 
and health care cases; 22 Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the (non-) 
English patient: A double-bill on residency rights under Article 18 EC’ (2003) 28 European Law 
Review 699. 
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Relying on this, I query whether this could also concern Union choice-of-law 
rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU, under which the Union legislator is 
provided with an express competence to deal with choice-of-law matters. In 
particular, the question here is whether a difference in treatment in terms of the 
applicable law imposed by these rules could be contrary to the principle of equal 
treatment on grounds of movement and required to be set aside in so far as a 
particular case is concerned.23 In this respect, I argue that a different approach 
should be adopted as regards these rules. I explain this by the fact that subjecting 
them to the principle of equal treatment does not sit well with their aim, which is 
to guarantee certainty over the applicable law and predictability of litigation. 
There is a risk that this aim could be jeopardised, if these rules are required to be 
set aside in light of the principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement. Any 
possible disadvantage arising as a result of the application of these choice-of-law 
rules cannot be excluded. However, I argue that the importance of certainty over 
the applicable law and predictability of litigation in the context of cross-border 
contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships warrants the aim of 
Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU to be considered and 
even taken as a ground for objective justification of such a disadvantage. 
 
Chapter III – Principle of party autonomy 
 
In the third chapter, I focus on the possible role of the principle of party autonomy 
in the context of scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. I first look at the 
                                                 
23 Here, I only focus on the principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement. This is because 
of the neutral connecting factors Union choice-of-law rules under Article 81 TFEU are based 
upon, it is less likely that they could result in direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. 
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rationale behind the principle of party autonomy, its place in the Union legal order 
and limitations attached to it under Union secondary legislation. 
 
I then explore the relationship between the principle of party autonomy and the 
principle of equal treatment. In contrast to the ordo-liberal approach, in this 
chapter I argue that the party autonomy principle, in particular the discretion 
available to private parties to set aside national rules by choosing the governing 
law, does not appear to affect scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment.  
 
For this purpose, I outline three scenarios that might occur in a contractual 
context.24 First, two private parties established in Member States A and B can 
choose the law of Member State B as the governing law. Suppose that the party 
established in Member State A supplies goods or provides services to the party 
established in Member State B. Second, the same parties can opt for the law of a 
third Member State. And finally, two private parties established in the same 
Member State can choose the law of a third Member State to govern their 
contract. 
 
I point out that in light of Article 3 (4) of the Rome I Regulation, the principle of 
equal treatment could be, at least theoretically, applied in all three scenarios, 
including the third one.25 However, only in the first scenario, a rule part of the 
chosen law is most likely to be found to be discriminatory contrary to Articles 34 
                                                 
24 I have included three schemes to better illustrate these scenarios. 
25 According to this provision, ‘if all other elements relevant to the situation are located in one or 
more Member States, the choice of the applicable law of the country other than that of a Member 
State shall not prejudice the application of the provisions of Union law, where appropriate as 
implemented in the Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by an 
agreement’. 
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or 56 TFEU. This is hardly likely to occur in the second and third scenarios, 
considering the remoteness of a link between the contract at issue and the third 
Member State. This is because of the absence of the exercise of the freedoms 
under Articles 34 or 56 TFEU involving the territory of that Member State. 
 
Mandatory rules  
 
In the context of the first scenario, thus, I first consider rules of the chosen law 
that are mandatory in an inter-State context. These are national rules that can 
apply to a given cross-border relationship on their own terms, irrespective of, for 
instance, the law designated by a choice-of-law rule. I argue that these rules are 
subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment and cannot be applied if 
they are discriminatory, for instance, against the party established in Member 
State A. I point out that this outcome would not be any different, if these rules are 
part of the law chosen by private parties. This is because they are mandatory in an 
inter-State context and, therefore, would apply to a contract even without a 
choice-of-law clause agreed by private parties. 
 
Default rules 
 
In the same vein, in the context of the first scenario, I then examine national rules 
that are not mandatory in an inter-State context.  These are, for instance, default 
rules that are applicable to a given contract only if they are part of the national law 
designated by a choice-of-law rule or that chosen by private parties. Therefore, 
unlike national rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context, default rules do 
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not apply on their own terms. More importantly, private parties to a contract are 
free to exclude the applicability of default rules of the chosen law by replacing 
them with specific contractual terms instead. Because of that, private parties have 
more discretion over the scope of default rules that are part of the chosen law. 
 
I first point out that default rules of the chosen law can also come within the scope 
of the principle of equal treatment, provided that they fall within the Treaty. The 
discretion of private parties over the scope of these rules does not seem to play a 
role in mere finding their discriminatory effect. Similarly, the fact that private 
parties are free to opt out of a default rule of the chosen law but have not done so 
does not appear to be a sufficient ground to apply that rule when it is 
discriminatory contrary to Articles 34 or 56 TFEU. Private parties are certainly 
bound by a choice-of-law clause and any other contractual arrangement. However, 
I argue, first, that not opting out of a default rule might not always indicate the 
actual intention of the parties to a contract. Second, the issue of the compatibility 
of a default rule might arise at a later stage, in which case it would be inconsistent 
with the internal market rationale not to allow a party to raise this matter before a 
forum court, regardless of the discretion it enjoys over its scope. I conclude that 
this line of argumentation does not seem to be affected by the Court’s obiter 
dictum in Alsthom Atlantique,26 considering the fact that the case concerned 
Article 35 TFEU and the obiter dictum has not been reiterated by the Court as 
regards other Treaty free movement provisions. 
 
 
                                                 
26 The Court held that parties to an international contract of sale were generally free to determine 
the law applicable to their contractual relationship and could therefore avoid being subject to the 
national law at issue. 
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Contractual term 
 
To shed further light on the role of the discretion available to private parties, I 
then consider the relationship between a contractual term and the principle of 
equal treatment. I start with the analysis of the horizontal direct effect of the 
Treaty free movement provisions. I argue that even a contractual term agreed 
between private parties could be subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal 
treatment laid down in Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU, which could possibly 
produce a horizontal direct effect.27 As I point out, however, this could only occur 
if there are factors that limit the exercise of contractual freedom available to 
private parties. First, this could be the case when the discriminated party to a 
contract that agreed a given contractual term is in a relatively weaker bargaining 
position within a contractual relationship. Second, it could also be that the 
discriminated party to a contract has to agree a given contractual term, because 
either the other party, which is imposing it, is in a monopolistic position or such a 
contractual term is a common practice within a specific market.28 These two 
factors are obviously interlinked. I conclude that in their absence contractual 
freedom itself appears to be an effective means to deal with any disadvantages 
that could be otherwise imposed in a contractual context. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Unlike Article 34 TFEU, a horizontal direct effect seems possible in the context these Treaty 
free movement provisions. 
28 Michael Schillig, ‘The Interpretation of European Private Law in light of Market Freedoms and 
EU Fundamental Rights’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 285, 
300. 
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Chapter IV – Is it an implicit choice-of-law rule? 
 
In the forth chapter, I aim to clarify whether the effect produced by the principle 
of equal treatment could be in any way compared to that of a choice-of-law rule. I 
point out that in contrast to a choice-of-law rule the principle of equal treatment 
does not explicitly or implicitly determine the law governing a cross-border 
relationship. To demonstrate that, I analyse the functioning of the principle of 
equal treatment in three different contexts. I start by looking at the situations 
where those coming from other Member States are deprived of advantages 
available to their in-state equivalents, then turning to double burden situations. In 
this respect, I argue that the principle of equal treatment only opposes the 
application of the discriminatory rule of a Member State. It itself does not, even 
indirectly, lead to the application of the law of another Member State.  
 
I then examine the effect of the principle of equal treatment in the context of 
Garcia Avello, Bosmann and Boukhalfa, where a choice-of-law rule itself is either 
subject to or involved in scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. In this 
respect, I argue that in all three cases the principle of equal treatment certainly has 
an impact on to what national law a given cross-border relationship should be 
subject, but only in Boukhalfa the application of the principle of equal treatment 
led to the substitution of the otherwise applicable national law. But this, as I point 
out, does not appear to be sufficient to compare the effect produced by the 
principle of equal treatment to that of a choice-of-law rule, considering the 
specific national choice-of-law rule and, more importantly, the factual 
circumstances involved in Boukhalfa. 
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The overall conclusion of this thesis is that in the context of the determination of 
the law governing a cross-border relationship, the principle of equal treatment 
only functions as an additional check on the operation of otherwise applicable 
substantive and choice-of-law rules, both of which if found to be discriminatory 
would not be applied, unless there are objectively justified. The principle of equal 
treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions does 
not, even implicitly, create an opening for the application of the law of a Member 
State. This is because, in contrast to a choice-of-law rule, it in essence does not 
contain a reference to a particular national substantive law that always becomes 
applicable whenever one has recourse to it. 
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Chapter I  
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT AND THE DESIGNATED LAW 
 
Given their divergent objectives, a choice-of-law rule could be at odds with the 
principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free 
movement provisions.1 In particular, the designated national substantive law, for 
                                                 
1 Article 18 TFEU enshrines the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. In 
particular, it provides that ‘within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to 
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited’. The term ‘any specific provisions’ refers to, for instance, Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU 
that embody the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality in the context of free 
movement of persons. The general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality under 
Article 18 TFEU only applies when the issue at hand does not fall within the scope of these Treaty 
provisions. See in this respect Case 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR I-1461, 
para 13; Case C-10/90 Maria Masgio v Bundesknappschaft [1991] ECR I-1119, para 13; Case C-
379/92 Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 18; Case C-1/93 
Halliburton Services BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1994] ECR I-1137 , para 12; Case C-
176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castor Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des 
sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR I-2681, para 37; Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2651, para 20; Case C-251/98 C. 
Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem [2000] ECR I-2787, 
para 23; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others (C-397/98), 
Hoechst AG and Hoechst (UK) Ltd (C-410/98) v Commissioners of Inland Revenue and HM 
Attorney General [2001] ECR I-1727, para 38; Case C-422/01 Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia 
(publ) and Ola Ramstedt v Riksskatteverket [2003] ECR I-6817, para 61; Case C-443/06 Erika 
Waltraud Ilse Hollmann v Fazenda Pública [2007] ECR I-8491, para 28; Case C-105/07 Lammers 
& Van Cleeff NV v Belgische Staat [2008] ECR I-173, para 14; Case C-311/08 Société de Gestion 
Industrielle (SGI) v État belge [2010] ECR I-487, para 31. In other words, the relationship 
between, on the one hand, the principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and, on the 
other hand, the Treaty free movement provisions is based on the principle of lex specialis derogat 
lex generalis. See in this respect Anthony Arnull, The European Union and Its Court of Justice 
(Oxford University Press 1999) 202; A P van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the 
European Union: Cross-border Access to Public Benefits (Hart Publishing 2003) 69; Pasquale 
Pistone, The Impact of Community Law on Tax Treaties: Issues and Solutions (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 22. This means that when the Treaty free movement provisions are not 
applicable, an individual can still rely on Article 18 TFEU, provided that a situation falls within 
the scope of the Treaty. See eg Case C-411/98 Angelo Ferlini v Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg 
[2000] ECR I-8081, para 46-47. However, if a national rule is contrary to the principle of equal 
treatment under the Treaty free movement provisions, it is also considered to be contrary to Article 
18 TFEU. See in this respect Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, para 
19; Case 90/76 S.r.l. Ufficio Henry van Ameyde v S.r.l. Ufficio central italiano di assistenza 
assicurativa automobilisti in circolazione internazionale (UCI) [1977] ECR 1091, para 27; Case 
305/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR I-1461, para 12. In a similar way, if a 
national rule is compatible with the principle of equal treatment under the Treaty free movement 
provisions, it is also considered to be compatible with Article 18 TFEU. See in this respect Case 
C-326/92 Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Patricia Im- und Export 
Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI Electrola GmbH [1993] ECR I-
5145, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para 13.  
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instance, could be subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. In 
this context, it is necessary to clarify whether the fact that the law at issue is 
applicable to a cross-border relationship pursuant to a choice-of-law rule could 
make any difference in its scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment and, in 
particular, whether this could play any role in its justification. Furthermore, it is 
not clear as to how a forum court would be able to invoke the principle of equal 
treatment against the application of the designated national substantive rule. 
Generally, from a conflict of laws perspective, a forum court can refuse to apply 
the designated national substantive law, if it is contrary, on the one hand, to the 
mandatory rules or public policy of the forum, and on the other hand, to the 
mandatory rules of the country, to which the cross-border relationship at issue is 
linked. In this context, one might question whether from a choice-of-law 
perspective the principle of equal treatment could be in any way compared to a 
mandatory rule or the public policy exception and, therefore, applied as being 
either of them.2 If the answer is in the negative, what are the grounds for a forum 
court to give effect to the principle of equal treatment against the application of 
the designated national substantive rule and what are the problems that might 
arise in this regard? 
 
In this chapter, I will start with an overview of choice-of-law rules that are 
applicable in the Union context and their specific nature.3 This part will primarily 
                                                 
2 I focus on mandatory rules and the public policy exception because Union secondary legislation 
that enshrines unified choice-of-law rules does not contain a clear-cut provision that requires a 
forum court sitting in a Member State to apply Union primary law. One could certainly mention 
Article 3 (4) of the Rome I Regulation, which, however, is confined to the law chosen by private 
parties to a cross-border contractual relationship. In addition, there is also Preamble 35 of the 
Rome II Regulation and Preamble 40 of the Rome I Regulation. They, however, seem to concern 
other relevant Union secondary legislation.  
3 I will also mention choice-of-law rules of international origin applicable in the Union context in 
order to emphasise the importance of the unification of choice-of-law rules at Union level. 
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serve the aim of establishing the basis for the subsequent analysis of the 
interaction between choice-of-law rules and the principle of equal treatment. I will 
then discuss the possible role of choice-of-law rules in the context of the scrutiny 
of the designated national substantive law under the principle of equal treatment. 
For this purpose, I will look at the approach taken by the Court in the cases where 
national rules usually applicable pursuant to a choice-of-law rule are scrutinised in 
light of Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. In the final part, 
I will provide a comparative analysis of the principle of equal treatment with 
mandatory rules and the public policy exception. Having argued that the principle 
of equal treatment substantially differs from a mandatory rule and the public 
policy exception, I will look at other grounds based on which a forum court can 
invoke the principle of equal treatment against the application of the designated 
national substantive law. 
 
1. Choice-of-law rules in the Union 
 
The exercise of the Treaty free movement rights involves entering into 
contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships linked to more than 
one national legal system. For instance, a branch situated in a Member State of a 
bank incorporated in another Member State can offer banking services to a 
customer who is employed in a third Member State but resident in a fourth 
Member State. Such a cross-border relationship between private parties can 
theoretically be subject to each of the national legal systems it is linked to. 
However, because of the difference in substance between them, the simultaneous 
                                                                                                                                     
However, my analysis in this chapter and throughout this thesis will concern national and Union 
choice-of-law rules. This is mainly due to the fact that choice-of-law rules that are enshrined in 
international conventions are not ratified or in force in majority of Member States. 
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application of the law of each State to the same factual background might 
contradict each other yielding conflicting results.4 Thus, their cumulative 
application is often impossible,5 which, in turn, raises the question of what 
national law is applicable to a given cross-border relationship. Choice-of-law 
rules aim to provide a solution in this respect. These rules designate the applicable 
national substantive law. In this way, they determine the territorial and personal 
limitations of national substantive rules.6 As far as matters of substance are 
concerned, choice-of-law rules are indifferent in nature, meaning that they 
themselves do not provide any substantive solutions.7 The latter, in turn, is dealt 
by the designated national substantive law. In a contractual context, for instance, a 
choice-of-law rule does not address any substantive issues related to a contract, 
for instance its validity or the rights of contracting parties. The rule only 
determines the national substantive rules regulating these matters. 
 
Choice-of-law rules operate based on so-called connecting factors, which link a 
given judicial category to a particular national substantive law.8 The most 
important connecting factors are nationality and territoriality.9 Choice-of-law 
rules based on nationality as a connecting factor mainly apply to matters of 
                                                 
4 J Georges Sauveplane, ‘Renvoi’ in Ulrich Drobnig and Konrad Zweigert (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Instalment 26 ( Mohr Siebeck 1990) 12; Mireille van Eechoud 
(n 2) 106. 
5 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and the 
Exception of Mutual Recognition’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 46. 
6 Kurt Lipstein, Principles of the Conflict of Laws: National and International (Martinus Nijhoff 
1981) 93. 
7 Frank Vischer, ‘General Course on Private International Law’ (1992) 232 Recueil des Cours 9, 
23; Th M de Boer, ‘Facultative Choice of Law. The Procedural Status of Choice-of-Law Rules and 
Foreign Law’ (1996) 257 Recueil des Cours 223, 239. 
8 Lawrence Collins, C G J Morse, David McClean and Others (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
the Conflict of laws (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 33. 
9 Ralf Michaels, ‘The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution: Lessons for the United States?’ 
(2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607, 1615. 
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personal status, family and succession.10 With regard to other matters, choice-of-
law rules predominantly operate based on territoriality. This means that the 
regulation of a particular judicial category is allocated to a national substantive 
law based on its location. In this respect, for instance, among others, one could 
mention choice-of-law rules that refer to the place of employment, the place of a 
company’s establishment, the place where an immovable property is located or 
the place where a disputed event takes place. 
 
Prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, the areas of choice-of-law rules and internal 
market were quite separate.11 Although, the original EC Treaty introduced the free 
movement provisions in order to foster private activities across the borders of 
Member States, it did not touch upon any choice-of-law issues.12 Each Member 
State had its own set of choice-of-law rules which, based on different principles, 
provided different solutions with regard to the regulation of cross-border 
relationships.13 There were also choice-of-law rules embodied in international 
conventions adopted by international organisations, such as the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law.14 The Conference has adopted several conventions, 
                                                 
10 Johan Meeusen, ‘Instrumentalisation of Private International Law in the European Union: 
Towards a European Conflicts Revolution?’ (2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 
287, 291; See also Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law 
(Europa Law Publishing 2006) 23. 
11 Katharina Boele-Woelki and Ronald H van Ooik, ‘The Communitarization of Private 
International Law’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 1, 2; See also Oliver Remien, 
‘European Private International Law, the European Union and its Emerging Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 53, 53. 
12 Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 687, 687; Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Conflict of Laws 
and the European Economic Union’ (1966-1967) 15 American Journal of Comparative Law 204, 
204. 
13 Gülüm Bayraktaroğlu, ‘Harmonization of Private International Law at Different Levels: 
Communitarization v. International Harmonization’ (2003) 5 European Journal of Law Reform 
127, 131. 
14 See also international conventions adopted by UNCITRAL: 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG); 1974 United Nations on the Limitations 
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which enshrine unified choice-of-law rules with respect to various areas including 
the international sale of goods, protection of children, traffic accidents, 
maintenance obligations and child abduction.15 For instance, with regard to non-
contractual liability arising from traffic accidents, the applicable national 
substantive law is the law of the country where the accidents occurs.16 Similarly, 
the liability of manufacturers and other persons for damages caused by a product 
is determined by the law of the place of injury.17 
 
Such unification of choice-of-law rules has always been necessary due to the 
problem arising as a result of the application of divergent national choice-of-law 
rules. In light of it, the same cross-border relationship could be subject to different 
national substantive laws. In other words, the applicable national substantive law 
might vary depending on a forum court seised with a case. Unified choice-of-law 
rules would provide a solution in this respect by ensuring that a given cross-
border relationship is subject to the same national substantive law irrespective of 
the forum.18 However, the international unification of national choice-of-law rules 
has had a limited effect, since the applicability of these rules is very much 
                                                                                                                                     
Period in the International Sale of Goods; 1974 United Nation Convention on the Limitation 
Period in the International Sale of Goods. 
15 See 1955 Convention on the law applicable to international sales of goods; 1996 Convention on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and co-operation in respect of parental 
responsibility and measure for the protection of children; 1971 Convention on the law applicable 
to traffic accidents; 1973 Convention on the law applicable to maintenance obligations; 1980 
Convention on the civil aspect of international child abduction. One should keep in mind however 
that not all Member States have ratified these conventions. 
16 See Article 3 of 1971 Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents. The Member States 
which have ratified the Convention are France, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Spain. 
17 See Article 4 of 1973 Convention on the law applicable to products liability. This choice-of-law 
rule applies if the law of the place of injury is also the place of the habitual residence of the person 
directly suffering damage; the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable or the 
place where the products were acquired by the person directly suffering damage. Only four 
Member States (Finland, France, Luxembourg and Spain) have ratified this convention. 
18 Peter M North and James J Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International law 
(Butterworth’s 1999) 11. 
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dependant on the ratification of the international conventions that embody them. 
Thus, whether a particular internationally unified choice-of-law rule applies to a 
cross-border relationship in the Union context would be conditional on the place 
of the forum.  
 
The first step linking the areas of choice-of-law rules and internal market was the 
adoption of the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations.19 The Convention established a set of uniform choice-of-law rules 
that determined the national substantive law applicable with regard to contractual 
obligations.20 Besides the Rome Convention, the two areas have also been linked 
by a number of uniform choice-of-law rules contained in various Regulations and 
Directives.21  
 
A crucial step towards the unification of national choice-of-law rules was made 
with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty. The changes brought about by it 
heralded a new era with regard to the place of choice-of-law rules in the Union 
                                                 
19 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to the contractual obligations [1998] OJ C 027. 
20 Conor Quigley, European Union Contract Law: the Effect of EC Legislation on Contractual 
Rights, Obligations and Remedies, vol 1 (Kluwer Law International 1997) 5. The Convention was 
an inter-State agreement and did not have the status of a Union legislative instrument. See in this 
respect, S M Nott, ‘For Better or Worse? The Europeanisation of the Conflict of Laws’ (2002) 24 
Liverpool Law Review 3, 4. This could be explained by the absence of a legal basis in the EEC 
Treaty at that time with regard to choice-of-law matters. See in this respect, Paul Beaumont, 
‘European Court of Justice and Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ (1999) 48 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 206, 228-229. 
21 Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 095/29; 
Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the 
protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the 
right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis [1994] OJ L 280/83; Directive 1999/44/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associate guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12. These Directives provide protection 
to the consumer in case the law of a non-Member State is specified as the law applicable to a 
contract. See also Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1 that has replaced and 
repealed Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to 
self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ 
L 149/2. 
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legal order. The new Title IV of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 65 EC, for the 
first time expressly empowered the then Community legislator to deal with 
choice-of-law matters.22 Currently, under Article 81 TFEU that has replaced 
Article 65 EC, in order to develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having 
cross-border implications, 
 
the European Parliament and the Council (...) shall adopt measures, 
particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market, aimed at ensuring (...) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the 
Member States concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction. 
  
Based on this Treaty provision, a number of Regulations enshrining unified 
choice-of-law rules have so far been adopted: the Rome I Regulation that replaced 
the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations;23 the Rome 
II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations;24 the 
Regulation on maintenance obligations;25 and the Rome III Regulation on the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation.26 
 
The introduction of Article 81 TFEU has opened up the possibility to address at 
Union level the problem arising as a result of the application of divergent national 
choice-of-law rules. A good example, here, is the choice-of-law rule applicable 
with regard to a tort or delict. Prior to the adoption of the Rome II Regulation, in 
                                                 
22 Ulrich Drobnig, ‘European Private International Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
Perspectives for the Next Decade’ (2000) 11 King’s College Law Journal 190, 190. 
23 Regulation 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II Regulation’) [2007] OJ L 199/40.  
24 Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I Regulation’) [2008] OJ L 177/6. 
25 Regulation 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ 
L7/1. 
26 Regulation 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (‘Rome III Regulation’) [2010] OJ L 343/10. 
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most Member States the national substantive law regulating issues related to a tort 
or delict was determined pursuant to the lex loci delicti commissi rule, i.e. the 
choice-of-law rule referring to the law of the place where the harmful act was 
committed.27 However, the interpretation of this rule varied from Member State to 
Member State. In some, the term ‘place where the harmful act was committed’ 
referred to the place where the causal event took place, while in others, it meant 
the place where the damage arose.28 In addition, in some cases, it was left for a 
forum court or the plaintiff to choose the relevant jurisdiction.29 Such 
interpretations of the same rule in different Member States might affect the 
position of private parties involved in tort situations. It would be difficult to 
foresee what national substantive law would be applied to a tort case, given the 
fact that the use of divergent interpretations of the same rule would lead to the 
application of different national substantive rules. This has been addressed by the 
Union choice-of-law rule that designates the law of the place where the damage 
occurs as the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort/delict (the lex loci damni rule).30 
 
So far choice-of-law rules unified at Union level have been adopted in the form of 
Regulations, which, as is well known, are ‘binding in their entirety and directly 
applicable’31 in Member States. This ensures the uniform and consistent 
application of these rules by national authorities, in particular national courts 
dealing with cross-border relationships. At the same time, however, this does not 
                                                 
27 Willibald Posch, ‘The ‘Draft Regulation Rome II’ in 2004: It Past and Future Perspectives’ 
(2004) 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 129, 140. 
28 Bernhard A Koch, ‘Comparative Report’, in Bernhard A Koch (ed.), Economic Loss caused by 
genetically modified organisms: Liability and Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in 
Non-GM Crops, Tort and Insurance Law 24 (Springer 2008) 637. 
29 ibid, see eg footnotes 230-235 concerning each Member State. 
30 See Article 4.1 of the Rome II Regulation. 
31 Article 288 TFEU. 
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fully guarantee that the problem with the international unification of choice-of-
law rules mentioned above will not occur at Union level. In this respect one could 
mention, for instance, the Rome III Regulation. In contrast to the Rome I and II 
Regulations, the Rome III Regulation has only established an enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation due to 
the lack of unanimity on the Commission’s proposal. Therefore, the Regulation is 
effective amongst the Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation,32 
while national choice-of-law rules remain applicable in others. Furthermore, the 
unification of choice-of-law rules at Union level so far has not involved all areas. 
In those that are not subject to Union harmonised rules, Member States apply their 
own choice-of-law rules. Some are based on the same connecting factors, while 
others vary,33 which means that the problem related to the application of divergent 
choice-of-law rules still remains. In this regard, one could mention, for instance, 
the law applicable to companies (lex societatis), which in some Member States is 
the law of the place where a company is incorporated,34 whilst in others, it is the 
law of the place where a company’s head office or central management is 
located.35 Similarly, the law applicable to names varies from Member State to 
Member State - it is determined based on either nationality or habitual residence.36 
 
                                                 
32 According to Recital 6 of the Preamble to the Rome I Regulation, these are Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, 
Romania and Slovenia. 
33 Gülüm Bayraktaroğlu (n 13) 131. 
34 These are, for instance, United Kingdom, Ireland and Netherlands. 
35 These are, for instance, Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Hungary. With regard to its scrutiny under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, see Case 81/87 The Queen v 
H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc 
[1988] ECR 5483; Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-
1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
(NCC) [2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-9641. 
36 With regard to their scrutiny under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions, 
see Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-353/06 
Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639; Case 
C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien (CJEU, 22 December 2010). 
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2. Scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment 
 
A forum court relying on the relevant choice-of-law rule would determine the 
national substantive law applicable to a cross-border contractual, non-contractual 
or other civil law relationship between private parties. First of all, it is necessary 
to mention that most rules applicable in this respect are usually those of private 
law nature.37 The latter refers to a system of rules that deals with matters, for 
instance, related to contracts, torts and properties in the context of legal 
relationships between private parties.38 These rules are closely connected with the 
Treaty free movement provisions.39 As Rutgers points out, they provide the ‘legal 
infrastructure’ for the exercise of the Treaty free movement rights.40 Without 
them, cross-border activities in the internal market would simply be impossible.41 
Indeed, one can hardly imagine, for instance, the possibility to sell goods, to 
provide services or to hire employees without entering into a contract and rules to 
regulate such contractual relationships.  
 
At the outset, one could have thought that private law rules did not fall within the 
scope of the Treaty free movement provisions. This is because, initially, the 
Treaty free movement provisions were arguably more focused on the elimination 
of barriers to free movement in the internal market, which resulted from the 
                                                 
37 Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Accidental Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Applying, 
Considering, and Adjusting Rules from Different Jurisdictions’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 113, 114. 
38 Holger  Spamann, ‘Choice of Law in a Federal System and an Internal Market’ (2001) 8 Jean 
Monnet Working Papers 24. 
39 Jürgen Basedow, ‘A Common Contract Law for the Common Market’ (1996) 33 Common 
Market Law Review 1169, 1179. 
40 Jacobien W Rutgers, ‘Free Movements and Contract Law’ (2008) 3 European Review of 
Contract Law 474, 475. 
41 Stefan Leible, ‘Fundamental Freedoms and European Contract Law’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed.), 
Constitutional Values and European Contract Law (Kluwer Law International 2008) 65. 
35 
 
application of public and administrative rules of Member States.42 Despite that, 
however, according to the Court’s case-law, private law rules are not subject to 
any special treatment.43 They can also come within the scope of the Treaty free 
movement provisions. In particular, these rules can also be scrutinised under the 
principle of equal treatment laid down under Article 18 TFEU or under the Treaty 
free movement provisions. Unless they are objectively justified, these rules cannot 
be applied, if they impose discriminatory treatment on grounds of either 
nationality or movement – i.e if they put at a disadvantage those who have 
exercised the Treaty free movement rights.44 This derives, as the Court held, from 
the fact that ‘the effectiveness of [Union] law cannot vary according to the various 
                                                 
42 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen (n 5) 46. 
43 See eg Case 22/80 Boussac Saint-Frères SA v Brigitte Gerstenmeier [1980] ECR 3427; Case C-
339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v Compagne de construction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] ECR I-
107; Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantidinis v Stadt Altensteig [1993] ECR I-1191. 
44 Direct discrimination on grounds of nationality occurs when a national of another Member State 
is treated differently in law. See eg Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359; Case 
270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273. Indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality, 
in turn, arises when a rule or measure of a Member State, although based apparently on a neutral 
criterion, bears (or likely to bear) more heavily on a national of another Member State. See eg 
Case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153; Case 39/75 Robert-
Gerardus Coenen and Others v Sociaal-Economische Raad [1975] ECR 1547; Joined Cases 62 
and 63/81 Société anonyme de droit français Seco et Société anonyme de droit français Desquenne 
& Giral v Etablissement d'assurance contre la vieillesse et l'invalidité [1982] ECR 223; Case C-
237/94 John O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617. As regards companies, ‘their 
registered office (...) serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular state, like 
nationality in the case of natural persons’. See in this respect Case 270/83 Commission v France 
[1986] ECR 273, para 18; Case C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte 
Commerzbank AG [1993] ECR 4017, para 13; Case C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc 
(ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) [1998] ECR I-4695, para 20; Case 
C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2651, para 
23; Case C-141/99 Algemene Maatschappij voor Investering en Dienstverlening NV (AMID) v 
Belgische Staat [2000] ECR I-11619, para 20. The notion of indirect discrimination is also 
codified in Union secondary legislation. For instance, Article 2 of Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 
June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22 states that ‘indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where 
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin 
at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons’. Similarly, Article 2 of Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16 provides that ‘indirect discrimination shall be 
taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons 
having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual 
orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons’. 
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branches of national law which it may affect’.45 The scope of Union law cannot 
depend on the nature of a national rule or its domestic qualification.46 It is the 
effect of a particular rule on free movement in the Union that brings it within the 
scope of the principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty 
free movement provisions.47 
 
Now, in this context, one might also question whether the scrutiny of national 
private law rules under the principle of equal treatment could be affected by the 
fact that the scope of these rules as regards a given cross-border relationship is 
determined by a choice-of-law rule. In particular, it is not clear whether the 
applicability of a discriminatory national private law rule in accordance with a 
choice-of-law rule could play a role in its justification.48 The answer is in the 
                                                 
45 See Case 82/71 Ministère public de Italian Republic v Società agricola industria latter (SAIL) 
[1972] ECR I-119, para 5; Case C-20/92 Anthony Hubbard (Testamentvollstrecker) v Peter 
Hamburger [1993] ECR I-3777, para 19. This also finds support in Case 106/77 Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629, para 17. 
46 Marc Fallon and Stéphanie Francq, ‘Towards Internationally Mandatory Directives for 
Consumer Contract’ in Jürgen Basedow, Isaak Meier, Anton K Schnyder and Others (eds), Private 
International Law: From National Conflicts Rules Towards Harmonization and Unification - 
Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (T.M.C Asser Institute 2000) 172; Jona Israël, European Cross-
Border Insolvency Regulation: a Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings in 
light of a Paradigm of Co-operation and a Comitas Europaea (Intersentia 2005) 100. 
47 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Recent Developments in the Law Governing the Fee Movement of Goods 
in the EC’s Internal Market’ (2006) 1 European Review of Contract Law 90, 90.   
48 A directly discriminatory rule can be justified on the grounds expressly mentioned in Articles 
36, 45 and 52 TFEU, whilst an indirectly discrimination rule can also be justified on the basis of 
the additional open category of mandatory requirements. In the context of free movement of 
goods, see eg  Case 46/76 W. J. G. Bauhuis v Netherlands [1977] ECR 5; Case 120/78 Rewe-
Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649; Case 
34/79 Regina v Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby [1979] ECR 3795; Case 
155/80 Summary proceedings against Sergius Oebel [1981] ECR 1993; Case 95/81 Commission v 
Italy [1982] ECR 2187; Case 238/82 Duphar BV and Others v Netherlands [1984] ECR 523; Case 
229/83 Association des Centres distributeurs Édouard Leclerc and Others v SARL "Au blé vert" 
and Others [1985] ECR 1; Case C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln 
e.V. v Mars GmbH [1995] ECR I-1923. In the context of free movement of workers, see eg Case 
152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153; Case 41/74 Yvonne van 
Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR I-1337; Case 30/77 Régina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 
1999; Case C-237/94 John O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617; Case C-18/95 F.C. 
Terhoeve v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland [1999] 
ECR I-345; Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castor Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v 
Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR I-2681; Case C-
348/96 Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa [1999] ECR I-11. In the context of freedom 
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negative considering the approach taken by the Court in the cases involving this 
type of national rules. 
 
In the context of free movement of goods, one could mention cases concerning 
national advertising and unfair competition rules. Even before the adoption of the 
Rome II Regulation, in most Member States these rules were applied pursuant to 
the choice-of-law rule referring to the law of the marketplace.49  Currently, this is 
one of the choice-of-law rules enshrined in Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation 
with regard to non-contractual obligation arising out of a restriction of 
competition. One of the early cases where the Court was asked to rule on the 
compatibility of a national advertising rule with Article 34 TFEU are, for instance, 
Oosthoek, GB-INNO-BM and Yves Rocher.50 The issue in these cases concerned a 
rule of the Member State of destination that banned certain advertising strategies 
which, however, were allowed in the Member State of origin. The Court found 
that a national rule restricting or prohibiting certain form of advertising and 
certain means of sales promotion could affect imports between Member States, 
                                                                                                                                     
of establishment and services, see eg Case C-484/93 Peter Svensson et Lena Gustavsson v 
Ministre du Logement et de l'Urbanisme [1995] ECR I-3955; Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v 
Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal 
proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard 
Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96) [1999] ECR I-8453; Case C-224/97 Erich 
Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517; Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v 
Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2651; Case C-36/01 Omega Spielhallen- und 
Automatenaufstellungs v Oberbürgermeisterin der Budesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-960; Case C-
451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v Giuseppe Calafiori [2006] ECR I-2941. See 
also Christa Tobler, Indirect Discrimination: a Case Study into the Development of the Legal 
Concept of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law (Intersentia 2005), 316. 
49 Frauke Henning-Bodewig, Unfair Competition Law: European Union and Member States 
(Kluwer Law International 2006) 12. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 may 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) no 2006/2004 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ 
L 149/22 does not contain a provision regarding choice-of-law rules. 
50 Case 286/81 Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 
4575; Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du commerce luxembourgeois [1990] ECR I-
667; Case C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V v Yves Rocher GmbH. 
[1993] ECR I-2361. 
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since it would affect the marketing opportunities available for imported 
products.51 Thus, the Court continued that to compel a producer either to adopt 
advertising or sales promotion schemes which differed from Member State to 
Member State or to discontinue a particular promotion scheme which was 
considered to be particularly effective could constitute an obstacle to imports even 
if the national rule at issue applied to domestic and foreign products without any 
distinction.52 In its reasoning, however, the Court did not touch upon any choice-
of-law matter, even though the national advertising rule found to be contrary to 
Article 34 TFEU was part of the law of the marketplace (i.e. the Member State 
where the advertisement was distributed). 
 
Similarly, the absence of a reference to the relevant choice-of-law rule in the 
reasoning of the Court could also be observed in the context of free movement of 
persons. For instance, in Phil Collins,53 the issue related to the German rule on 
                                                 
51 Case 286/81 Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 
4575, para 15. This was reiterated by the Court in GB-INNO-BM and Yves Rocher (see, para 7 and 
10, respectively). 
52 ibid. This line of reasoning is also reflected in the specific approach developed by the Court in 
Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. See also, Case C-292/92 Ruth Hünermund and Others v 
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-6787; Case C-320/93 Lucien 
Ortscheit GmbH v Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH [1994] ECR I-5243; Case C-391/92 
Commission v Hellenic Republic [1995] ECR I-1621; Case C-387/93 Criminal proceedings 
against Giorgio Domingo Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663; Case C-412/93 Société d'Importation 
Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA [1995] ECR 179; Joined Cases 
C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlang 
AB (C-34/95) and TV-Shop i Severige AB (C-35/95 and C-36/95) [1997] ECR I-3843; Case C-
405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR 
I-1795. Having mentioned Keck, one should keep in mind, however, that in light of the recent 
rulings delivered by the Court there are question marks over whether Keck is still good law. See 
Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519; Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy 
Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273. For the general discussion of these rulings, see 
Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Leaving Keck behind? The free movement of goods after the rulings in 
Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos’ (2009) 34 European Law Review  914; Pal 
Wenneras and Ketil Boe Moen, ‘Selling arrangements, keeping Keck’ (2010) 35 European Law 
Review 387; Jukka Snell, ‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan’ (2010) 47 
Common Market Law Review 437.  
53 Joined Cases 92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mHbH and Patricia 
Im- und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI Electrol a GmbH 
[1993] ECR I-5145. 
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copyright, according to which the scope of copyright protection varied based on 
the nationality of a performer. In particular, in contrast to German performers, 
those from other Member States could not prohibit the non-authorised distribution 
of their performances, which were given abroad.54 Considering the compatibility 
of that rule with Article 18 TFEU, the Court held that a Member State was 
precluded from making the grant of an exclusive right subject to the requirement 
that the person concerned was a national of that State.55 This is because, according 
to the Court, Article 18 TFEU, prohibiting any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, required that persons in situations governed by Union law to be placed 
on a completely equal footing with nationals of the Member State concerned.56 
The German law on copyright was applicable because of the lex loci protectionis 
rule. According to this rule, the law governing copyright and related issues is the 
law of the country where the copyright protection is sought.57 This rule, however, 
was not touched upon by the Court.  
 
This approach of the Court is present not only in cases concerning national 
substantive rules but also in those where national procedural rules are subject to 
                                                 
54 However, with the exception of foreign performing artists who fell under Article 4 of 1961 
Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations. According to this provision, Germany was required to grant foreign performing 
artists the same treatment as its own nationals in respect of performances that took place within the 
territory of another Contracting State of the Convention. In the present case, the Convention was 
not applicable, since the United States had not acceded to the Convention.  
55 Joined Cases 92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Patricia 
Im- und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI Electrola GmbH 
[1993] ECR I-5145, para 32. 
56 ibid. According to the Court, neither the disparities between the national laws relating to the 
protection of copyright and related right nor the fact that not all Member States had yet acceded to 
the 1961 Rome Convention could justify the breach of the principle under Article 18 TFEU (para 
31).This was put forward by the defendants as a ground for the objective justification of the 
disparity in treatment. 
57 In Germany, in the field of copyright and neighbouring rights the applicable law is determined 
according to the law of the place where the copyright protection is sought. See Final Report to the 
Study on Intellectual Property and the Conflict of Laws, (ETD/99/B-3000/E/16, 18 April 2000), 14 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd1999b53000e16_en.pdf’>  
accessed 23 September 2011. 
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scrutiny. It is a well-established principle both in civil and common law systems 
that the applicable rules of procedure are determined pursuant to the law of the 
forum.58 Rules of procedure regulate the manner in which judicial proceedings are 
conducted.59 The compatibility of these rules with the principle of equal treatment 
was raised, for instance, Data Delectra, Hayes and Saldahna.60 The issue in these 
cases concerned the procedural rule of a Member State that required only foreign 
nationals, acting as plaintiffs, to furnish security for costs of judicial proceedings. 
The rule was found by the Court to be contrary to Article 18 TFEU. Here also 
there is no mention of the relevant choice-of-law rule in the reasoning of the 
Court. 
 
Two conclusions could be drawn from the approach adopted by the Court. On the 
one hand, it could be argued that the Court assumes that a given national rule is 
applicable pursuant to the relevant choice-of-law rule and only considers its 
effect.61 On the other hand, more importantly, no interest shown by the Court in 
the choice-of-law aspect seems to demonstrate that in the context of scrutiny 
                                                 
58 Gernot Biehler, Procedures in International Law (Springer 2008) 90; George Panagopoulos, 
‘Substance and Procedure in Private International Law’ (2005) 1 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 69, 69; Janeen M Carruthers, ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of laws: 
A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 53 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 691, 691. 
59 George Panagopoulos (n 58) 71. 
60 Case C-43/95 Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Ronny Forsberg v MSL Dynamics Ltd. [1996] ECR 
I-4661; Case C-323/95 David Charles Hayes and Jeannette Karen Hayes v Kronenberger GmbH 
[1997] ECR I-1711; Case C-122/96 Stephen Austin Saldanha and MTS Securities Corporation v 
Hiross Holding AG [1997] ECR I-5325. See also Case 15/78 Société générale alsacienne de 
banque SA v Walter Koestler [1978] ECR 1971; Case 22/80 Boussac Saint-Frères SA v Brigitte 
Gerstenmeier [1980] ECR 3427; Case C-412/97 ED Srl v Italo Fenocchio [1999] ECR I-3845. 
The issue in the latter case, for instance, concerned the compatibility with principle of equal 
treatment under Article 35 TFEU of the national procedural rule that prohibited the issue of a 
summary payment order to be served outside national territory. The Court held that the rule 
complied with Article 34 TFEU, since ‘the possibility that nationals would therefore hesitate to 
sell goods to purchasers established in other Member States is too uncertain and indirect’. See in 
this respect para 11. 
61 Michel Tison, ‘Unravelling the General Good Exception: The Case of Financial Services’, in 
Mads Andenas and Wulf-Henning Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford 
University Press 2002) 371-372. 
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under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions the reason of the 
applicability of a rule or the mechanism leading to its application is less important 
given its actual effect on free movement in the Union.62 This might certainly be 
due to the fact that a rule is subject to scrutiny because of its substance rather than 
the relevant choice-of-law rule. At the same time, however, the approach taken by 
the Court could also be construed as confirming that the relevant choice-of-law 
rule does not play any role when the designated national substantive rule is per se 
contrary to Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. Indeed, the 
fact that a national substantive rule is applicable to a given cross-border 
relationship pursuant to a choice-of-law rule, regardless  of whether it is national 
or Union choice-of-law rule, cannot exempt it from being subject to scrutiny 
under the principle of equal treatment. In a similar vein, this also cannot be taken 
as a sufficient justifying factor. This is because, a national or Union choice-of-law 
rule declares a national substantive law as applicable, but it does not ensure its 
automatic compliance with the principle of equal treatment. In other words, a 
choice-of-law rule does not provide immunity of the designated national 
substantive law from scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. Otherwise, 
this would lead to an unacceptable result – a rule would easily escape scrutiny 
under the principle of equal treatment, when it is in fact discriminatory in nature 
or effect.  
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Tito Ballarino and Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘On Avello and Other Judgments: A New Point of 
Departure in the Conflicts of Laws’ (2004) 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 84, 102. 
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3. Invoking the principle of equal treatment 
 
In light of the above-mentioned, a forum court sitting in a Member State can 
subject a national rule regulating a cross-border contractual, non-contractual or 
other civil law relationship to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment, 
irrespective of its domestic classification into a rule of private law nature and, in 
particular, its applicability in this context pursuant to the relevant choice-of-law 
rule. What remains unclear, however, is on what basis a forum-court would be 
able to invoke the principle of equal treatment against the application of the 
designated national substantive rule.  
 
From a conflict of laws perspective, the applicability of the national substantive 
law designated by a choice-of-law rule is not without exception. Mandatory rules 
and the public policy exception are two principles that provide grounds to depart 
from the accepted method of assigning a cross-border relationship to a particular 
national substantive law pursuant to the relevant choice-of-law rule. In other 
words, in light of mandatory rules and the public policy exception, the applicable 
national substantive rule is not determined by a choice-of-law rule, but according 
to other rules that reflect certain overriding values or state policies. Taking this 
into consideration, in so far as scrutiny of the designated national substantive law 
is concerned, one could query whether the effect of the principle of equal 
treatment could be compared to that of mandatory rules or the public policy 
exception. Specifically, the question here is whether a forum court sitting in a 
Member State can invoke the principle of equal treatment either as a mandatory 
rule or the public policy exception against the application of the designated 
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national substantive law. If this is not the case, what is the basis to invoke the 
principle of equal treatment in this context? 
 
3.1. Mandatory rules 
 
There are various terms used in the academic literature in order to explain these 
rules. These include, among others, lois de police, rules of immediate application, 
self-limiting rules and spatially conditioned rules. As Guedj points out, these are 
not synonyms, though they have certain commonalities.63 Notwithstanding their 
possible differences, for purposes of clarity in the present context I will refer to 
them as ‘mandatory rules’. 
 
Mandatory rules are applied to cross-border relationships irrespective of the 
national substantive law applicable by virtue of a choice-of-law rule.64 Mandatory 
rules go beyond the mere choice of the applicable law by providing substantive 
solutions,65 but without regard to the result in a single case.66 In other words, these 
rules replace the rules of the law applicable pursuant to a choice-of-law rule or 
chosen by private parties by providing different substantive solutions that reflect 
certain state policies or other social, economic, and political interests inherent in 
                                                 
63 Thomas G Guedj, ‘The Theory of the Lois de Police, a Functional Trend in Continental Private 
International Law – A Comparative Analysis With Modern American Theories’(1991) 39 
American Journal of Comparative Law 661, 665. 
64 Pierre Mayer, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration’ (1986) 2 Arbitration 
International 274, 274. 
65 Peter E Nygh, ‘The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the Choice of Law in 
Contract and in Tort’ (1995) 251 Recueil Des Cours 269, 378: Susanne Knofel, ‘Mandatory rules 
and Choice of Law: A Comparative Approach to Article 7 (2) of the Rome Convention’ (1999) 
Journal of Business Law  239, 245; Jens Rinze, ‘The Scope of Party Autonomy under the 1980 
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ (1994) Journal of Business 
Law 412, 426. 
66 Frank Vischer (n 7) 102. 
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them.67 These policies and interests are so crucial that the application of the law of 
another State cannot be tolerated.68 Among others, one could mention, for 
instance, policies of fiscal nature, policies protecting certain economic and 
monetary interests, free and fair trade or functioning of an effective market or 
policies safeguarding environment and animal welfare.69 
 
Mandatory rules are considered to be part of the substantive law of a State, 
whereby their application is not dependent upon the designation by a choice-of-
law rule or the choice made by private parties to cross-border relationships.70 A 
forum court seised with a case is required to give effect to these rules in the 
context of any cross-border relationship, irrespective of the otherwise applicable 
national substantive law.71 This also applies to the situation where private parties 
to a contract have chosen the law governing the contract. In other words, this 
means that private parties cannot avoid their scope having a choice-of-law clause 
in their contract.72 Such an obligation does not only concern the mandatory rules 
that are part of the law of the forum, but also the law of other States that a given 
cross-border relationship is linked to.73 
 
                                                 
67 Andrew Barraclough and Jeffrey Waincymer, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 205, 206.   
68 Thomas G Guedj (n 63) 665. 
69 Marc Blessing, ‘Impact of the Extraterritorial Application of Mandatory Rules of Law on 
International Contracts’ (1999) 9 Swiss Commercial Law Series 5, 14 – 15. 
70 Thomas G Guedj (n 63) 665. 
71 Horatia Muir Watt and Luca G Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Party Autonomy and Mandatory Rules in a 
Global World’ (2004) 4 Global Jurists Advances 1, 1. 
72 Christopher R Drahozal, ‘Contracting Around: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules and Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards’ (2002-2003) 3 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 419, 420. 
73 ibid 12-14. 
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The mandatory nature of these rules primarily depends on the sphere of their 
application, which is determined by a reference to their objective or purpose.74 
Legal acts containing mandatory rules can explicitly embody the scope and 
purpose of these rules, whilst in other cases it is determined through judicial 
interpretation.75 Mandatory rules can have limited scope ratione materiae or 
ratione personae. As regards the former, for instance, one can mention mandatory 
rules, the applicability of which is limited to the territory of a particular State. As 
far as the latter is concerned, these are, for instance, rules that are applicable to the 
nationals of a State, regardless of the place where they reside.  
 
Rules can be mandatory in nature in a domestic or inter-State context. Mandatory 
rules in a domestic context are those that are mandatory only with regard to a 
legal relationship that is confined to the territory of a single State. Mandatory 
rules in an inter-State context, in turn, refer to rules that have mandatory 
applicability with regard to any legal relationship irrespective of whether it is 
linked to more than one national legal system. Due to differences in their scope, 
these rules do not have the same effect on the national substantive law designated 
by a choice-of-law rule or chosen by private parties. Mandatory rules in a 
domestic context are not mandatory with regard to legal relationship linked to 
more than one national legal system.76  
                                                 
74 Thomas G Guedj (n 63) 665. 
75 ibid, see also Jens Rinze (n 65) 427. 
76 Trevor C Hartley, ‘The Modern Approach to Private International Law. International Litigation 
and Transactions from a Common-Law Perspective: General Course on Private International Law’ 
(2006) 319 Recueil des Cours 9, 225. As an example, one could mention a rule concerning the 
validity of a contract. Suppose that in Member State A that rule is mandatory only with regard to a 
contractual relationship confined to its territory. This rule would have no effect with regard to a 
contract between two private parties established in Member States A and B respectively and if the 
law of Member State B is the law governing their contract according to the relevant choice-of-law 
rule. In other words, the scope of national rules that are mandatory in a domestic context is limited 
in the context of a cross-border relationship subject to the law of another State. Thus, the 
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Rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context are also mentioned in Union 
secondary legislation that enshrines unified choice-of-law rules. They are referred 
to as overriding mandatory provisions. In the context of cross-border contractual 
obligations, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation defines them as ‘provisions the 
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent 
that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of 
the law otherwise applicable to the contract’.77 Article 9 of the Rome II 
Regulation, in turn, provides that unified choice-of-law rules regulating cross-
border non-contractual obligations should not restrict the application of the law of 
the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the otherwise 
applicable law. Overriding mandatory provisions under these provisions apply to 
all cross-border relationships – they are not confined to intra-Union ones.78 This 
category includes both rules of public and private law nature.79  
 
                                                                                                                                     
application of national rules that are mandatory in a domestic context is decided in accordance 
with the relevant choice-of-law rule. See in this respect, Trevor C Hartley (n 76) 226. 
77 Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of Rome Convention. This definition was drawn from the Court’s 
finding in Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude 
Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage 
SARL (C-376/96) [1999] ECR I-8453. The issue in these cases concerned the Belgian legislation 
on social obligations, which was classified as public-order legislation. It was applied to the French 
companies that were temporarily involved in construction in Belgium. The Court held ‘the fact 
that national rules are categorised as public-order legislation does not mean that they are exempt 
from compliance with the provisions of the Treaty; if it did, the primacy and uniform application 
of [Union] law would be undermined. The considerations underlying such national legislation can 
be taken into account by [Union] law only in terms of the exceptions to [Union] freedoms 
expressly provided for by the Treaty and, where appropriate, on the ground that they constitute 
overriding reasons relating to the public interest’. See paragraph 30.  
78 Andrea Bonomi, ‘The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
Some General Remarks’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private International Law 165, 173. See also 
Andrea Bonomi, ‘Overriding Mandatory Provisions in the Rome I Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private International Law 285, 288-
289. 
79 Christopher Tillman, ‘The Relationship between Party Autonomy and the Mandatory Rules in 
the Rome Convention’ (2002) Journal of Business Law 45, 67. 
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Both the principle of equal treatment and mandatory rules in an inter-State context 
confront the application of the designated national substantive law to a given 
cross-border relationship. They are, however, essentially different. As mentioned 
earlier, mandatory rules in an inter-State context are rules that apply irrespective 
of the law applicable by virtue of a choice-of-law rule or chosen by private 
parties.80 The ‘mandatory-ness’ of these rules should be understood specifically 
from a choice-of-law perspective. They replace or override the rules of the 
otherwise applicable national substantive law by providing different substantive 
solutions that reflect state policies or other interests inherent in them.81 In contrast, 
although the principle of equal treatment is also mandatory in nature, it does not 
provide any substantive solutions, but merely ensures that applicable national 
rules are not directly or indirectly discriminatory on grounds of nationality or 
result in a disadvantage imposed on those who have exercised the Treaty free 
movement rights. In other words, the aim of the principle of equal treatment is not 
to deal with any matter of substance, but to guarantee that it is regulated by non-
discriminatory means. Furthermore, in case of mandatory rules, in essence, no 
attention is paid to the content of the otherwise applicable national substantive 
rule.82 They are applicable irrespective of what the latter provides. The principle 
of equal treatment, it turn, appears to operate in the opposite way. It is only 
triggered by the allegedly discriminatory effect of a particular rule. For instance, 
in Garcia Avello,83 the principle of equal treatment applied because of the 
discriminatory treatment imposed in light of the Belgian substantive rule 
concerning names. Therefore, it could be argued that the functioning of the 
                                                 
80 Pierre Mayer (n 64) 274. 
81 Andrew Barraclough and Jeffrey Waincymer (n 67) 206.   
82 Thomas G Guedj (n 63) 680.  
83 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613. 
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principle of equal treatment is very much premised on the content of a rule and its 
effect on free movement in the Union. 
 
3.2. Public policy of the forum 
 
The public policy exception is a principle that provides an additional ground for a 
forum court not to apply the otherwise applicable national substantive law. As 
Lew points out, ‘public policy reflects the fundamental economic, legal, moral, 
political, religious and social standards of every extra-territorial community (…) 
and covers principles and standards, which are so sacrosanct as to require their 
maintenance at all costs and without exemption’.84 The public policy exception 
bars the application of the designated national substantive law, if it contradicts the 
policies of the State that enforces it.85 In this way, the public policy exception 
operates as a principle that produced the so-called negative effect, since relying on 
it, a forum court can refuse to apply any national substantive law or recognise any 
judgment delivered by a court sitting in another State.86 Usually, the law of the 
forum would be applied instead.87 The public policy exception is enshrined in 
Union secondary legislation that unifies national choice-of-law rules. For 
instance, Article 21 of the Rome I Regulation, Article 26 of the Rome II 
Regulation and Article 12 of the Rome III Regulation provide that the application 
of the law designated by the relevant choice-of-law rule may be refused if it is 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum. 
                                                 
84 Julian D M Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards (Oceana Publications 1978) 532. 
85 Jacob Dolinger, ‘World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws’ 
(1982) 17 Texas International Law Journal 167, 167. 
86 ibid 169. 
87 Michael Forde, ‘The ‘Ordre Public’ Exception and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions’ 
(1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 259, 260. 
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There is no consensus in the academic literature as regards the difference between 
mandatory rules and the public policy exception. Some argue that these are two 
different principles.88 Several arguments are put forward in this respect. First, the 
rationale and the starting point of these principles differ.89 The public policy 
exception centres on the result of the application of the designated national 
substantive law to a cross-border relationship. It usually applies after the 
designation of that law pursuant to the relevant choice-of-law rule.90 In contrast, 
mandatory rules express the imperativity of a domestic regulation, having no 
attention paid to the content of the designated national substantive law.91 
Therefore, in essence, they are applied prior to the designation of the national 
substantive law at issue. Others, however, assert that the application of mandatory 
rules is a specific manifestation of a State’s public policy.92 For advocates of this 
approach, public policy consists of ‘laws of immediate application whose 
observance is essential for safeguarding the political, social and economic 
organisation of a country’.93  Public policy is comprised of mandatory rules that 
include a State’s most basic notions of morality and justice’.94 Internationally 
recognised principles, such as the principle of party autonomy, equal treatment of 
parties, non-discrimination, good faith, and human rights, are also emphasised in 
                                                 
88 Thomas G Guedj (n 63) 680. 
89 ibid. 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid, see also Frank Vischer (n 7) 102. 
92 Michael Forde (n 87) 259. 
93 Yyes Derains, ‘Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration’ 
in Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (ICCA 
Congress Series 1987) 228. 
94 Mark A Buchanan, ‘Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1988) 26 
American Business Law Journal 511, 513. 
50 
 
this respect.95 Notwithstanding the possible differences between the rationale 
underpinning mandatory rules and the public policy exception, both exclude the 
application of the otherwise national substantive law. 
 
It was demonstrated earlier that unless there are objective justifications, the 
designated national substantive law cannot be applied, if it imposes 
discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free 
movement provisions. Giving effect to the principle of equal treatment could, 
thus, lead to the application of the otherwise applicable national substantive law 
being refused. From a choice-of-law perspective, this outcome might resemble the 
one that occurs when a forum court gives effect to the public policy of the forum. 
Both the principle of equal treatment and the public policy exception result in the 
rejection of the application of the designated national substantive law. The 
application of both requires scrutiny of the effect of the applicable law in a case at 
hand. A particular rule is caught by the principle of equal treatment, if it is 
discriminatory on grounds of nationality or movement. Similarly, the application 
of the law that manifestly contradicts the public policy of the forum is rejected. In 
addition, both appear to apply at the final stage of the actual application of the 
designated national substantive law, rather than at the stage involving the process 
of the selection or formulating of that law, as it is the case with mandatory rules.96 
With regard to the principle of equal treatment, this seems to be the case 
particularly when indirectly discriminatory treatment on grounds of nationality is 
                                                 
95 Laurence R Fenelon, ‘Applicability of Foreign Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration’, 
<http://www.rcmck.com/business-publications/foreign-mandatory-rules-in-international-
arbitration/> accessed 18 September 2011. 
96 Michel Tison (n 61) 371. 
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at issue. The mere application of a rule appears to be necessary in order to 
establish its indirectly discriminatory effect. 
 
However, in addition to their similarities, one could also point out the differences 
between the principle of equal treatment and the public policy exception. The 
rejection of the applicable law relying on the public policy of the forum usually 
leads to the application of the law of the forum. In contrast, one can hardly 
envisage such an outcome with respect to the principle of equal treatment. This is 
based on the fact that the principle of equal treatment does not contain an implicit 
reference to a particular national substantive law that always becomes applicable 
whenever one has recourse to it.97 Furthermore, using Lew’s words,98 the public 
policy exception serves to protect ‘the fundamental economic, legal, moral, 
political, religious and social standards’ of the forum. The principle of equal 
treatment, in turn, ensures free movement in the Union.99 
  
3.3. Union public policy 
 
In terms of the outcome of their application against the designated national 
substantive law, the principle of equal treatment, thus, can hardly be compared to 
the mandatory rules or public policy of the forum. However, this should not be 
                                                 
97 This is further elaborated in the third chapter. 
98 Julian D M Lew (n 84) 532. 
99 On a different note, the public policy exception also falls within the scope of the principle of 
equal treatment. The Court held on several occasions that national measures based on public 
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understood as suggesting that the principle of equal treatment cannot be invoked 
by a forum court sitting in a Member State if the otherwise applicable national 
substantive rule is discriminatory in nature or effect. In contrast, the right and also 
obligation of a forum court to do so is derived from the principle of equal 
treatment being one of the fundamental principles in the Union legal order. In 
general, as has been pointed out by Fumagalli, from a conflict of laws perspective 
Union primary and secondary law constitute the core of Union public policy, 
which should be given effect by a forum court similar to the public policy of the 
forum.100 
 
It is necessary to mention that the term ‘Union public policy’ is not specifically 
mentioned, for instance, in Union secondary legislation adopted under Article 81 
TFEU that unifies national choice-of-law rules. Nor does the latter, in particular 
the Rome I, Rome II and Rome III Regulations, for example, contain a clear-cut 
preference given to Treaty provisions or general principles over the national 
substantive law designated by the relevant choice-of-law rule.101 Despite that, 
however, the Union public policy exception is, in essence, implicitly embedded, 
for instance, in the Preambles to the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. In both, it 
is stipulated that ‘the Regulation should not prejudice the application of other 
instruments laying down provisions designed to contribute to the proper 
                                                 
100 Luigi Fumagalli (n 99) 178-180. 
101 The Commission’s original proposal for the Rome II Regulation provided such a provision. 
Article 23 stated that ‘[the] Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions contained 
in the Treaties establishing the European Communities or in acts of the institutions of the 
European Communities which: in relation to particular matters, lay down choice-of-law rules 
relating to non-contractual obligations; or lay down rules which apply irrespective of the national 
law governing the non-contractual obligation in question by virtue of this Regulation; or prevent 
application of a provision or provisions of the law of the forum or of the law designated by this 
Regulation’. Article 27 of the final version, however, only states that ‘[the] Regulation shall not 
prejudice the application of provisions of [Union] law which, in relation to particular matters, lay 
down conflict-of-law rules relating to non-contractual obligations’. 
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functioning of the internal market in so far as they cannot be applied in 
conjunction with the law designated by the rules of this Regulation. The 
application of provisions of the applicable law designated by the rules of this 
Regulation should not restrict the free movement of goods and services as 
regulated by Union instruments’.102 In a certain way, in this respect, one could 
also mention Article 3 (4) of the Rome I Regulation, which provides an exception 
to the freedom of private parties to choose the governing law. In particular, it 
states that ‘where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the 
choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties’ choice of applicable 
law other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of 
provisions of [Union] law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State 
of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement’. 
 
More generally, the duty of a forum court sitting in a Member State to give effect 
to Union public policy and, in particular, the principle of equal treatment as part 
of it, emanates from the obligation of loyal cooperation under Article 4 TEU.103 
This duty, first of all, concerns the law of the forum, in case it is determined as 
applicable to a cross-border relationship pursuant to the relevant choice-of-law 
rule. More importantly, it could also be extended to the law of another Member 
                                                 
102 Preamble 35 of the Rome II Regulation and Preamble 40 of the Rome I Regulation. However, 
with regard to the last part, it is not clear whether it refers to the substance of the provisions of the 
law designated by these Regulations or their mere application in light of these Regulations. cf. 
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particular matters and in areas coordinated by such instruments, subject the supply of services or 
goods to the laws of the Member State where the service-provider is established and, in the area 
coordinated, allow restrictions on freedom to provide services or goods originating in another 
Member State only in limited circumstances’. 
103 According to Article 4 (3) TEU, ‘the Member States shall take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement 
of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives’. 
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State in a similar context. In particular, one would expect a forum court sitting in 
a Member State to set aside the otherwise applicable rule of another Member State 
as regards a given cross-border relationship, if it is found to be discriminatory 
contrary to Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. In this 
respect, strictly in terms of the compliance with the relevant Union rules, it would 
not matter whether it is the application of the law of the forum or that of another 
Member State is under consideration.104  
 
At the same time, however, this might not be as straightforward as it appears. One 
could question, for instance, whether a forum court sitting in a Member State is 
better placed to assess the compatibility of the law of another Member State with 
Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions, taking into account its 
possible lack of knowledge and expertise in that law. While it is true that even 
when a forum court considers the compatibility of the otherwise applicable 
foreign law in light of the public policy of the forum, it would need to be aware, 
to a certain extent, of the substantive content of the law at issue. If the law at hand 
contradicts the public policy of the forum, a forum court would simply refuse to 
apply it. In the present context, however, the task of a forum court might be more 
complex, since it would have to establish whether the rule of another Member 
State at issue is discriminatory and, consequently, its compatibility or 
incompatibility with Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. In 
particular, finding direct discrimination on grounds of nationality could be 
problematic, but more so, establishing indirect discrimination on grounds of 
                                                 
104 Though, it is questionable whether a forum court sitting in a Member State can actually assess 
the compliance of, for instance, foreign goods with the law of the Member State where they are 
produced. This is because otherwise this would be inconsistent with the free movement of goods 
and services rationale in the internal market. More on this, see Chapter 5. 
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nationality and, specifically, examining the grounds for objective justification of 
both.  
 
A possible solution, in this respect, lies in the possibility for a forum court to 
request a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. It is already an established 
practice that the preliminary reference procedure can be used even when the 
questions raised by a national court concern the law of another Member State.105 
The possibility for a forum court to make a preliminary reference could help to 
minimise any possible error in ruling on the compatibility of the law of another 
Member State with Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. 
More importantly, this also allows the Member State whose legislation is under 
consideration to be involved in the proceedings.106 Having said that, as much as 
this might be a solution for the problem arising as a result of the court of a 
Member State assessing the compatibility of the law of another Member State 
with the relevant Union rules, it is also necessary to point out the reluctance and 
the rather restrictive approach of the Court in addressing this type of preliminary 
ruling requests.107 
 
                                                 
105 See eg Case 20/64 SARL Albatros v Société des pétroles et des combustibles liquides (Sopéco) 
[1965] ECR 29, p 34; Case 261/81 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA [1982] ECR 
I-3961, para 9; Case C-150/88 Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Eau de Cologne & Parfümerie-
Fabrik, Glockengasse n. 4711 v Provide Srl. [1989] ECR I-3891, para 12; Case C-47/90 
Établissements Delhaize frères et Compagnie Le Lion SA v Promalvin SA and AGE Bodegas 
Unidas SA [1992] ECR I-3669, para 9. 
106 On the flip side, however, one could also argue that this might create practical difficulties for 
that Member State in defending its legislation at issue, since it would have to merely intervene in 
the preliminary ruling proceedings before the Court without being involving in the main 
proceedings before the referring national court. See in this respect, Morten P Broberg and Niels 
Fenger, Preliminary references to the European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2010), 
200. As the Court held, ‘the reply on this point must be that in the absence of provisions of 
[Union] law in the matter , the possibility of taking proceedings before a national court against a 
member state other than that in which that court is situated depends both on the laws of the latter 
and on the principles of International law’. See in this respect, Case 244/80 Pasquale Foglia v 
Mariella Novello [1981] ECR 3045, para 24. 
107 Morten P Broberg and Niels Fenger (n 106) 200. 
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To start with, in Foglia, for instance, the Court held that ‘[it] must display special 
vigilance when, in the course of proceedings between individuals, a question is 
referred to it with a view to permitting the national court to decide whether the 
legislation of another Member State is in accordance with [Union] law’.108 This is 
because, according to the Court, given the freedom granted to private parties to a 
contract under national legal systems, ‘[their conduct] may be such as to make it 
impossible for the State concerned to arrange for an appropriate defence of its 
interests by causing the question of the invalidity of its legislation to be decided 
by a court of another Member state’.109 This, in turn, as the Court continued, could 
result in the preliminary ruling procedure being diverted by private parties from 
the purpose which it was laid down by the Treaty.  
 
Furthermore, in the more recent rulings of der Weduwe and Bacardi-Martini,110 
the Court declined to rule on the questions submitted, emphasising the limited or 
incomplete interpretation of the law of another Member State and the lack of 
reasoning on the necessity for a preliminary ruling provided by the referring court. 
In particular, in der Weduwe, the issue related to the judicial investigation 
conducted by the Belgian authorities concerning the offences of forgery. Mr der 
Weduwe, a Dutch national employed by two banks in Luxembourg, was 
questioned as a defendant in the course of this investigation. Even though he was 
under the obligation to provide evidence under Belgian law, Mr der Weduwe 
refused to do so, invoking the obligation of professional banking secrecy under 
Luxembourg law. This was found by the Belgian court to seriously impede the 
                                                 
108 Case 244/80 Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello (Foglia 2) [1981] ECR 3045, para 30. 
109 ibid, para 29. 
110 Case C-153/00 Criminal proceedings against Paul der Weduwe [2002] ECR I-11319; Case C-
318/00 Bacardi-Martini SAS and Cellier des Dauphins v Newcastle United Football Company Ltd 
[2003] ECR I-905. 
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collection of evidence into activities carried out in Belgium under Article 56 
TFEU. In particular, the employees of banks established in Luxembourg and 
exercising the right to provide services in Belgium were faced with a dilemma of 
having to breach either the Belgian law on providing evidence or the Luxembourg 
law on professional banking secrecy. In this context, the Belgian court referred 
questions concerning the compatibility of both with Article 56 TFEU. The Court 
found them to be inadmissible. In this respect, it questioned the interpretation of 
the referring court that the Luxembourg law on professional banking secrecy had 
an extra-territorial effect in Belgium and that any possible exceptions attached to 
it were limited to the territory of Luxembourg. The Court held, first, that such an 
interpretation of the Luxembourg law at issue was hypothetical since Luxembourg 
courts had not ruled on it and, second, that ‘it [was] not the only possible 
interpretation’.111 According to the Court, ‘the national court has not in any way 
explained why it considers the interpretation on which it relies to be the only one 
possible’.112 ‘The fact that the relevance of the questions raised by the national 
court rests on a particular interpretation of a national law other than its own made 
it particularly necessary to state the grounds for the order for reference on that 
point’.113 
 
In Bacardi-Martini, in turn, the issue related to the questions of the compatibility 
of the French law prohibiting the advertisement of alcoholic drinks on television 
with Article 56 TFEU referred by an English court. This was in the context of the 
contractual dispute between Bacardi-Martini and Newcastle United, and also 
involving Dorna Marketing. Dorna Marketing was in a contractual agreement 
                                                 
111 Case C-153/00 Criminal proceedings against Paul der Weduwe [2002] ECR I-11319, para 37. 
112 ibid, para 38. 
113 ibid.  
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with several football clubs including Newcastle United to sell and display 
advertisements around the touchline of football pitches. It entered into a contract 
with Bacardi-Martini, a French company, and undertook to provide the latter with 
advertising time. Since one of the games played by Newcastle United was to be 
broadcasted on a French channel, Newcastle United instructed Dorna Marketing 
to remove Bacardi-Martini’s advertisement from the touchline displays in order to 
comply with the French law at issue. As a result, Bacardi-Martini brought 
proceedings against Newcastle United seeking damages and injunctions. The 
English court hearing the case decided to seek a preliminary ruling on the 
compatibility of the French law at issue with Article 56 TFEU.114 The Court again 
declared the questions submitted inadmissible. It held that since the questions 
were intended to assess the compatibility of the law of another Member State with 
Union law, the national court had to explain why it considered them to be 
necessary to deliver a judgment.115 According to the Court, even though the 
English court considered the question of the legality of the French law to be 
important, in its reasoning, however, it essentially confined itself to repeating 
Newcastle United’s argument that the failure to remove the relevant advertisement 
would result in a breach of the French law. In particular, the English court did not 
demonstrate whether it itself considered that Newcastle United could reasonably 
suppose that it was obliged to comply with the French law at issue. On this basis, 
the Court concluded that it did not have the evidence that it was necessary to rule 
                                                 
114 One of the reasons for doing so was the fact that the English court found it inappropriate to rule 
on the compatibility of the French law with Article 56 TFEU without the French Government 
being able to submit its observations on the point. 
115 Case C-318/00 Bacardi-Martini SAS and Cellier des Dauphins v Newcastle United Football 
Company Ltd [2003] ECR I-905, para 46. See also the reasoning of the Court in Case C-341/01 
Plato Plastik Robert Frank GmbH v Caropack Handelsgesellschaft mbH [2004] ECR I-4883. 
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on the question of the compatibility of the law of a Member State referred by a 
court of another Member State. 
 
Der Weduwe and Bacardi-Martini demonstrate, first of all, that the issue of a 
forum court sitting in a Member State assessing the compatibility of the law of 
another Member State with Article 18 TFEU and, in particular, the Treaty free 
movement provisions is not just theoretical but also practical. Second, more 
importantly, they once again highlight the problem related to the lack of 
knowledge and expertise of a court sitting in a Member State in deciding on the 
compliance of the law of another Member State with the relevant Union rules. In 
this respect, the rather restrictive approach taken by the Court in both cases is not 
of much help. Such a problem might often arise in the context of cross-border 
disputes between private parties involving choice-of-law matters in the internal 
market. Considering this and the importance of providing legal certainty in this 
context, there is a need for the Court’s expertise and assistance and, consequently, 
for more leniency on the part of the Court in dealing with such preliminary ruling 
questions.116 This is not to say that every request for a preliminary ruling should 
actually be considered by the Court or that there should not be any conditions 
attached in this regard. This specifically concerns cases before a national court, 
which similar to Bacardi-Martini, for instance, involve a genuine dispute 
involving the law of more than one Member State;117 where a preliminary ruling 
                                                 
116 Robert Lane, ‘Article 234: A Few Rough Edges Still’ in Mark Hoskins and William Robinson, 
A True European: Essays for Judge David Edward (Hart Publishing 2004) 338. 
117 See eg Case 104/79 Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello (Foglia1) [1980] ECR 745. The Court 
in this ruling held that ‘the duty of the Court of Justice under [Article 267 TFEU] is to supply all 
courts in the [Union] with the information on the interpretation of [Union] law which is necessary 
to enable them to settle genuine disputes which are brought before them’. 
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is indeed likely to be pivotal for the resolution of such a dispute;118 and finally, 
where the interests of, at least, one of the parties are at stake. 
 
4. Interim conclusion 
 
In this chapter, first, I argued that the fact that the national substantive law is 
applicable pursuant to the relevant national or Union choice-of-law rule would 
have no effect, if that law is found to impose discriminatory treatment and cannot 
be applied in light of Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. 
Rules are caught by the principle of equal treatment because of their effect on free 
movement in the Union. Their domestic classification into private law rules and, 
more importantly, their applicability pursuant to choice-of-law rules can hardly 
play a role in this regard.119 National substantive rules can be applied to a given 
cross-border relationship pursuant to a national or Union choice-of-law rule, but 
this mere fact cannot be taken as a ground to exclude them from scrutiny under 
the principle of equal treatment nor justify any discriminatory treatment. 
In this context, even though the principle of equal treatment could be in a 
certain way compared to mandatory rules and the public policy exception, it 
substantially differs from the other two in terms of the outcome of its 
application. Notwithstanding this fact, I argue that a forum court relying on the 
Union public policy exception can invoke the principle of equal treatment 
against the application of both the law of the forum and that of another Member 
State. This is certainly crucial in adjudicating cross-border disputes between 
private parties where the question of the applicable law arises. At the same time, 
                                                 
118 ibid. 
119 Jona Israël (n 46) 100; Michael Tison (n 61) 102. 
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nevertheless, it is doubtful whether this could genuinely ensure the compliance 
with Union law and provide justice in cross-border relationships, considering 
the possible lack of knowledge and expertise of a forum court sitting in a 
Member State in addressing the compatibility of the law of another Member 
State with Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. In this 
respect, therefore, an important role is left to the preliminary ruling procedure, 
within which, however, the less restrictive and more lenient approach of the 
Court is desirable. 
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Chapter II  
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT AND CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES 
 
In the previous chapter, I focused on the scrutiny of the designated national 
substantive law under the principle of equal treatment. It was demonstrated that a 
forum court relying on the Union public policy exception cannot apply the 
designated national substantive law, if it imposes discriminatory treatment. In this 
regard, it was argued that the fact that the law at issue was applicable by virtue of 
a national or Union choice-of-law rule could hardly affect this outcome. Now, 
what remains to be examined is whether choice-of-law rules themselves fall 
within the scope of the principle of equal treatment, and, in particular, what would 
be the outcome, if their application results in a difference in treatment in terms of 
the applicable law. Two issues could be raised in this regard. On the one hand, 
one could query whether the nature of choice-of-law rules, in particular, the fact 
that they only determine the law applicable to a cross-border relationship without 
dealing with matters of substance, could affect their scrutiny under the principle 
of equal treatment. On the other hand, it is also questionable whether a possible 
difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law arising as a result of the 
application of a national or Union choice-of-law rule could be caught by the 
principle of equal treatment. 
 
In this chapter, I will first focus on whether the specific nature and objective of 
choice-of-law rules are sufficient to exclude these rules from the scope of the 
principle of equal treatment. Next, I will analyse whether national choice-of-law 
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rules that are based on nationality and territoriality as a connecting factor can be 
discriminatory contrary to the principle of equal treatment. Premised upon the 
finding of the Court in Bosmann, I will then examine the interaction of the 
principle of equal treatment with Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 
81 TFEU. 
 
1. Nature and objective of choice-of-law rules  
 
In the context of choice-of-law rules, one may first of all wonder whether their 
specific objective and nature require a different approach in so far as scrutiny 
under the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 18 TFEU and in the 
Treaty free movement provisions is concerned. 
 
Unified choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU, for instance, ensure 
certainty over the applicable law and predictability of litigation. Preambles to both 
the Rome I and II Regulations mention that ‘the proper functioning of the internal 
market creates a need, in order to improve the predictability of the outcome of 
litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, 
for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same national 
law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is brought’.1 Based 
on single connecting factors, Union choice-of-law rules are intended to solve the 
problem arising as a result of the application of divergent national choice-of-law 
rules. Union choice-of-law rules ensure the clear designation of the law applicable 
                                                 
1 See Recital 6 of the Preambles to the Rome I and II Regulations. 
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to a cross-border relationship.2 As mentioned earlier, replacing divergent national 
choice-of-law rules, Union choice-of-law rules guarantee that the same national 
substantive law is applied to the same cross-border relationship, irrespective of the 
forum. This, in turn, allows private parties in the context of cross-border 
relationships to know with certainty what national substantive law will be 
applicable and predict the outcome of litigation.3 
 
In contrast to Union choice-of-law rules, there is a lack of consensus in the 
academic literature over the objective pursued by national choice-of-law rules.4 
This is mainly due to the fact that they are enshrined in national legislation but 
deal with cross-border (or inter-State) relationships. Therefore, whether they 
indeed pursue a specific objective depends on the approach one adopts. 
 
Some argue that national choice-of-law rules merely reflect the substantive 
policies of the national legal system they are part of.5 In particular, according to 
them, national choice-of-law rules are implicitly linked to and safeguard certain 
State policies inherent in national substantive rules.6 Thus, a forum court, hearing 
a case, should first give effect to the substantive rules of the forum. This has been 
contested by those who argue that it promotes judicial parochialism and 
                                                 
2 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice – Text adopted by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council of  3 December 1998 [1999] OJ C 19, para 16. 
3 Th M de Boer, ‘The Purpose of the Uniform Choice-of-law rules: The Rome II Regulation’, 
(2009) 56 Netherlands International Law Review 295, 305. 
4 Joseph W Singer, ‘Real Conflicts’ (1989) 69 Boston University Law Review 1, 34. 
5 Ralf Michaels, ‘The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution: Lessons for the United States?’ 
(2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607, 1616. 
6 Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Recent Development of the Conflict of Laws’ in Jürgen Basedow, Harald 
Baum and Yuko Nishitani (eds), Japanese and European Private International Law in 
Comparative Perspective (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 6; Jona Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regulation: a Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings in light of a Paradigm of 
Co-operation and a Comitas Europaea (Intersentia 2005) 97. 
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chauvinism in the context of the adjudication of cross-border (or inter-State) 
disputes.7 Strictly based on this approach, it is fair to argue that national choice-
of-law rules are no different to national substantive rules in terms of the objective 
they pursue. 
 
Others, however, contend that national choice-of-law rules are not confined to 
preserving national policies. For an example, Wai emphasises that the objectives 
of these rules are to ‘facilitate international commerce, increase interstate 
cooperation and order, and avoid parochialism and non-discrimination’.8 
According to the scholarship, these rules usually provide justice to private parties 
involved in cross-border relationships. 9 In particular, they fulfil the reasonable 
expectations of private parties, who might act in accordance with a particular 
national law.10 Without these rules, the invariable application of the law of the 
forum would often result in gross injustice.11 In this respect, choice-of-law rules 
prevent or reduce forum shopping.12 This is based on the fact that if a forum court 
always applies its own law, a unilateral choice of the forum by private parties 
                                                 
7 Louise Weinberg, ‘On Departing From Forum Law’ (1983-1984) 35 Mercer Law Review 595, 
598. 
8 Robert S Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Judicial Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of 
Private International Law in the Era of Globalization’ (2001-2002) 40 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 209, 224. The author examines these objectives in light of the regulatory 
function of choice-of-law rules developed in light of internationalist reforms. In this respect, the 
author refers, for instance, to the increasing number of international choice-of-law rules. 
9 Trevor C Hartley, ‘The Modern Approach to Private International Law. International Litigation 
and Transactions from a Common-Law Perspective: General Course on Private International Law’ 
(2006) 319 Recueil des Cours 9, 33. See also Lawrence Collins, C G J Morse, David McClean and 
Others (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of laws (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 
4-5. 
10 Joseph W Singer (n 4) 33. However, there is an exception to that, when the law chosen by the 
parties to a contract contradicts the public policy of the forum. 
11 Peter M North and James J Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International law 
(Butterworth’s 1999) 4. 
12 Th. M. de Boer, ‘Facultative Choice of Law. The Procedural Status of Choice-of-Law Rules and 
Foreign Law’ (1996) 257 Recueil des Cours 223, 283.  
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would obviously entail a unilateral choice of the governing law.13 This could be 
unfair, for instance, towards the defendant, since he/she would have to accept the 
jurisdiction of the court the plaintiff would have chosen.14 More importantly, 
similar to Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU, one could 
also argue that national choice-of-law rules aim to provide certainty over the law 
applicable to cross-border relationships and predictability of litigation.15 Under 
this approach, thus, in terms of their objective, national choice-of-law rules could 
be distinguished from national substantive rules. 
 
In addition to their specific objective, national and Union choice-of-law rules 
operate in a specific way. As mentioned earlier, a choice-of-law rule merely 
designates the law governing a cross-border relationship. As far as matters of 
substance are concerned, a choice-of-law rule is indifferent in nature, meaning 
that it itself does not provide any substantive solutions.16 The latter, in turn, is 
dealt by the designated national substantive law. In other words, a choice-of-law 
rule does not regulate any matter of substance but only determines the rules to 
which it is subject. 
 
Taking into account their objective and indifferent nature with regard to matters of 
substance, choice-of-law rules could be distinguished from substantive rules 
discussed in the first chapter.17 This, however, does not appear to warrant any 
                                                 
13 ibid.  
14 ibid. 
15 However, it seems fair to assume that this function mostly pertains to unified Union and some 
international choice-of-law rules, considering the difference in connecting factors that national 
choice-of-law rules are based upon. 
16 Frank Vischer ‘General Course on Private International Law’ (1992) 232 Recueil des Cours 9, 
23; Th M de Boer, ‘Facultative Choice of Law’ (n 12) 239. 
17 This is the case only in light of the second approach with regard to the actual objective of 
national choice-of-law rules. 
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special treatment as far as scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment is 
concerned. As regards the objective of choice-of-law rules, the issue seems to be 
rather straightforward. What objective a particular rule pursues does not have an 
effect on whether or not that rule can fall within the scope of the principle of equal 
treatment. As regards the indifferent nature of choice-of-law rules, at first sight, 
one might argue that choice-of-law rules are excluded from the scope of the 
principle of equal treatment, because they merely designate the applicable 
national substantive law, without touching upon the substance of the issue at hand. 
Thus, only the possible discriminatory effect of a substantive rule should be 
scrutinised under the principle of equal treatment. This might find support, for 
instance, in the way the Court deals with the cases involving choice-of-law rules. 
As mentioned earlier, the Court usually shows no interest with regard to the 
mechanism leading to the application of national rules.18  
 
However, it is questionable whether the mere nature of a choice-of-law rule, 
specifically that of national origin, is sufficient to escape the scope of the principle 
of equal treatment, even if it only designates the applicable national substantive 
law. Several factors could be put forward in this regard. To start with, one could 
refer to the fact that a particular rule falls within the scope of the principle of 
equal treatment not by virtue of its nature or origin, rather by virtue of its 
discriminatory effect on free movement in the Union.19 Similar to national 
substantive rules, national choice-of-law rules are also regarded as part of the law 
of Member States. To treat them differently could simply negate the effectiveness 
                                                 
18 See eg Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and 
the Exception of Mutual Recognition’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 52. 
19 Jacobien W Rutgers, ‘Free Movements and Contract Law’ (2008) 3 European Review of 
Contract Law 474, 476. 
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of the principle of equal treatment. As the Court held, scrutiny under Treaty 
provisions ‘cannot vary according to the various branches of national law it may 
affect’.20 In other words, the scope the principle of equal treatment cannot depend 
on the nature of a national rule.21  
 
For instance, in Data Delecta mentioned earlier,22 the Court found that the 
Swedish rule requiring only foreigners to furnish securities for the costs of judicial 
proceedings fell within the scope of the Treaty for the purpose of Article 18 
TFEU.23 In particular the Court held that the rule came within the scope of the 
Treaty, because of its possible effect on the economic activity of traders from 
other Member States.24 Although the rule at issue was not intended to regulate any 
commercial activity, as the Court specified, it could, however, disadvantage 
nationals of other Member States, since they could not resolve any disputes 
arising from their economic activities in the same way as Swedish nationals.25 The 
national rule at issue was procedural in nature. In contrast to substantive rules, it 
did not directly concern any economic activity and, more importantly, it did not 
provide any substantive solutions. However, this factor did not play any role in 
the Court reasoning. The rule was found to fall within the scope of Article 18 
TFEU. In this regard, what was important was its effect on intra-Union trade 
                                                 
20 See Case 82/71 Ministère public de Italian Republic v Società agricola industria latter (SAIL) 
[1972] ECR I-119, para 5; Case C-20/92 Anthony Hubbard (Testamentvollstrecker) v Peter 
Hamburger [1993] ECR I-3777, para 19. This also finds support in Case 106/77 Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629, para 17. 
21 Jona Israël (n 6) 100. 
22 Case C-43/95 Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Ronny Forsberg v MSL Dynamics Ltd. [1996] ECR 
I-4661. 
23 With regard to national procedural rules, see also Case C-122/95 Stephen Austin Saldanha and 
MTS Securities Corporation v Hiross Holding AG [1997] ECR I-5325; Case C-323/95 David 
Charles Hayes and Jeannette Karen Hayes v Kronenberger GbmH [1997] ECR I-1711; Case C-
274/96 Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz [1998] ECR I-7673 
24 Case C-43/95 Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Ronny Forsberg v MSL Dynamics Ltd [1996] ECR 
I-4661, para 13.  
25 ibid. 
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irrespective of its nature and, in particular, domestic classification.26 On this basis, 
it is fair to argue that national choice-of-law rules also come within the scope of 
Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions. Similar to national 
procedural rules, the specific nature of national choice-of-law rules can hardly 
make a difference, if their application has an effect on intra-Union trade.  
 
Furthermore, in the present context, it is also necessary to mention the obligation 
of loyal co-operation imposed on Member States by Article 4 TEU, which also 
concerns national courts. In several occasions, the Court held that when applying 
domestic law, national courts are required to interpret it in a way which accords 
with the requirements of Union law.27 This duty is not confined to national 
substantive rules, but also concerns other rules including choice-of-law rules. 
Therefore, on this basis, it could be argued that a national court, dealing with a 
cross-border relationship is obliged to give effect to the relevant national choice-
of-law rule, only if it complies with Union law. 
 
                                                 
26 Even though the Court emphasised the principle of national procedural autonomy, national 
procedural rules also fall within the scope of the Treaty and their applicability is subject to the 
‘equivalence’ and ‘effectiveness’ requirements. See in this respect Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz 
eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989; Case 
158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] 
ECR 1805; Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd 
and Others [1990] ECR I-2433; Case C-377/89 Ann Cotter and Norah McDermott v Minister for 
Social Welfare and Attorney General [1991] ECR I-1155; Case C-208/90 Theresa Emmott v 
Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General [1991] ECR I-4269; Case C-271/91 M. Helen 
Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] 
ECR I-4367; Case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd [1998] ECR I-7835; 
Case C-13/01 Safalero Srl v Prefetto di Genova [2003] ECR I-8679; Case C-467/01 Ministero 
delle Finanze v Eribrand SpA, formerly Eurico Italia SpA [2003] ECR I-6471; Case C-432/05 
Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271. 
27 See eg Case 157/86 Mary Murphy and Others v An Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR I-673, 
para 11; Case C-165/91 Simon J. M. Van Munster v Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen [1994] ECR I-
4661, para 34; See also Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8. 
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In addition, as pointed out in the first chapter, this duty imposed on national courts 
concerns not only their own national rules but also those of other Member States. 
This means that a national court applying a choice-of-law rule of another Member 
State is also required to ensure that it complies with Union law.28 This is of 
particular importance with regard to divergent national choice-of-law rules, which 
might designate different national substantive rules applicable to the same 
matter.29 For instance, as mentioned earlier, the law applicable to companies in 
some Member States is the law of the country where a company is incorporated, 
whilst in others, it is the law of the place where a company’s head office or central 
management is located.30 Thus, if a choice-of-law rule applicable to a cross-
border relationship is part of the law of a Member State, a forum court sitting in 
another Member State could only apply this rule, if it does not infringe Union law. 
 
This line of reasoning also concerns Union choice-of-law rules. They also fall 
within the scope of the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 18 TFEU 
and in the Treaty free movement provisions, despite the specific objective they 
pursue. As discussed below, however, this does not exclude the possibility for 
their objective in ensuring certainty over the applicable law and predictability of 
litigation to be considered as a ground for objective justification, if the application 
of a Union choice-of-law rule leads to an outcome contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment.  
 
                                                 
28 Jona Israël (n 6) 100. 
29 Gülüm Bayraktaroğlu, ‘Harmonization of Private International Law at Different Levels: 
Communitarization v International Harmonization’ (2003) 5 European Journal of Law Reform 
127, 131. 
30 With respect to the former, one could mention, for instance, United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Netherlands. As regards the latter, one could mention for instance, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal and Hungary. 
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Thus, notwithstanding their specific nature and objective, national and Union 
choice-of-law rules could also fall within the scope of the principle of equal 
treatment enshrined in Article 18 TFEU and in the Treaty free movement 
provisions. Now, it is necessary to find out whether a difference in treatment in 
terms of the applicable law arising as a result of the application of a national and 
Union choice-of-law rule could be incompatible with the principle of equal 
treatment. 
 
2. National choice-of-law rules 
 
Let us start with national choice-of-law rules. These rules usually determine the 
applicable law based on nationality or territoriality as a connecting factor.31  
                                                 
31 Nationality as a connecting factor to determine the applicable law was first expounded by 
Pasquale Mancini in the mid-nineteenth century. See, Pasquale S. Mancini, Della nazionalità come 
fondamento del diritto delle genti (Turin 1853). Mancini argued that national substantive law 
designated as applicable on the basis of nationality was the most suitable law to govern personal 
relationships of individuals, regardless of the place where they resided. See in this respect, Peter 
Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford University Press 1999), 8. According to 
Mancini, this meant that national substantive law should follow each person, whereby when he/she 
was abroad only the law of his/her nationality would be applicable to him/her. See in this respect, 
M Boguslavskii, Private International Law: the Soviet Approach (David Winter and William B. 
Simons tr, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988) 47; Alex Mills, ‘The Private History of International 
Law’ (2006) 55 International Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 40. 
Choice-of-law rules based on territoriality as a connecting factor are firmly rooted in the methods 
introduced by Friedrich Carl von Savigny in the nineteenth century. See in this respect, Jan von 
Hein, ‘Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New? Rome II and the European 
Choice-of-Law Revolution’ (2007-2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1663, 1668. For Savigny, a 
conflict of national substantive laws in the context of a cross-border relationship essentially 
concerned a conflict of territorial laws. The determination of the applicable national substantive 
law in Savigny’s theory in this respect is essentially premised upon the so-called ‘seat’ of a cross-
border relationship. In particular, according to him, in order to find the national substantive law 
governing a particular cross-border relationship, it is necessary ‘to discover for every legal relation 
(case) that legal territory to which, in its proper nature, it belongs or is subject (in which it has its 
seat)’. Savigny proposed, for instance, to use the following choice-of-law rules. These are ‘the 
domicile of any person concerned in the legal relation; the place where a thing which is the object 
of the legal relation is situated; the place of a juridical act, which has been or is to be done; the 
place of the tribunal which has to decide a law suit’. For example, according to Savigny, the law 
governing rights and obligations related to an movable or immovable property is the law of the 
place where it is located, because ‘their object is perceived by senses, and therefore occupies a 
definite space, the locality in space at which they are situated is naturally the seat of every legal 
relation into which they can enter’. See in this respect, Friedrich C von Savigny, A Treatise on the 
72 
 
 
2.1. Nationality as a connecting factor 
 
A choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a connecting factor was involved in 
Boukhalfa.32 The issue in that case related to the German choice-of-law rule 
concerning the employment contracts of the staff in the German diplomatic 
representations. Pursuant to this rule, the employment contracts signed with the 
staff having German nationality were governed by German law, whilst those 
signed with the staff having other nationalities were regulated in accordance with 
the law or custom of the host country. This rule was applied to Ms Boukhalfa, a 
Belgian national, who was employed in the German embassy in Algiers. As a 
result, in contrast to the employees having German nationality, her employment 
contract was subject to Algerian law. The question referred to the Court was 
whether such a difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law was 
prohibited by Article 45 TFEU. The Court, however, did not clearly address this 
question. Instead, its reasoning mainly concerned the territorial scope of Union 
law.33 In this respect, relying on the link between Ms Boukhalfa’s employment 
contract and German law, the Court found that Article 45 TFEU was applicable.34 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Conflict of Laws, and the Limits of their Operation in Respect of Place and Time (William Guthrie 
tr, T&T Clark Law Publishers 1869) 89-129. 
32 Case C-214/94 Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I-2253. 
33 The Court reiterated that Union law also applied to professional activities carried outside the 
Union territory, if there was a sufficient close link between an employment relationship and the 
law of a Member State and, thus, the relevant rule of Union law. (See para15). More on the 
extraterritorial application of Union law, see eg  Case 36/74 B.N.O Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v 
Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacíon 
Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405; Case 237/83 SARL Prodest v Caisse Primaire d’Assurance 
Maladie de Paris [1984] ECR 3153; Case 9/88 Mário Lopes da Veiga v Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie [1989] ECR 2989; Case C-60/93 R. L. Aldewereld v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1994] 
ECR I-2991; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] ECR I-7091. 
34 Case C-214/94 Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I-2253, para 16. 
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Hence, the applicability of Article 45 TFEU meant that the German choice-of-law 
rule at issue could not be applied, since a Belgian national could not be treated 
worse than a German national.35 This point was well addressed by AG Lèger in 
his Opinion. He held that in accordance with the German choice-of-law rule, the 
employment contracts of those working in the German diplomatic representations 
were subject to different rules according to whether or not they were German 
nationals.36 In other words, according to AG Lèger, the criterion giving rise to a 
difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law of the comparably placed 
employees was clearly nationality.37  
 
Boukhalfa, thus, shows how the mere application of a national choice-of-law rule 
based on nationality as a connecting factor could result in an outcome contrary to 
the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality. In this respect, 
however, it is not clear whether this should be understood as a general rule that 
nationality cannot be used as a connecting factor to determine the applicable law 
in the Union. It is true that in light of such a choice-of-law rule, a possible 
disparity in treatment, for instance, imposed on nationals of two Member States as 
a result of the application of different national substantive laws pursuant to their 
different nationalities cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, even though this prima 
facie might seem to be directly discriminatory on grounds of nationality, such a 
difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law would not be incompatible 
with Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions, provided that 
                                                 
35 Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (Europa Law 
Publishing 2006) 21. 
36 Case C-214/94 Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I-2253, Opinion of 
Advocate General Lèger, para 18. 
37 ibid. 
74 
 
nationality in this context is only used as a neutral connecting factor only to 
determine the applicable law. 
 
At the outset, it is necessary to mention that nationality is one of the connecting 
factors that are inherent in most national legal systems in the Union. Nationality 
determines the substantive law, for instance, applicable with regard to the matters 
of personal status and capacity, family relations and succession.38 As argued by 
the scholarship, nationality in this context has been adopted and used as a 
connecting factor to strengthen and maintain the special ties between a State and 
its nationals.39 Choice-of-law rules that are based on nationality as a connecting 
factor offer ‘a method of ascertaining the law which most closely accords with the 
social and cultural environment of the person concerned’.40 Therefore, within 
these national legal systems, nationality is a legitimate ground to determine the 
applicable law and cannot per se be held to be incompatible with the principle of 
equal treatment so long as it is used as a neutral connecting factor.  
 
This line of reasoning also finds support in the Court’s case-law. A choice-of-law 
rule based on nationality as a connecting factor was also involved, for instance, in 
Garcia Avello.41 The issue in that case related to the Belgian rule, according to 
                                                 
38 Michael Bogdan (n 35) 23. See also John O’Brien and Raymond Smith, Conflict of Laws (2nd 
edn, Cavendish 1999), 88. Though, habitual residence is also used as a connecting factor in some 
Member States. See eg Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee 
Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639. The issue in that case concerned the Danish choice-of-law rule, 
under which the law applicable with regard to names is the law of habitual residence. 
39 See eg Johan Meeusen, ‘Instrumentalisation of Private International Law in the European 
Union: Towards a European Conflicts Revolution?’ (2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and 
Law 287, 293; Kurt Siehr, ‘General Problems of Private International Law in Modern 
Codifications – De Lege Lata and De Lege Europea Ferenda’ (2005) 7 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 17, 32. 
40 Ko Swan Sik, ‘The Netherlands and the Law concerning Nationality’ (1980) 3 International 
Law in the Netherlands 1, 18. 
41 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613. 
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which a child could only bear his/her father’s surname. Under the Belgian choice-
of-law rule, this rule applied to all Belgian nationals, even if they were resident 
outside Belgium. In addition, it was also applicable to Belgian nationals, who at 
the same time had one or more nationalities. The rule was applied with regard to 
the children who had dual Belgian-Spanish nationality. Their parents, Mr Garcia 
Avello and Mrs Weber, requested the Belgian authorities to register their 
children’s surname as ‘Garcia Weber’ according to the Spanish tradition, instead 
of ‘Garcia Avello’. Pursuant to the Belgian rule, their request was rejected by the 
Belgian authorities. The question referred to the Court was whether this was 
compatible with Article 18 TFEU. The Court pointed out that the principle of 
equal treatment on grounds of nationality required that comparable situations 
should not be treated differently and different situations should not be treated in 
the same way.42 Having mentioned the fact that under Belgian rule at issue, a 
person having only Belgian nationality and a person having Belgian and other 
nationality were treated similarly, the Court went on to the question of whether 
these two categories of persons were indeed in comparably placed situations. 
According to the Court this was not the case. Based on that, the Court held that 
Belgian nationals, who had also other nationality, bore different surnames under 
the legal systems concerned.43 To treat this category of persons in a similar way as 
those having only Belgian nationality would create difficulties for them, for 
instance, with regard to the legal effect of diplomas or documents drawn in 
different surnames.44  
 
                                                 
42 ibid para 31.  
43 ibid para 35. 
44 ibid para 36. 
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The Court’s reasoning appears to have rather limited or no impact on the 
application of the Belgian choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a connecting 
factor. In particular, the Court did not condemn the Belgian authorities for using 
nationality as a connecting factor for the application of the Belgian rule 
concerning names. On the contrary, as Meeusen points out, the Court itself rested 
its reasoning on the dual nationality of the children and the different rights to 
which their two nationalities gave rise.45 Thus, it appears that the main problem in 
Garcia Avello was not the application of the choice-of-law rule based on 
nationality as a connecting factor, but the Belgian rule that gave a preference to 
Belgian nationality as regards Belgian nationals who also had other nationalities. 
Because of that, they were also required to comply with the choice of surname 
under the Belgian substantive rule at issue. This is supported by the wording of 
the conclusion reached by the Court. It held that Articles 18 and 20 TFEU 
precluded the Belgian authorities to refuse the request to change the children’s 
surname, when the purpose of the request was to enable those children to bear a 
surname, to which they were entitled pursuant to the law and tradition of another 
Member State.46 
 
The argument that the use of nationality only as a neutral connecting factor is 
compatible with the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality also 
derives from the case of Hoorn.47 The issue in that case related to the agreement 
between Germany and the Netherlands on the pension payments in respect of the 
forced labour performed in Germany during the Second World War. According to 
the agreement, the amount of the pension payment was calculated pursuant to the 
                                                 
45 Johan Meeusen (n 39) 294. 
46 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613, para 45. 
47 Case C-305/92 Albert Hoorn v Landesversicherungsanstalt Westfalen [1994] ECR I-1525.  
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law of a worker’s nationality. Therefore, the amount of the pension payment 
provided to Mr Hoorn, a Dutch national, was determined according to Dutch law 
and was less than that granted to German nationals under German law. Mr Hoorn 
submitted that the difference in the amount of the pension payment paid was 
contrary to Article 18 TFEU. This claim was rejected by the Court. It held that the 
agreement between Germany and the Netherlands ‘merely determines the law 
applicable to the workers concerned, without stating the scope of the benefits’.48 
According to the Court, the difference in treatment arose from the difference in 
the amount of the benefits granted under Dutch and German law.49 Furthermore, 
the Court also found that the fact that Mr Hoorn was subject to Dutch law was not 
contrary to Article 18 TFEU, since it treated all eligible Union citizens equally 
irrespective of their nationality.50  
 
From the reasoning of the Court in Bosmann and Hoorn, it is clear that not every 
difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law imposed by a national 
choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a connecting factor is in fact contrary to 
Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement provisions. In particular, such a 
difference in treatment, though prima facie directly discriminatory on grounds of 
nationality, would not constitute discrimination and, thus, require objective 
                                                 
48 ibid para 12. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid para 13.  In this respect, it is also necessary to mention that free movement in the internal 
market is not supposed to be neutral as regards, for instance, taxation or social security. See in this 
respect Joined Cases C-393/99 and C-394/99 Institut national d'assurances sociales pour 
travailleurs indépendants (Inasti) v Claude Hervein and Hervillier SA (C-393/99) and Guy 
Lorthiois and Comtexbel SA (C-394/99) [2002] ECR I-2829, para 30; Case C-365/02 Proceedings 
brought by Marie Lindfors [2004] ECR I-7183, para 34; Case C-403/03 Egon Schempp v 
Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421, para 45. 
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justification if nationality in this context is merely used as a neutral connecting 
factor to determine the applicable law.51  
 
This, however, would not be the case, for instance, in two situations. First, this is 
when the applicable law is determined based on the possession of a particular 
nationality rather than the factor of nationality in general. This would constitute 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, since the preference given to a particular 
nationality would result in a group that possesses that nationality being privileged 
over the other one that does not.52 Therefore, unless there is an objective 
justification,53 such a choice-of-law rule would be caught by Article 18 TFEU or 
the Treaty free movement provisions. This is quite evident, if one compares, for 
instance, the choice-of-law rules involved in Boukhalfa and Hoorn. The rule in 
Boukhalfa does not appear to be neutral as the one in Hoorn. Specifically, in 
Boukhalfa, it seems that the determination of the applicable national substantive 
law was more centred on the fact of the possession of German nationality, rather 
than the factor of nationality in general as it was the case in Hoorn.54 In other 
                                                 
51 Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR 
I-7639, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, para 62. According to Advocate General 
Sharpston, distinctions between individuals as regards the applicable law based on nationality are 
inevitable where nationality only serves as a link to a particular national legal system. This also 
finds support in the recently adopted Rome III Regulation. Under Articles 5 and 8 of the Rome III 
Regulation, as one of the options provided, spouses can choose the law of the State of which one 
of them is a national as the law governing their divorce or legal separation. In the absence of a 
choice made, the law of the State of which both spouses are nationals at the time the court is seised 
with the case could be the applicable national substantive law. 
52 Tito Ballarino and Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘On Avello and Other Judgments: A New Point of 
Departure in the Conflicts of Laws’ (2004) 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 84, 102. See 
also, Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘The Inapplicability of the Connecting Factor of Nationality to the 
Negotiating Capacity in International Commerce’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private International 
Law 711, 723. 
53 As regards a justified residence requirement, see eg Case C-209/03 The Queen, on the 
application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and 
Skills [2005] ECR I-2119; Case C-138/02 Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2004] ECR I-2703; Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de 
Informatie Beheer Groep [2008] ECR I-8507. 
54 See also Case C-55/00 Elide Gottardo v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) 
[2002] ECR I-413. 
79 
 
words, as AG Lèger pointed out in Boukhalfa, the law applicable to the 
employment contracts was determined based on the fact of whether or not the 
person had German nationality. In this way, the choice-of-law rule at issue 
disadvantaged those who were nationals of other Member States, by treating them 
differently than German nationals. In this respect, it seems correct to argue that as 
far as the use of nationality as a connecting factor is concerned, a Member State is 
required to give equal value to its own nationality and that of another Member 
State, unless there is an objective justification for not doing so. 
 
Second, it could also be contrary to Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement 
provisions, in particular, discriminatory on grounds of movement, if a Member 
State, where nationality is used as a connecting factor, for instance, refuses to give 
effect to habitual residence, which is, in turn, used as a connecting factor in 
another Member State. That is to say, even though it is up to Member States to 
choose whether to have either nationality or habitual residence as a principal 
connecting factor in any area within their legal system, in certain circumstances 
falling within the scope of the Treaty free movement rights they might also be 
required to give equal value to both.  
 
This is well explained by Advocate General Sharpston in Grunkin Paul.55 The 
issue in that case related to the refusal by the German authorities to recognise the 
name consisting of both parents’ surnames that was given under Danish law to a 
child, a German national, who was born and resided in Denmark. His both parents 
were also German nationals but resided in Denmark. According to the Danish 
                                                 
55 Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR 
I-7639, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston. 
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choice-of-law rule, the law applicable with regard to names is the law of the place 
of habitual residence, while under the German choice-of-law rule it is the law of a 
person’s nationality. In contrast to German law that excludes the possibility to 
combine both parents’ surnames, Danish law allows that using either a hyphen or 
as a middle name. 
 
According to Advocate General Sharpston, the refusal to recognise the effects of 
measures which were valid under another legal system using another connecting 
factor offended the principle of equal treatment. The Advocate General found that 
it was contrary to the general principle of equal treatment, if ‘a choice of law rule 
of a Member State leads systematically to a refusal to recognise a surname given 
to a national of that Member State in accordance with the law of his Member State 
of birth and habitual residence, which is applicable by virtue of its own choice of 
law rules’.56 In Advocate General’s words, the principle of equal treatment 
required that, ‘when a situation is not purely internal to a Member State but 
involves the exercise of a right guaranteed by the (...) Treaty, a link to the law of 
another Member State should not be treated differently according to whether it is 
based on nationality or habitual residence’.57 
 
 
                                                 
56 ibid para 69. AG Sharpston held this based on the fact that if the child was born in a Member 
State that applies the jus soli, he could have acquired the nationality of that Member State and, in 
such a scenario, German authorities would have recognised the name given under the law of that 
Member State. Therefore, in AG Sharpston’s words, ‘German citizens born in another Member 
State and registered under a name formed in accordance with the law of that State as the State of 
their habitual residence are thus treated differently depending on whether the State also allows 
them to acquire its nationality, a matter not necessarily linked to the criterion it uses when 
determining the applicable law relating to names’. (see para 68). 
57 ibid. 
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2.2. Territoriality as a connecting factor 
 
So far the analysis concerned the possible discriminatory effect arising as a result 
of the application of a national choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a 
connecting factor. Now, let us consider the question of whether a national choice-
of-law rule based on territoriality as a connecting factor could also be caught by 
the principle of equal treatment laid down under Article 18 TFEU and, 
specifically, the Treaty free movement provisions.  
 
In accordance with a national choice-of-law rule based on territoriality as a 
connecting factor, the applicable national substantive law is determined pursuant 
to the location of the essential element of a given legal relationship. As an 
example, one could mention, for instance, habitual residence, marketplace, the 
place of employment, the place of a company’s establishment, the place where an 
immovable property is located, or the place where a disputed event takes place. 
Such a territorial choice of the applicable law was, for instance, subject to scrutiny 
under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU in a series of rulings concerning company 
formation and recognition. These are, for instance, Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art.  
 
Before going into them, it is necessary to mention that there are two different 
theories, i.e. the place of incorporation theory and the real-seat theory, used in 
Member States to indentify the law governing companies.58 According to the 
                                                 
58 Luca Cerioni, EU corporate law and EU company tax law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 70. 
The place of incorporation theory is used, for instance, in United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Finland, Denmark and Sweden. The real seat theory, in turn, is used, for instance, in Belgium, 
Germany, France, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal and Hungary.  
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place of incorporation theory, a company is a creature of the legal system where it 
is incorporated and, thus, the place of a company’s incorporation is regarded as 
the most appropriate connecting factor to determine the law governing the matters 
related to its formation, internal relations and recognition.59 In contrast, under the 
real-seat theory, the prevailing legal system is where a company conducts its main 
activities and, therefore, the place where its head office or central management is 
located is considered as the main connecting factor to determine the applicable 
law.60 
 
In Centros,61 the subject of contention was the refusal by the Danish authorities to 
register a branch of Centros, a company incorporated in the UK. The refusal was 
based on the ground that Centros had never traded in the UK and was essentially 
seeking to create not a branch but a permanent establishment in Denmark by 
circumventing the rules regarding the paying-up of minimum capital under Danish 
law. English law did not impose such a requirement. The Court found that the 
refusal by a Member State to register a branch of a company formed in 
accordance with the law of another Member State constituted an obstacle to the 
exercise of freedom of establishment under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. The Court 
rejected the argument related to the possible circumvention of the relevant rules 
under Danish law. In particular, the Court held that ‘the fact that a national of a 
Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form it in the Member 
State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up 
branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right 
of establishment. The right to form a company in accordance with the law of a 
                                                 
59 Robert R Drury, ‘Migrating Companies’ (1999) 24 European Law Review 354, 356. 
60 ibid. 
61 Case C-212/97 Cenros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459. 
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Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in the 
exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the 
Treaty’.62 The Court also added that the fact that a company did not conduct any 
business in the Member State of its incorporation was not sufficient to prove the 
existence of an abuse or fraudulent conduct.63  
 
In Überseering,64 the issue related to the German rule, under which, the right of a 
company to bring legal proceedings was dependent on its legal capacity. 
According to German law, the latter was determined pursuant to the law of the 
place where a company had its actual centre of administration as oppose to the 
law of the place of its incorporation. This was also applicable to companies, 
incorporated in other States, which had transferred their actual centre of 
administration to Germany. Überseering was a company incorporated in the 
Netherlands and owned a property in Germany. It entered into a contract with 
NCC to refurbish a garage and a motel situated on that property.65 Überseering 
sought compensation from NCC, because it was not satisfied with the paint work 
done by the latter. Its claim was dismissed by the German court. It found that 
Überseering’s actual centre of administration was transferred to Germany once its 
shares were acquired by two German nationals. As a result, according to the 
German court, as a company incorporated in the Netherlands, Überseering did not 
have a legal capacity in Germany and, consequently, the right to bring legal 
proceedings there. 
 
                                                 
62 ibid para 27. 
63 ibid para 29. 
64 Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) 
[2002] ECR I-9919. 
65 In the meantime, two German nationals residing in Germany acquired all shares in Überseering. 
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The Court found the refusal to recognise the legal capacity of a company 
incorporated in a Member State on the ground that its actual centre of 
administration had been moved to another Member State was contrary to Articles 
49 and 54 TFEU. In this regard, the Court held that Überseering, validly 
incorporated in the Netherlands, was entitled under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU to 
exercise freedom of establishment.66 It was of little significance that its shares 
were acquired by German nationals residing in Germany, since that did not cause 
Überseering to cease to be a legal person under Dutch law.67 According to the 
Court, the company’s ‘existence is inseparable from its status as a company 
incorporated under [Dutch] law, since a company exists only by virtue of the 
national legislation which determines its incorporation and functioning. The 
requirement of reincorporation of the same company in Germany is therefore 
tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment’.68 
 
In Inspire Art,69 in turn, the issue concerned the Dutch rule, which required 
companies incorporated in other States but carrying their activities exclusively in 
the Netherlands to register as a formally foreign company and meet several 
requirements in this respect, such as minimum capital and directors’ liability. This 
rule was applied to Inspire Art, a British company, which was carrying its activity 
in the Netherlands through a branch in Amsterdam. Its sole director, who resided 
in The Hague, was authorised to act alone and independently on behalf of the 
company. Due to its exclusive activity in the Netherlands, Inspire Art was threfore 
                                                 
66 ibid para 80. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid para 81. 
69 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] 
ECR I-10155. 
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required to add in the commercial register that it was a formally foreign company 
and meet the necessary requirements in this regard.  
 
The Court was asked to rule on whether this was compatible with Articles 49 and 
54 TFEU. Relying on Centros and Segers,70 the Court first reiterated that with 
regard to the application of these Treaty provisions, it was immaterial that a 
company was formed in a Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself 
in another Member State, where its main or entire activity was to be conducted.71 
In particular, according to the Court, the fact that a company was formed in the 
first Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable 
legislation did not constitute an abuse.72 The Court, thus, held that Inspire Art 
could rely on Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, even if it was formed in the UK for the 
purpose of circumventing the stricter rules under Dutch law. As a result, the 
application of the additional rules on minimum capital and directors’ liability 
under Dutch law to a company formed in accordance with the law of another 
Member State had the effect of impeding the exercise of freedom of 
establishment.73 In this respect, the Court also pointed out that the fact that foreign 
companies were recognised under Dutch law and were not refused registration did 
not make a difference.74 
 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, thus, show that the use of ‘real seat’ or, in 
other words, the place where a company’s head office or central management is 
                                                 
70 Case 79/85 D.H.M. Segers v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en 
Verzekeringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen [1986] ECR I-2375, para 16; Case C-212/97 
Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459, para 17. 
71 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] 
ECR I-10155, para 95. 
72 ibid para 96. 
73 ibid para 101. 
74 ibid para 99. 
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located as a connecting factor can be discriminatory contrary to Articles 49 and 54 
TFEU.75 From the outset, it is necessary to point out that the mere use of ‘real 
seat’ as a connecting factor by a Member State is clearly compatible with Articles 
49 and 54 TFEU. In particular, similar to nationality and habitual residence in 
case of natural persons, it is up to a Member State to decide whether to base upon 
either ‘real seat’ or the place of incorporation as a connecting factor to establish 
the legal personality of a company and, in general, the fact that the latter has the 
status of being established under its law. This is evident from the reasoning the 
Court gave in the early case of Daily Mail and has reiterated in the recent case of 
Cartesio.76 In these cases, the Court held that ‘unlike natural persons, companies 
are creatures of the law and, in the present state of [Union] law, creatures of 
national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which 
determines their incorporation and functioning’.77 The Court also added that the 
Treaty had taken into account this variety in national legislation, which was 
expressed by the fact that connecting factors such as the registered office, central 
administration and principal place of business were given the same footing under 
Article 54 TFEU.78 According to the Court, the freedom of a Member State to 
define the relevant connecting factor did not only concern the formation of a 
company, but also the condition whereby a company could retain the status of 
                                                 
75 More on the effect of the Court rulings, see eg  Hans C Hirt, ‘Freedom of Establishment, 
International Company Law and the Comparison of European Company Law Systems after the 
ECJ’s decision in Inspire Art ltd’ (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1189; Eddy 
Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s seat in European Company Law’ (2003) 40 Common 
Market Law Review 661; Werner F Ebke, ‘Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries’ (2000) 
48 American Journal of Comparative Law 623; Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘No Freedom of Emigration 
for Companies?’ (2005) 16 European Business Law Review 621. 
76 Case 81/87 The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily 
Mail and General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483; Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt 
[2008] ECR I-9641. 
77 ibid Daily Mail, para 19; Cartesio, para 104. 
78 ibid Daily Mail, para 21; Cartesio, para 106. 
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being established under its law.79 Thus, on the one hand, to grant such a status, a 
Member State is free to require a company to have its registered office as well as 
its ‘real seat’ on its territory.80 On the other hand, a Member State can also refuse 
to permit a company to retain that status if it intends to move its seat to another 
Member State.81 
 
In light of Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, however, it would be 
incompatible with Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, if a Member State refuses to 
recognise a company validly incorporated under the law of another Member State 
relying on ‘real seat’ as a connecting factor. In particular, assume for a moment 
that a Member State allows a company incorporated under its law to move its seat 
to another Member State while retaining the status of being established under its 
law. The second Member State in this respect cannot use ‘real seat’ as a 
connecting factor to deny the legal capacity of that company by requiring it to re-
incorporate itself under its law,82 and consequently, have its registered office as 
well as ‘real seat’ on its territory.83 Similarly, the second Member State cannot 
impose additional requirements on the branch of a company validly incorporated 
                                                 
79 Cartesio, para 107. 
80 ibid para 110. 
81 ibid. In this respect, the requirement of winding-up or liquidation could be imposed on the 
company. However, according to the Court such a requirement could be incompatible with 
Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, ‘a company governed by the law of one Member State moves to another 
Member State with an attendant change as regards the national law applicable, since in [this] 
situation the company is converted into a form of company which is governed by the law of the 
Member State to which it has moved’. 
82 Enrico Vaccaro, ‘Transfer of Seat and Freedom of Establishment in European Company Law’ 
(2005) 16 European Business Law Review 1348, 1350. 
83 Under the real seat theory, for a company to have its legal capacity recognised, it has to be 
incorporated in the ‘real seat’ State, meaning that its place of incorporation and ‘real seat’ should 
coincide within one and the same State. See in this respect, Peter Behrens, ‘From “Real Seat” to 
“Legal Seat”: Germany’s Private International Company Law Revolution’ in Peter Hay, Lajos 
Vekas, Yehuda Elkana and Others (eds), Resolving International Conflicts: liber amicorum Tibor 
Várady (Central European University Press 2009) 46. See also, Alexandros Roussos, ‘Realising 
the Free Movement of Companies’ (2001) 12 European Business Law Review 7, 8-9; Werner F 
Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, Inspire Art and 
Beyond’ (2005) 16 European Business Law Review 7, 13. 
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under the law of another Member State before it is allowed to enjoy the right 
under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. In both occasions, therefore, the use of ‘real seat’ 
as a connecting factor would be incompatible with Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, 
unless there are objective justifications for doing so. As the Court pointed out, 
requirements relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the interests 
of creditors, minority shareholders or employees, could in certain circumstances 
be taken as a ground for objective justification.84 Though, it is necessary to 
mention that in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, for instance, the Court did 
not accept any claims based on these grounds.  
 
In this context, strictly in terms of the limitations imposed on the use of a choice-
of-law rule based on a specific connecting factor, Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art in a certain way could be compared to Grunkin Paul. As further 
explained in the fourth chapter, Grunkin Paul and other similar rulings seem to 
extend the principle of party autonomy with regard to names.85 That is to say, a 
person can register a name according to the tradition and law of a Member State 
of his/her own choice on the basis of a particular connecting factor, for example 
habitual residence. Another Member State in this regard cannot refuse to 
recognise that name based on another connecting factor, such as nationality, 
unless it is objectively justified. In the same vein, the party autonomy principle 
also appears to be extended to the matters related to company formation and 
                                                 
84 See eg Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
(NCC) [2002] ECR I-9919, para 92. 
85 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-353/06 
Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639; Case 
C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien (CJEU, 22 December 2010); 
Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės 
administracija and Others (CJEU, 12 May 2011). 
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recognition.86 This means that one has the freedom to choose any national 
jurisdiction to establish a company, irrespective of whether the connecting factor 
used in this regard is the place of incorporation or ‘real seat’. Other Member 
States, in turn, are obliged to recognise such a company and any additional 
requirements imposed on it or its branch should be objectively justified. Because 
of its specific nature, this obligation particularly concerns a Member State that 
follows the real-seat theory.  In this way, similar to the nationality-habitual 
residence dichotomy discussed earlier, in situations falling within the scope of 
Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, such a Member State is required to give equal weight to 
the place of incorporation and ‘real seat’ as connecting factors to determine the 
legal capacity of a company.87 
 
3. Union choice-of-law rules 
 
The analysis presented above shows that national choice-of-law rules can be 
caught by the principle of equal treatment, if nationality or territoriality they are 
based upon is not merely used as a neutral connecting factor to determine the 
applicable law. In particular, the following is likely to be incompatible with the 
principle of equal treatment and, therefore, require objective justification. This 
would be the case, for instance, when in the process of identifying the applicable 
law one nationality is given preference over the other nationality. Similarly, this 
could also occur if nationality and habitual residence or two territorial connecting 
                                                 
86 Sylvaine Poillot-Peruzzetto, ‘International Company Law in the ECJ Decisions’ in Jürgen 
Basedow, Harald Baum and Yuko Nishitani (eds) (n 6) 197. 
87 In this respect, is seems relevant to mention the finding of AG Sharpston in Grunkin Paul that 
‘when a situation is not purely internal to a Member State but involves the exercise of a right 
guaranteed by the (...) Treaty, a link to the law of another Member State should not be treated 
differently’. Such a situation was present, for instance, in Überseering, where a company having 
its ‘real seat’ in Germany but the place of incorporation in another Member State was treated 
differently than a company having its ‘real seat’ and the place of incorporation in Germany. 
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factors having the same scope, such as the place of incorporation and ‘real seat’, 
are not given equal weight by a Member State. 
 
As far as Union choice-of-law rules are concerned, in particular those adopted 
under Article 81 TFEU, the situation, however, appears to be different. 
Considering the territorial nature of the connecting factors that Union choice-of-
law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU are premised upon, the application of 
these rules might lead to a difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law. 
Such a difference in treatment is less likely to constitute direct or indirect 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, because Union choice-of-law rules are 
based on single neutral connecting factors, which, in turn, are designed in light of 
the Treaty free movement provisions. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement 
provisions is not confined to questions of nationality, but also encompasses the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of movement. Thus, a rule that puts at a 
disadvantage and as a result treats differently those who have exercised the Treaty 
free movement rights in comparison to those who have not could be caught under 
these Treaty provisions.88 In this context, one could therefore query whether a 
difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law imposed on those who have 
exercised the Treaty free movement rights and those who have not could also be 
found to be discriminatory under Article 18 TFEU or the Treaty free movement 
                                                 
88 See eg, Case C-419/92 Ingetraut Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda 
[1994] ECR I-505, para  12; Case C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] 
ECR I-3089, para 32; Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D'Hoop v Office national de l'emploi [2002] 
ECR I-6191, para 30; Case C-464/02 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929, 
para 50; Joined Cases C-151/04 and C-152/04 Criminal proceedings against Claude Nadin and 
Others [2005] ECR I-11203, para 34; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R.A. Tas v Raadskamer 
WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451, para 31; Case C-544/07 Uwe 
Rüffler v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wrocławiu Ośrodek Zamiejscowy w Wałbrzychu [2009] 
ECR I-3389, para 73. 
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provisions. In particular, it is not clear whether the objective of Union choice-of-
law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU in ensuring certainty over the applicable 
law and predictability of litigation in the context of cross-border relationships 
could play any role in this regard.  
 
In this context, let us first consider Bosmann. This case could be interpreted as 
involving discriminatory treatment on grounds of movement imposed as a result 
of the application of the lex loci laboris rule, the main choice-of-law rule 
enshrined in Regulation 1408/71.89 The specific approach taken by the Court in 
Bosmann with regard to the lex loci laboris rule could shed some light on the 
relationship between Union choice-of-law rule adopted under Article 81 TFEU 
and the principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement laid down in Article 
18 TFEU and in the Treaty free movement provisions. 
 
3.1. Bosmann and Union choice-of-law rules under Article 48 TFEU* 
 
Pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule under Regulation 1408/71, a person employed 
in the territory of a Member State was subject to the legislation of that State in 
relation to social security, even if he/she resided in the territory of another 
Member State.90 According to the facts in Bosmann, Mrs Bosmann, a Belgian 
national, was entitled to a child benefit in Germany, where she was residing. After 
taking up a job in the Netherlands, the German authorities refused to pay the 
                                                 
* The findings in this section has been published in (2011) 1 European Journal of Social Law 76. 
89 Regulation 1408/71 was adopted under Article 48 TFEU and aimed to coordinate the application 
of national social security legislations. This Regulation has been replaced and repealed by 
Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems, [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
90 Ibid, Article 13. According to Article 73, that person was also entitled in respect of his/her 
family members to the family benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State of 
employment. This rule also remains as a main choice-of-law rule in Regulation 883/2004. 
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benefit, relying on the fact that Mrs Bosmann was subject to Dutch law in light of 
the lex loci laboris rule. However, under Dutch law she could not receive a similar 
benefit, since it was not paid with regard to children aged over 18. The question 
referred to the Court was whether Regulation 1408/71 should be interpreted 
restrictively so as to allow Mrs Bosmann to receive a child benefit under German 
law. 
 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Mazák held that the refusal by the German 
authorities to grant a child benefit to Mrs Bosmann was lawful. According to AG 
Mazák, the issue in this context specifically concerned the substantive conditions 
for the entitlement to a child benefit laid down under Dutch law, rather than the 
applicability of Dutch law pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule.91 AG Mazák 
continued that the entitlement to a child benefit was a matter dealt in accordance 
with the applicable national legislation, which varied from Member State to 
Member State. This is because, in AG Mazák’s words, under Union law national 
social security systems were only coordinated, not harmonised.92  
 
The Court, however, reached the opposite conclusion. According to the Court, 
even though the German authorities were not required to grant a child benefit to 
Mrs Bosmann,93 this did not necessarily mean that she had no possibility to 
                                                 
91 Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Familienkasse Aachen [2008] 
ECR I-3827, Opinion of Advocate General Mazák, para 64. 
92 Ibid, para 59. The position taken by Advocate General Mazák supports the idea that Union 
choice-of-law rules should be given effect, even if their application results in disadvantageous 
treatment. This is because such treatment is linked to the differences in substance existing between 
the applicable national substantive rules. 
93 Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Familienkasse Aachen [2008] 
ECR I-3827, para 27. This was because, pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule enshrined in the 
Regulation, the applicable law was Dutch law, which did not provide a similar benefit. In addition, 
the Court rejected the argument that the lex loci laboris rule should be disregarded in light of 
Article 10 of Regulation 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down the procedure for implementing 
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receive the benefit. She was eligible for it under the German legislation, since she 
resided in Germany.94 In this regard, the Court held that the Regulation should be 
interpreted in light of Article 48 TFEU, which aimed to facilitate free movement 
of workers so that migrant workers did not lose their right to social security 
benefits or had the amount of these benefits reduced because they had exercised 
the right to free movement.95 On these grounds, the Court came to the conclusion 
that Mrs Bosmann could receive a child benefit pursuant to German law, even 
though Dutch law was the only applicable law pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule. 
 
3.1.1. Discrimination on grounds of movement 
 
To begin with, Bosmann seems to extend the equal treatment requirement on 
grounds of movement under Article 45 TFEU with regard to the lex loci laboris 
rule and even other choice-of-law rules under Regulation 1408/71 (now 
Regulation 883/2004). As pointed out earlier, Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free 
movement provisions go beyond the mere prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, whether it is direct or indirect.96 The principle of equal 
treatment under these Treaty provisions also prohibits a difference in treatment on 
grounds of movement - situations where those who have exercised the Treaty free 
                                                                                                                                     
Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self 
employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving within the Community 
[2006] OJ L 74/1. This Regulation has been repealed by Regulation 883/2004. According to 
Article 10 of this Regulation (rules applicable in the case of overlapping of rights), ‘entitlement to 
benefits or family allowance due under the legislation of a Member State, (...) shall be suspended 
when, during the same period and for the same member of the family, benefits are due only in 
pursuance of the national legislation of another Member State (...)’. 
94 Ibid, para 28. 
95 Ibid, para 29. 
96 Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR 
I-7639, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, para 64. See also Anastasia Iliopoulou and Helen 
Toner, ‘A New Approach to Discrimination Against Free Movers?’ (2003) 28 European Law 
Review 389, 395; Nicolas Bernard, ‘Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law’ (1996) 45 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 82, 87. Obviously, not to mention non-discriminatory 
barriers that are caught by the Treaty free movement provisions. 
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movement rights are disadvantaged, or in other words, situations where cross-
border activities are treated less advantageously than domestic ones.97 In the 
context of Article 18 TFEU, this is well illustrated in D’Hoop.98 The issue in this 
case concerned the tideover allowance available under Belgian law for job-
seeking school-leavers, if they had completed secondary education in Belgium. 
Ms D’Hoop was denied the allowance on the ground that she had completed her 
secondary education in France. This was found by the Court to be incompatible 
with Union law. Considering the issue in the context of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, 
the Court held that: 
 
In that a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member States the same 
treatment in law as that accorded to the nationals of those Member States 
who find themselves in the same situation, it would be incompatible with 
the right of freedom of movement were a citizen, in the Member State of 
which he is a national, to receive treatment less favourable than he would 
enjoy if he had not availed himself of the opportunities offered by the Treaty 
in relation to freedom of movement.99 
 
                                                 
97 Damien Charmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press 2010) 462. This has its roots in the general formula 
reiterated by the Court on several occassions that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way. See in this respect, 
Case 106/83 Sermide SpA v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others [1984] ECR 4209, para 28; 
Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613, para 31; Case C-403/03 
Egon Schempp v Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421, para 28; Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber 
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2008] ECR I-9705, para 75; Case C-164/07 James Wood v Fonds 
de garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions [2008] ECR I-4143, para 
13; Case C-155/09 Commission v Greece (CJEU, 20 January 2011), para 68. 
98 Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D'Hoop v Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191.  
99 ibid para 30. See also, Case C-406/04 Gérald De Cuyper v Office national de l’emploi [2006] 
ECR I-6947, para 39; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R.A. Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de 
Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451, para 31; Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought 
by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639, para 21; Case C-499/06 Halina 
Nerkowska v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Koszalinie [2008] ECR I-3993, para 32; 
Case C-221/07 Krystyna Zablocka-Weyhermüller v Land Baden-Württemberg [2008] ECR I-9029, 
para 35; Case C-544/07 Uwe Rüffler v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wrocławiu Ośrodek 
Zamiejscowy w Wałbrzychu [2009] ECR I-3389, para 73; Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein 
v Landeshauptmann von Wien (CJEU, 22 December 2010), para 53; Case C-391/09 Malgožata 
Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others 
(CJEU, 12 May 2011), para 68. 
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Similarly, in the context of the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons, 
one could mention, for instance, Nadin.100 The issue in that case related to the 
Belgian rule that prohibited residents in Belgium to use vehicles registered in and 
made available to them by employers established in other Member States. 
According to the Court, the rule was contrary to Article 49 TFEU. In this respect, 
the Court held that: 
 
The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for persons are 
intended to facilitate the pursuit by [Union] citizens of occupational 
activities of all kinds throughout the [Union], and preclude measures which 
might place [Union] citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an 
economic activity in the territory of another Member State.101 
 
                                                 
100 Joined Cases C-151/04 and C-152/04 Criminal proceedings against Claude Nadin and Others 
[2005] ECR I-11203. 
101 ibid para 34. See also, with regard to rules on qualification, Case 115/78 J. Knoors v Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs [1979] ECR 399, para 19; Case 246/80 C. Broekmeulen v Huisarts 
Registratie Commissie [1981] ECR 2311, para 27; Case C-61/89 Criminal proceedings against 
Marc Gaston Bouchoucha [1990] ECR I-3551, para 13;; Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land 
Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR. I-1663, para 32; Case C-153/02 Valentina Neri v European 
School of Economics (ESE Insight World Education System Ltd) [2003] ECR I-13555, para 51; 
Case C-286/06 Commission v Kingdom of Spain [2008] ECR I-8025, para 72; Case C-151/07 
Theologos-Grigorios Khatzithanasis v Ipourgos Igias kai Kinonikis Allilengiis and Organismos 
Epangelmatikis Ekpaidefsis kai Katartisis (OEEK) [2008] ECR  I-9013, para 32. With regard to 
possible limitations, see eg Case C-311/06 Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri v Ministero della 
Giustizia and Marco Cavallera [2009] ECR I-415. With regard to rules on residence, see eg Case 
C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR I-3089, para 32; With 
regard to immigration rules, see Case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal et 
Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265, para 23. 
With regard rules concerning previous employment or the place of employment, see eg Case C-
419/92 Ingetraut Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda [1994] ECR I-
505, para  12; Case C-464/02 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929, para 50. 
With regard to service providers and recipients, see eg Case C-381/93 Commission France [1995] 
ECR I-5145, para 17; Case C-70/99 Commission v Portugal [2001] ECR I-4845, para 27; Case C-
295/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-1737, para 10; Case C-92/01 Georgios Stylianakis v 
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Tesoro [1984] ECR  377, para 16; Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën 
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Such a difference in treatment could also be observed in Bosmann. The 
application of Dutch law pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule in Bosmann did not 
result in directly or indirectly discriminatory treatment on grounds of nationality. 
However, its application to the situation involving Mrs Bosmann put her at a 
disadvantage, because she had exercised the right to free movement under Article 
45 TFEU. In particular, giving effect to Dutch law instead of German law with 
respect to the entitlement to a child benefit could be argued resulted in a 
difference in treatment between, on the one hand, those resident and employed in 
Germany and, on the other hand, those resident in Germany but employed in other 
Member States.102 The fact that this was held to be contrary to Article 48 TFEU 
taken together with Article 45 TFEU seems to extend the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of movement with regard to the lex loci laboris rule, 
                                                 
102 cf Joined Case C-393/99 and C-394/99 Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs 
indépendants (Inasti) v Claude Hervein and Hervillier SA (C-393/99) and Guy Lorthiois and 
Comtexbel SA (C-394/99) [2002] ECR I-2829. The Court in that case held that ‘the Treaty offers 
no guarantee to a worker that extending his activities into more than one Member State or 
transferring them to another Member State will be neutral as regards social security. Given the 
disparities in the social security legislation of the Member States, such an extension or transfer 
may be to the worker's advantage in terms of social security or not, according to circumstance. It 
follows that, in principle, any disadvantage, by comparison with the situation of a worker who 
pursues all his activities in one Member State, resulting from the extension or transfer of his 
activities into or to one or more other Member States and from his being subject to additional 
social security legislation is not contrary to [Articles 45 and 49 TFEU] if that legislation does not 
place that worker at a disadvantage as compared with those who pursue all their activities in the 
Member State where it applies ...’ (see para 51). This was also reiterated in Case C-387/01 Harald 
Weigel and Ingrid Weigel v Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg [2004] ECR I-9445, para 55; 
Case C-365/02 Proceedings brought by Marie Lindfors [2004] ECR I-7183, para 34; Case C-
403/03 Egon Schempp v Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421, para 45; Case C-293/06 
Deutsche Shell GmbH v Finanzamt für Großunternehmen in Hamburg [2008] ECR I-1129, para 
43. However, it should be mentioned that these cases concerned national taxation. In light of this, 
one could question whether it was reasonable to have recourse to the free movement of workers 
rationale because of the disadvantage that arose as a result of the mere application of Dutch law 
pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule. After all, it was Mrs Bosmann’s choice to take up a job in the 
Netherlands. If she had not done so, she would have not been at a disadvantage. Such a 
disadvantage was the result of the disparity in the social security legislations applied in two 
Member States. The Court held on several occasions that Member States retain the power to 
organise their social security system, and in the absence of harmonisation measures at Union level, 
determine the conditions under which social security benefits are granted. See in this respect, Case 
238/82 Duphar BV and other v The Netherlands State [1984] ECR 523, para 16; Case C-70/95 
Sodemare SA, Anni Azzuri Holding SpA and Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl v Regione Lombardia [1997] 
ECR I-3395, para 27; Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR 
I-1931, para 17; Case C-444/05 Aikaterini Stamatelaki v NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron 
Epangelmation (OAEE) [2007] ECR I-3185, para 23. 
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despite that similar to other Union choice-of-law rules it is premised upon a 
neutral connecting factor. Specifically, the reasoning of the Court in Bosmann 
appears to imply that a Union choice-of-law rule adopted under Article 48 TFEU 
is not immune from being subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal 
treatment on grounds of movement, if its application leads to a difference in the 
national substantive law applied to migrant and non-migrant Union citizens. 
 
3.1.2. Subordination of the lex loci laboris rule  
 
Not only does Bosmann seem to extend the equal treatment requirement on 
grounds of movement with regard to the lex loci laboris rule, but it also appears to 
subordinate it to Article 45 TFEU taken in conjunction with Article 48 TFEU.  An 
important factor in this respect is the finding of the Court that the application of 
the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 could not entail the loss by migrant workers 
of their rights to social security benefits or the reduction of the amount of these 
benefits.103 In this way, it could be argued that the Court deviated from the 
previous understanding of the role of the lex loci laboris rule and other choice-of-
law rules under Regulation 1408/71 (now Regulation 883/2004).104 
 
 
                                                 
103 Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Familienkasse Aachen [2008] 
ECR I-3827, para 29. 
104 See in this respect Case 302/84 A. A. Ten Holder v Direction de la Nieuwe Algemene 
Bedrijfsvereniging [1986] ECR I-1821; Case 60/85 M. E. S. Luijte v Raad van Arbeid [1986] ECR 
I-2365. In both cases, the Court rejected the possibility of the application of the law of the Member 
State of residence that was not designated as applicable by the Regulation. In doing so, the Court 
found that ‘the provisions [of Regulation 1408/71] constitute a complete system of conflict rules 
the effect of which is to divest the legislature of each Member State of the power to determine the 
ambit and the conditions for the application of its national legislation’. The Court continued that a 
Member Sate was not entitled to determine the extent to which its own legislation or that of 
another Member State was applicable, since it was under the obligation to comply with the 
provisions of Union law in force. 
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3.1.2.1. No substantial effect on the lex loci laboris rule 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Bosmann contradicts the very wording of Regulation 
1408/71 (now Regulation 883/2004), one could certainly be hesitant to read too 
much into the reasoning of the Court, by drawing any general conclusion with 
regard to the role of the lex loci laboris rule in the context of the coordination of 
national social security systems. It could be argued that the reasoning of the Court 
in Bosmann was very much focused on the specific circumstances of the case and 
was not intended in any way to enunciate a clear statement of principle. Relying 
on the factual background of the case, it seems that the Court aimed at not letting 
Mrs Bosmann to be deprived of the right to a child benefit under German law that 
provided more generous social security protection. In this respect, an essential 
factor appears to be the general wording of the relevant German rule, which 
covered all residents irrespective of their place of employment. From the 
reasoning of the Court, it could be understood that the lex loci laboris rule could 
not be given effect in such a case, since its application would result in excluding 
the person at issue from the scope of national law.105  
 
It is fair to assume that the decision of the Court might have been different, if the 
German rule did not have such a wide scope and was specifically worded in light 
of Regulation 1408/71. The German rule, for instance, could state that a child 
benefit was granted to all residents except those who were subject to the 
                                                 
105 Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Familienkasse Aachen [2008] 
ECR I-3827, para 31. 
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legislation of another Member State in accordance with Regulation 1408/71.106 In 
this scenario, it is likely that the Court would give effect to the lex loci laboris 
rule. It is true that the difference between the positions taken by the Court in this 
scenario and Bosmann could seem rather puzzling. After all, in both situations, in 
essence, the person is subject to a disadvantage as a result of the application of the 
lex loci laboris rule. In both situations, the application of the lex loci laboris rule 
by the German authorities, either invoking the Regulation itself or the national 
rule that refers to it, leads to the loss by Mrs Bosmann of the right to receive a 
child benefit under German law, which she would have retained if she had stayed 
in Germany. However, in contrast to Bosmann, in the present scenario, according 
to the wording of the German rule, Mrs Bosmann would not fall within its scope 
because of her employment in the Netherlands. In this respect, as the Court held in 
Bosmann, Union law would not compel the German authorities to grant a child 
benefit to Mrs Bosmann. Furthermore, the disadvantage faced by Mrs Bosmann is 
also likely to be justified on objective grounds. For example, this could be the fact 
that the Regulation aims to preserve the financial balance of national welfare 
systems107 or the fact that Mrs Bosmann was no longer in a comparable position 
to claim the treatment provided to those who are employed and resident in 
Germany.108 The compatibility of the lex loci laboris rule in such a scenario also 
                                                 
106 Yves Jorens and Jean-Philippe Lhernould (eds), ‘Towards a new framework for applicable 
legislation – News forms of mobility, coordination principles and rules of conflict’, Think Tank 
Report 2008, Training and Reporting on European Social Security (Project DG EMPL/E/3 – 
VC/2007/0188), 26 < http://www.tress-network.org/tressnew/public/europeanreport/thinktank_ 
mobility.pdf> accessed 19 September 2011. 
107 See eg Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-19131, 
para 41; Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance nationale des mutualités 
chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363, para 47; Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de 
maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR I-1831, para 39; Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v 
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen 
[2001] ECR I-5473, para 72. 
108 See in this respect Case C-212/06 Government of the French Union and Wallon Government v 
Flemish Government [2008] ECR I-1683, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, para 78. 
According to Advocate General Sharpston, in light of the principle of equality enshrined in 
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finds support in the facts of the Flemish Insurance case.109 Being subject to an 
infringement procedure opened up by the Commission in light of Regulation 
1408/71, the Flemish Union made certain amendments to the newly introduced 
insurance scheme. According to one of them, the scheme was not applicable to 
persons residing within the Flemish region, who pursuant to Regulation 1408/71 
were subject to the social security scheme of another Member State.110 This 
amendment was not subject to any further infringement proceedings nor 
considered in the judgment. 
 
3.1.2.2. Extending the ‘binary’ approach to the lex loci laboris rule 
 
Having said that, however, the position taken by the Court in Bosmann could also 
be understood as a confirmation of the fact that the applicability of the lex loci 
laboris rule is subordinated to the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons. 
The Court’s reasoning seems to endorse the idea that notwithstanding its nature, 
the lex loci laboris rule does not take an absolute priority in every single case, 
since any disadvantage imposed as a consequence of its application cannot be 
disregarded. In particular, it suggests that the lex loci laboris rule is not indifferent 
with regard to the exercise of the Treaty free movement rights to the extent that 
any adverse effect of its application is accepted.111 In this respect, it could be 
argued that in light of the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons the 
                                                                                                                                     
Regulation 1408/71, the Member State in whose territory equality is to be achieved should be the 
State where the place of work in situated. 
109 Case C-212/06 Government of the French Union and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government (Flemish Insurance) [2008] ECR I-1683. The issue in that case related to the 
insurance scheme introduced by the Flemish Union of Belgium for persons whose autonomy was 
reduced by a serious and prolonged disability. 
110 ibid para 10. 
111 Oxana Golynker, ‘Co-ordination of Social Security Scheme in the European Union: The 
Rashomon effect in Bosmann’ (2009) 16 Journal of Social Security Law 91, 99. 
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exclusive nature and scope of the lex loci laboris rule are limited to the extent that 
the rule is not applicable if its application disadvantages a migrant worker. In 
other words, the applicability of the lex loci laboris rule depends on the effect it 
produces in a specific situation that should comply with the Treaty provisions on 
free movement of persons.  
 
The Bosmann ruling echoes the ‘binary’ approach developed by the Court in the 
context of the cases involving Union citizenship and health care provisions 
enshrined in Union secondary legislation.112 In particular, one could even go 
further arguing that in Bosmann the Court extended the ‘binary’ approach with 
regard to the part of Regulation 1408/71 and now Regulation 883/2004, which 
embody provisions that determine the applicable national social security 
legislation. The ‘binary’ approach concerns the relationship between Union 
primary and secondary law. Under this approach, the requirements provided by 
Union secondary law are not regarded by the Court as conclusive or exhaustive. 
Instead, according to the Court, they are required to be interpreted in light of the 
                                                 
112 I borrowed the terms ‘binary approach’ and ‘binary technique’ from Eleanor Spaventa, Free 
movement of persons in the European Union -Barriers to movement in their constitutional context 
(Kluwer Law International 2007) 140. See also Eleanor Spaventa, ‘The impact of Articles 12, 18, 
39 and 43 of the EC Treaty on the coordination of social security system’ in Yves Jorens (ed.), 50 
years of Social Security Coordination Past – Present – Future (Report of the conference 
celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the European Coordination of Social Security, European 
Commission, 2009), 118 <ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5338&langId=en> accessed 19 
September 2011. With regard to health care, see Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des 
caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931;Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance 
nationale de mutualités chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-157/99 B. S. M. Geraets-
Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and -H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep 
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yyonne 
Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325. With 
regard to Union citizenship, see Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzerczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale 
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-228/07 Jörn Petersen v 
Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterreich [2008] ECR I-6989. 
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demands of Union primary law.113 Thus, a rule or measure can comply with the 
provisions of Union secondary law, but that does not guarantee its compliance 
with Union primary law. For instance, in the notable case of Baumbast,114 the 
refusal to grant a person the right of residence, based on the fact that the 
conditions set out in Directive 90/364 were not completely met,115 was found by 
the Court to be a disproportionate interference with the right to reside provided 
under Article 21 TFEU.116 As a result, using the ‘binary’ technique, the Court 
extended the right to reside to the person, who, however, did not completely fulfil 
the black letter provisions of the Directive clearly worded by the Union 
legislator.117 
 
                                                 
113 Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the (non-) English patient: A 
double-bill on residency rights under Article 18 EC’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 699, 705. 
See also Eleanor Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union (n 112) 121. On the 
general relationship between Union secondary legislation and the Treaty free movement 
provisions, see Karsten Engsig Sorensen, ‘Reconciling secondary legislation with the Treaty rights 
of free movement’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 339. 
114 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
7091. 
115 Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 180/26. This 
Directive made the right to reside conditional upon having sufficient resources and comprehensive 
health insurance. It was replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
116 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
7091, para 93. The issue in that case related to the refusal by the UK authorities to renew the 
residence permit of the German national living in the UK. The refusal was based on the fact that 
he did not have a comprehensive health insurance cover as required by the conditions set out in 
Directive 90/364/EEC.  Even though Mr Baumbast had health insurance in Germany, he did not 
have an insurance cover for emergency treatment in the UK. More on this case, see Eleanor 
Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union (n 112) specifically Chapters 6 and 7; 
Michael Dougan, ‘The constitutional dimension to the case-law on Union citizenship’ (2006) 31 
European Law Review 613, 632-640; Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (n 113). For other 
examples where the Court used the ‘binary’ approach, see eg Case C-157/99 B. S. M. Geraets-
Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and -H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep 
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 VG. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-25/02 Katharina 
Rinke v Ärztekammer Hamburg [2003] ECR I-8349; Case C-208/07 Petra von Chamier-
Glisczinski v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse [2009] ECR I-6095. 
117 Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and 
its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13, 26. 
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Taken from this perspective, it is apparent that in light of Bosmann the fact that a 
rule or measure is deemed lawful pursuant to the lex loci laboris rule does not 
imply the same under the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons. The 
rule is subject to scrutiny under these Treaty provisions and the result of its 
application is required to comply with them in so far as the specific case is 
concerned. It should be mentioned, however, that under the ‘binary’ approach, the 
compatibility of Union secondary law with Union primary law is not questioned. 
In Bosmann, the Court certainly did not rule that the lex loci laboris rule itself was 
contrary to the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons, nor even 
considered that question.118 Otherwise, it would have meant that Regulation 
1408/71 was required to be set aside as being incompatible with the hierarchically 
superior Treaty provision at issue.119 
 
3.2. Bosmann and Union choice-of-law rules under Article 81 TFEU* 
 
Relying on this, one could be of the opinion that, as a general rule, Union choice-
of-law rules, even those adopted under Article 81 TFEU, are subordinated to the 
principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement.120 In particular, it could be 
                                                 
* The findings in this section will be published in the Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law. 
118 This also would be at odds with the Court’s ruling in Case C-249/04 José Allard v Institut 
national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (INASTI) [2005] ECR I-4535. In 
this case, the Court held that Article 13 of Regulation 1408/71 that enshrined the lex loci laboris 
rule was not liable to hamper or to render less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty, but on the contrary, it contributed to facilitating the exercise of these 
freedoms. 
119 In this regard, see Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (n 113) 705. 
120 It appears that the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons could be invoked in the 
context of relationships between private parties. See in this respect, Case 36/74  B.N.O Walrave 
and L.J.H. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren 
Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405; Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v 
Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139; Case C-341/05  Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-438/05 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
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argued that a Union choice-of-law rule adopted under Article 81 TFEU cannot be 
applied, if the mere application of the national substantive law pursuant to it 
results in a difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law imposed on those 
who have exercised the Treaty free movement rights and those who have not. The 
Union choice-of-law rule at issue would not be declared invalid, but is more likely 
to be set aside in so far as the specific case is concerned. This line of reasoning 
might not be surprising if one takes into account the fact that Union choice-of-law 
rules under Article 81 TFEU are adopted in the form of Regulations, which are 
required to comply with and interpreted in light of the relevant Treaty 
provisions.121 This also in a certain way finds support, for instance, in the 
Preambles to the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, which as already mentioned in 
the first chapter, stipulate that ‘the Regulation should not prejudice the application 
of other instruments laying down provisions designed to contribute to the proper 
functioning of the internal market in so far as they cannot be applied in 
conjunction with the law designated by the rules of this Regulation. The 
application of provisions of the applicable law designated by the rules of this 
Regulation should not restrict the free movement of goods and services as 
regulated by [Union] instruments’.122  
  
 
                                                                                                                                     
OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-94/07 Andrea Raccanelli v Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV [2008] ECR I-5939. 
121 Case 112/77 August Töpfer & Co. GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 1019, para 19; Case C-
47/90 Établissements Delhaize frères et Compagne Le Lion SA v Promalvin SA and AGE Bodegas 
Unidas SA [1992] ECR I-3669, para 26; Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbeweb eV v 
Clinique Laboratoires SNC et Estée Lauder Cosmetic GmbH [1994] ECR I-317, para 12. 
122 Preamble 35 of the Rome II Regulation and Preamble 40 of the Rome I Regulation (italics 
added). Having said that, however, one might question whether the first part refers to the Treaty 
free movement provisions or only Union secondary legislation. Furthermore, it is also questionable 
whether the last part concerns the substance of the provisions of the law designated by these 
Regulations or their mere application in light of these Regulations. 
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3.2.1. Aim of Union choice-of-law rules under Article 81 TFEU 
 
On close analysis, however, the issue might not be as straightforward. The clear 
subordination of Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU to the 
principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement because of their effect in a 
specific case seems questionable. To start with, such an approach with regard to 
these rules appears to be at odds with the objective assigned to them by the Union 
legislator. This is evidently outlined, for instance, in the Preambles to the Rome I 
and II Regulations. Recital 6 of both Preambles includes that ‘the proper 
functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve the 
predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and 
the free movement of judgments, for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member 
States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court in 
which an action is brought’. ‘Legal certainty in the European judicial area’ as a 
general objective is also emphasised in Recital 16 of the Rome I Regulation. In 
contrast to the Rome I Regulation, Recitals 13, 14 and 16 of the Rome II 
Regulation further specify the need for unified choice-of-law rules: ‘[to] avert the 
risk of distortions of competition between [Union] litigants’; ‘to do justice in 
individual cases’; ‘[to] ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the 
person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage’. The 
Preambles to the Rome I and Rome II Regulations clearly emphasise the 
importance of unified Union choice-of-law rules for the functioning of the internal 
market. Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU are intended to 
ensure certainty over the applicable law and predictability of litigation in the 
context of cross-border relationships. So long as substantive laws of Member 
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States remain divergent, certainty over which national substantive law is 
applicable to a given cross-border relationship is essential in order to facilitate 
cross-border activities in the internal market. For instance, a party to a contractual 
relationship needs rules to guide it when entering into the relationship, when 
performing it, and when a dispute with another party threatens.123 Having unified 
choice-of-law rules means that there is no need for private parties to familiarise 
themselves with every national substantive law linked to the cross-border 
relationship at issue, but only the national substantive law that is declared 
applicable. Therefore, it could be argued that the smooth exercise of the Treaty 
free movement rights in a certain way depends on the existence of unified choice-
of-law rules. 
 
Considering their aim, the clear subordination of Union choice-of-law rules 
adopted under Article 81 TFEU to the principle of equal treatment on grounds of 
movement also risks creating a tension between the choices made by the Court 
and the Union legislator.124 In other words, one might simply assume that the 
Court does not show enough respect to the choice made by the Union legislator.125 
The unification of national choice-of-law rules is regarded as an alternative to the 
harmonisation of national private (substantive) law rules. At present, there is no 
                                                 
123 Peter Hay, Ole Lando and Roland Rotunda, ‘Conflicts of Laws as a Technique for Legal 
Integration’ in Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe and Joseph Weiler (eds), Integration 
Through Law: Europe and American Federal Experience (Walter de Gruyter 1985) 167. 
124 Michael Dougan, ‘Cross-educational mobility and the exportation of student financial 
assistance’ (2009) 33 European Law Review 723, 729. 
125 A P van der Mei and Ger Essers, ‘Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
– Familienkasse Aachen [2008] ECR I-3827’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 959, 965 
(note). However, to what extent this should be the case seems questionable. If the Court indeed 
was required to respect the choice made by the Union institutions, then there would be no need for 
the procedure enshrined in Article 263 TFEU, under which the Court reviews the legality of 
measures adopted by the Union institutions. At the same time, however, such a position taken by 
the Court is desirable, considering the role of Union choice-of-law rules in ensuring certainty over 
the applicable law and predictability of litigation in the context of cross-border relationships and a 
limited choice of connecting factors, which application would be compatible with the Treaty free 
movement provisions. 
107 
 
unity of the private (substantive) law rules that are applicable in Member States. 
As has been pointed out by the Commission, the harmonisation of these rules is 
not ‘a short term prospect’,126 which, in turn, suggests that the fully-fledged 
harmonisation of national private (substantive) law rules can hardly be expected 
in the foreseeable future.127 Thus, the existence of differences between private 
(substantive) law rules applied in Member States necessitates the adoption of 
unified choice-of-law rules. The unification of choice-of-law rules has an 
advantage over the harmonisation of private (substantive) law rules, since, as it is 
argued by the scholarship, in comparison to the latter the former seems to cause 
only a small disturbance in national legal systems.128 As a result, Member States 
might be less reluctant to allow the Union legislative acts enacting unified choice-
of-law rules. 
 
 In addition, the importance of Union choice-of-law rules is also emphasised by 
the fact that they are adopted in the form of Regulations, which, as is well known, 
are ‘binding in their entirety and directly applicable’129 in Member States. This 
ensures the uniform and consistent application of these rules by national 
authorities, in particular national courts dealing with cross-border disputes. 
Taking this into consideration, by subordinating Union choice-of-law rules to the 
principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement because of the effect of the 
mere application of the designated national substantive law, the Court would 
                                                 
126 The Explanatory Memorandum in Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, COM [2003] 427 final. 
127 Oliver Remien, ‘European Private International Law, the European Union and its Emerging 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 53, 64. See also 
Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Experiences from Europe: Legal Diversity and the Internal Market’ (2003-
2004) 39 Texas International Law Journal 429, 440-447. In the author’s opinion, the full 
harmonisation of national substantive rules is not desirable. 
128 Peter Hay, Ole Lando and Roland Rotunda (n 123) 169. 
129 Article 288 TFEU. 
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question the choice of a connecting factor made by the Union legislator, which is 
there for a reason. A choice should be made in order to ensure the uniform 
application of the same national substantive law with regard to the same cross-
border relationship irrespective of the forum. 
 
3.2.2. Equal treatment on grounds of movement  
 
More importantly, it is debatable whether Union choice-of-law rules adopted 
under Article 81 TFEU could be caught by the principle of equal treatment on 
grounds of movement because of the effect of the application of the designated 
national substantive law in a specific case, given that the law itself is in substance 
compatible with Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions. As 
mentioned earlier, choice-of-law rules only determine the law applicable to a 
cross-border relationship. In particular, these rules designate the applicable law 
based on connecting factors, which varied from Member State to Member State 
prior to the introduction of Article 81 TFEU. Union choice-of-law rules adopted 
under Article 81 TFEU, in turn, are based on single specific connecting factors, 
which national courts are required to apply. This guarantees that the law 
applicable to a cross-border relationship is the same irrespective of the forum. 
These connecting factors are chosen specifically in light of the Treaty free 
movement provisions. This appears rather obvious, considering not only the very 
aim of these rules, but also the so-called ‘internal market requirement’ stipulated 
in Article 81 TFEU.130 According to it, Union choice-of-law rules can be adopted 
when they are necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market. In light 
                                                 
130 Andrew Dickinson, ‘European Private International Law: Embracing New Horizons or 
Mourning the Past’ (2005) 1 Yearbook of Private International Law 197, 211. 
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of Article 26 TFEU, this means that the Union legislator is required to 
demonstrate that the proposed unified choice-of-law rules are necessary for the 
cross-border movement of goods, services, people, and capital.131 This, in turn, 
suggests that these rules are indeed designed in light of the requirements of the 
Treaty free movement provisions. For instance, according to Article 4 of the 
Rome I Regulation, a contract for the sale of goods and the provision of services 
is governed by the law of the place where the seller and service provider have 
their habitual residence, respectively. The choice of the place of the seller’s or 
service provider’s habitual residence as a connecting factor appears to reflect the 
shift towards the application of the regulatory choice of the Member State of 
origin as regards goods or services themselves,132 which is established since the 
Cassis de Dijon ruling.133  
 
One might cast doubt on the relevance of this argument, pointing out that if this 
was a sufficient factor, the internal market legislation would no longer be subject 
to scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions. This finds backing, for 
instance, in the ‘binary’ approach discussed earlier with regard to the relationship 
between Union secondary and primary law – i.e. the compliance with black-letter 
provisions of Union secondary legislation does not per se entail the compliance 
with the Treaty provisions.134 However, it is hard to believe that this approach 
                                                 
131 Ibid.  
132 See eg Nick Bernard, Multilevel Governance in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 
2002) 15-60. 
133 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
With regard to services, see eg Joined Cases 110 and 111/78 Ministère public and ‘Chambre 
syndicale des agents artistiques et impresarii de Belgique’ ASBL v Willy van Wesemael and 
Others [1979] ECR 35; Case 279/80 Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb [1981] ECR 
3305. 
134 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
7091, para 93. See also the decision of the Court in Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v 
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen 
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could be applicable with regard to Union choice-of-law rules enshrined in 
Regulations adopted under Article 81 TFEU. To begin with, the ‘binary’ approach 
has been established and so far mainly applied in the context of the cases 
concerning health care provisions and Union citizenship.135 Therefore, it remains 
unclear whether it could be extended across a wider range of Union secondary 
measures.136 Furthermore, in all those cases the issue related to a relationship 
between a private party and a Member State, whilst Union choice-of-law rules 
adopted under Article 81 TFEU deal with cross-border relationships between 
private parties. This difference is essential, since the application of the ‘binary’ 
approach as regards Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU 
would not only negate their objective, but also might affect the position of a 
private party, which could be either the defendant or plaintiff. Finally, this could 
be due to the nature of Union choice-of-law rules. In those Union citizenship and 
health care cases, the provisions of Union secondary legislation at issue regulated 
matters of substance. In particular, the provisions that were given effect by 
national authorities were considered to be an impediment to free movement in the 
Union in so far as the cases at hand were concerned. In contrast, Union choice-of-
                                                                                                                                     
[2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 VG. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ 
Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO 
Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509. More on this case-law, see Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Public 
Services and European Law: Looking for Boundaries’ (2004) 5 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 271, 276-280. 
135 With regard to health care, see eg Case C-158/96  Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de 
maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance nationale 
de mutualités chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v 
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen 
[2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yyonne Watts v Bedford 
Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325. With regard to Union 
citizenship, see Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzerczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091; See also Case C-228/07 Jörn Petersen v 
Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterreich [2008] ECR I-6989. 
136 Michael Dougan ‘The constitutional dimension to the case-law on Union citizenship’ (n 116) 
640. 
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law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU do not provide any substantive 
solutions, but merely designate the applicable national substantive law.   
 
Due to the territorial connecting factors that Union choice-of-law rules adopted 
under Article 81 TFEU are mainly based upon,137 it is possible that the application 
of these rules might lead to a difference in treatment in terms of the applicable law 
imposed on an internal market participant. For instance, the application of the 
substantive law of Member State A to liability arising out of a cross-border tort 
pursuant to the relevant Union choice-of-law rule could put one of the parties at a 
disadvantage, which might not be the case if, let us say, the substantive law of 
Member State B was applicable. In this respect, however, it is doubtful whether 
such a disadvantage could be sufficient to trigger the equal treatment requirement. 
If the substantive law of Member State A is per se compatible with Article 18 
TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions, the disadvantage at issue is 
likely to be regarded as a mere result of disparities between national substantive 
laws.138 Moreover, in the present context, the party is also unlikely to satisfy the 
                                                 
137 So far, a Union choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a connecting factor is only enshrined 
in Articles 5 and 8 of the Rome III Regulation. As one of the options provided, spouses can choose 
the law of a State of which one of them is a national as governing their divorce or legal separation. 
In the absence of a choice made, the law of the State of which both spouses are nationals at the 
time the court is seised could be the applicable law. 
138 In this respect, see the formula developed by the Court in Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others 
v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, para 13. According to the Court, the principle of equal 
treatment ‘is not concerned with any disparities in treatment or the distortions, which may result 
from divergences existing between the laws of the various Member States, so long as the latter 
affect all persons subject to them, in accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their 
nationality’. This was confirmed in Case 1/78 Patrick Christopher Kenny v Insurance Officer 
[1978] ECR 1489, para 18; Joined Cases 185/78 to 204/78 Criminal proceedings against J. van 
Dam en Zonen and Others [1979] ECR 2345, para 10; Case 155/80 Summary proceedings against 
Sergius Oebel [1981] ECR 1993, para 10; Case 308/86 Criminal proceedings against R. Lambert 
[1988] ECR 4369, para 22; Joined Cases C-251/90 and C-252/90 Procurator fiscal, Elgin v 
Kenneth Gordon Wood and James Cowie [1992] ECR I-2873, para 19; Case C-379/92 Criminal 
proceedings against Matteo Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 34; Case C-177/94 Criminal 
proceedings against Gianfranco Perfili [1996] ECR I-161, para 17. In the context of disparities 
existing between national tax systems, see eg Case C-387/01  Harald Weigel and Ingrid Weigel v 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg [2004] ECR I-9445, para 55; Case C-365/02 Proceedings 
brought by Marie Lindfors [2004] ECR I-7183, para 34; Case C-403/03 Egon Schempp v 
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comparability test to trigger the equal treatment requirement.139 Because of the 
system established by a Regulation enshrining unified choice-of-law rules under 
Article 81 TFEU, the situation involving the party at issue would not be 
comparable to the situation where the substantive law of Member State B is 
declared applicable.140 In other words, it is unlikely that they would be considered 
to be similarly placed to warrant similar treatment.  
 
These arguments could certainly be confronted referring to Bosmann. In this case, 
as mentioned earlier, the mere application of Dutch law pursuant to the lex loci 
laboris rule appears to be contrary to the principle of equal treatment on grounds 
of movement, since as a result of it Mrs Bosmann having exercised the Treaty free 
movement right was treated differently than those who remained resident and 
employed in Germany.141 In addition, contrary to the reasoning given by AG 
Mazák, Mrs Bosmann could claim a child benefit under German law similar to 
                                                                                                                                     
Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421, para 45; Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell GmbH v 
Finanzamt für Großunternehmen in Hamburg [2008] ECR I-1129, para 43. In a similar way, with 
regard to disparities between national social security legislations, see eg Case 238/82 Duphar BV 
and other v The Netherlands State [1984] ECR 523, para 16; Case C-70/95 Sodemare SA, Anni 
Azzuri Holding SpA and Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-3395, para 
27; Joined Cases C-393/99 and C-394/99 Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs 
indépendants (Inasti) v Claude Hervein and Hervillier SA (C-393/99) and Guy Lorthiois and 
Comtexbel SA (C-394/99) [2002] ECR I-2829, para 51; Case C-444/05 Aikaterini Stamatelaki v 
NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE) [2007] ECR I-3185, para 23; 
Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931, para 17. 
139 However, it is necessary to mention that the comparability of two situations is often taken for 
granted by the Court and if it is considered, it often takes place as part of the justification process. 
See in this respect Eleanor Spaventa Free movement of persons in the European Union (n 112) 17. 
140 See eg  Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Familienkasse Aachen 
[2008] ECR I-3827, Opinion of Advocate General Mazák, para 80. 
141 In this respect, see eg Case 143/87 Christopher Stanton and SA belge d'assurances ‘L'Étoile 
1905’ v Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti) [1988] ECR 
3877, para 14; Case C-464/02 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929, para 34; 
Case C-464/05 Maria Geurts and Dennis Vogten v Administratie van de BTW, registratie en 
domeinen, Belgische Staat [2007] ECR I-9325, para 18; Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by 
Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639, para 21; Case C-544/07 Uwe 
Rüffler v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wrocławiu Ośrodek Zamiejscowy w Wałbrzychu [2009] 
ECR I-3389, para 64; Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien 
(CJEU, 22 December 2010), para 53; Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł 
Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others (CJEU, 12 May 2011), para 68. 
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those that were resident and employed in Germany. Despite these facts, the 
possible applicability of the Bosmann-esque approach to Union choice-of-law 
rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU should be considered with caution. First, 
this is because of the fact that the issue in Bosmann concerned a cross-border 
relationship involving a Member State and a private party. Second, more 
importantly, the position taken by the Court in that case was based on the specific 
objective of Article 48 TFEU, which allows the Union legislator to adopt 
measures to improve the conditions of employed or self-employed migrant 
workers. Since Regulation 1408/71 was adopted based on Article 48 TFEU, 
according to the Court, the lex loci laboris rule could not have an adverse effect 
on Mrs Bosmann. Article 81 TFEU, in turn, allows the Union legislator to adopt 
unified choice-of-law rules in order to develop judicial cooperation between 
Member States in civil matters having cross-border implications. In contrast to 
Article 48 TFEU, Article 81 TFEU, in essence, does not have an objective of 
protecting a particular group of internal market participants. Its objective is rather 
general - it aims to facilitate free movement in the internal market by providing 
certainty over the applicable law and predictability of litigation in the context of 
cross-border relationships.142 
 
3.3. Different approach for Union choice-of-law rules under Article 81 
TFEU 
 
In light of the arguments raised above, it is fair to argue that a different approach 
should be adopted with regard to Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 
                                                 
142 See eg Preamble 6 of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. 
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81 TFEU that deal with cross-border relationships between private parties.143 
These Union choice-of-law rules fall within the scope of Article 18 TFEU and the 
Treaty free movement provisions. However, the Bosmann-esque subordination of 
these rules to the principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement depending 
on the effect they produce in specific circumstances does not sit well with the 
policy behind these rules, which is to ensure certainty over the applicable law and 
predictability of litigation in the internal market. In particular, this could 
jeopardise the effectiveness of these rules and, more importantly, affect the 
position of a private party that would genuinely expect the application of the 
designated national substantive law, which is per se compatible Article 18 TFEU 
and the Treaty free movement provisions.144 Certainly, any possible disadvantage 
faced by internal market participants as a result of the application of these rules 
cannot be excluded. In this respect, nevertheless, first, it is questionable whether 
such a disadvantage could trigger the equal treatment requirement. Second, even 
if, for instance, the latter is the case, it is reasonable to expect that the requirement 
of legal certainty would be considered if not given effect as an objective ground 
for justification.145 The acceptance of such a disadvantage in so far as a specific 
                                                 
143 Stefania Bariatti, ‘Restrictions resulting from the EC Treaty provisions for Brussels I and Rome 
I’ in Johan Meeusen, Marta Pertegás and Gert Straetmans (eds), Enforcement of International 
Contracts in the European Union. Convergence and divergence between Brussels I and Rome I 
(Intersentia 2004) 85. The author is of the opinion that the notion of discrimination would have to 
be construed in a different and more restrictive way when it sets limits to Union choice-of-law 
rules. 
144 See eg the Court’s emphasis on the principle of legal certainty as an objective of the Brussels 
Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Case C-
281/02 Andrew Owusu v N.B. Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others 
[2005] ECR I-1383, para 38. See also Case C-129/92 Owens Bank Ltd v Fulvio Bracco and 
Bracco Industria Chimica SpA [2004] ECR I-117, para 32; Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde 
and Others v The Master of the vessel ‘Suhadiwarno Panjan’ and Others[1999] ECR I-6307, para 
23; Case C-256/00 Besix SA v Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred Kretzchmar GmbH & Co. KG 
(WABAG) and Planungs- und Forschungsgesellschaft Dipl. Ing. W. Kretzschmar GmbH & KG 
(Plafog)[2002] ECR I-1699, para 24. 
145 Case C-347/06 ASM Brescia SpA v Comune di Rodengo Saiano [2008] ECR I-5641, para 64. 
The Court in that case held that a difference in treatment could be justified in light of objective 
circumstances, such as the necessity of complying with the principle of legal certainty. With 
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case is concerned is the price to be paid in return to ensure certainty over the 
applicable law and predictability of litigation in the context of cross-border 
relationships.  
 
This leaves us with Union choice-of-law rules that deal with cross-border 
relationships involving a Member State and a private party such as those 
enshrined in Regulation 883/2004. The situation with regard to these choice-of-
law rules is different due to the fact that the importance of certainty over the 
applicable law and predictability of litigation does not play a similar significant 
role as such. If these rules, in a specific case, result in an outcome that is deemed 
to be contrary to the principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement, the 
idea that setting aside these rules in light of it risks undermining certainty over the 
applicable law and predictability of litigation could hardly be sufficient in this 
context. This is because of the fact that in contrast to Union choice-of-law rules 
adopted under Article 81 TFEU, the primary objective of Union choice-of-law 
rules adopted under Article 48 TFEU, for instance, is the protection of a particular 
group of internal market participants, i.e. migrant workers, rather than certainty 
over the applicable law and predictability of litigation in the internal market in 
general. This is evident in the Court’s interpretation in Bosmann of the lex loci 
laboris rule specifically in light of Article 48 TFEU and Preamble 1 to Regulation 
1408/71. As the Court held, Article 48 TFEU aimed to facilitate free movement of 
workers and Regulation 1408/71, in turn, coordinated national social security 
legislations to contribute towards the improvement of workers’ ‘standard of living 
                                                                                                                                     
regard to the principle of legal certainty, see also Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche 
Milchkontor GmbH and Ohers v Germany [1983] ECR 2633, para 30; Case C-143/93 Gebroeders 
van Es Douane Agenten BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1996] ECR I-431, para 
27; Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep 
[2008] ECR I-8507, para 67. 
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and conditions of employment’.146 In contrast to the Rome I or Rome II 
Regulations, for instance, neither Regulation 1408/71 nor Regulation 883/2004 
enshrines certainty over the applicable law and predictability of litigation as an 
objective. This line of argumentation might explain the difference in the 
conclusions reached by AG Mazák and the Court in Bosmann. It seems that AG 
Mazák’s reasoning was premised on the idea that the lex loci laboris rule was 
intended to provide certainty over the applicable national social security 
legislation, which served to the interests of migrant workers as well as Member 
States. In contrast, the Court’s reasoning, in turn, seems to be based on the idea 
that the main role of the lex loci laboris rule is the protection of migrant workers, 
i.e. ensuring that migrant workers are not deprived of social security cover 
because of the simultaneous application of the legislation of two or more Member 
States or that they are not required to pay double social security contributions.  
 
4. Interim conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that even national and Union choice-of-law rules 
themselves fall within the scope of the principle of equal treatment, despite the 
fact that they only designate the applicable national substantive law without 
touching upon any matters of substance. 
 
Notwithstanding this fact, national choice-of-law rules would not be incompatible 
with the principle of equal treatment and, therefore, require objective justification, 
                                                 
146 Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit [2008] ECR I-3827, paras 29-30. 
This is also enshrined in the Preamble to Regulation 883/2004. 
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if nationality and territoriality, which they are usually based upon, are only used 
as neutral connecting factors to determine the applicable law. 
 
As far as Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU are 
concerned, these rules are intended to ensure certainty over the applicable law and 
predictability of litigation in the context of cross-border relationships between 
private parties. Thus, setting aside them pursuant to the principle of equal 
treatment on grounds of movement because of the effect they produce in a 
specific case could impact upon the effectiveness of achieving their aim, which is 
crucial for private parties engaged in cross-border contractual, non-contractual or 
other civil law relationships. One certainly cannot deny that the mere application 
of the designated national substantive law in accordance with these rules could 
place one of the parties to a cross-border relationship at a disadvantage. Despite 
that, I argued that such a disadvantage is hardly likely to trigger the equal 
treatment requirement and even if it is the case, it is reasonable to expect that 
Union choice-of-law rules adopted under Article 81 TFEU are objectively 
justified in light of their aim. 
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Chapter III  
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT AND PARTY AUTONOMY 
 
In the first chapter, it was demonstrated that the designated national substantive 
law cannot be applied, if it is discriminatory contrary to Article 18 TFEU or the 
Treaty free movement provisions. The fact that it is applicable by virtue of a 
choice-of-law rule cannot affect this outcome. However, in this respect, one could 
question whether the outcome would be the same if a discriminatory rule, for 
instance, is part of the law chosen by private parties to govern their contract. In 
particular, it is not clear whether that rule could be applicable, even though it 
imposes discriminatory treatment on one of the parties to a contractual 
relationship contrary to the Treaty free movement provisions and whether the 
principle of party autonomy could play any role in this regard.  Here, I will 
consider the Treaty free movement provisions as applicable in the present context, 
despite the fact that, as will be demonstrated, not all of these Treaty provisions, in 
particular Article 34 TFEU, can be invoked ‘horizontally’. This is because of the 
fact that in this context it is, in essence, a national rule applicable in a contractual 
context that is subject to scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions, 
rather than a specific condition or term imposed by a private party. Therefore, I 
will touch upon the horizontal applicability of the Treaty free movement 
provisions only when I discuss the possible scrutiny of a contractual term under 
these Treaty provisions. 
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In this chapter, I will first focus on the principle of party autonomy and its role in 
the Union legal order. In particular, it is necessary to examine its place in Union 
secondary legislation and the Court’s case-law; how it operates and what 
limitations are attached to it. Further, I will look at the relationship between the 
principle of party autonomy and the Treaty free movement provisions in light of 
the ordo-liberal approach that these Treaty provisions themselves guarantee the 
principle of party autonomy across borders. In this context, I will then examine 
whether the principle of party autonomy could play a role in the scrutiny of the 
law chosen by private parties under the principle of equal treatment. In this 
respect, I will distinguish between rules of the chosen law that are mandatory in 
an inter-State context (hereafter also ‘mandatory rules’) and those, for instance, 
default rules that are not. In the final part, I will discuss the scrutiny of a 
contractual term under the Treaty free movement provisions.  
 
1. The rationale of the principle of party autonomy 
 
The principle of party autonomy means that private parties are free to choose the 
law governing the cross-border contractual, non-contractual or other civil law 
relationships they are involved in.1 The very nature of that freedom is derived 
from the principle of contractual freedom.2 In other words, the principle of party 
autonomy mirrors the principle of contractual freedom on the choice-of-law 
                                                 
1 William J Woodward, ‘Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of Party 
Autonomy’ (2001) 54 SMU Law Review 697, 711. On the historical development of the principle 
of party autonomy, see Ernest G Lorenzen, ‘Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of 
Laws’ (1920-21) 30 Yale Law Review 53; Ian A Baxter, ‘International Business and Choice of 
Law’ (1987) 36 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 92. 
2 A Thomson, ‘A Different Approach to Choice of Law in Contract’ (1980) 43 Modern Law 
Review 650, 650. See also Frank Vischer, ‘General Course on Private International Law’ (1992) 
232 Recueil des Cours 9, 126; Mo Zhang, ‘Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International 
Perspective of Contractual Choice of Law’ (2006) 20 Emory International Law Review 511, 552. 
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level.3 In light of contractual freedom, private parties are free to decide, among 
others, whether or not to enter into a contract, to include or exclude a particular 
contractual term or to dissolve or continue a contractual relationship.4 In the same 
vein, private parties are also entitled to choose the applicable law.5 The 
importance of that freedom lies in the fact that the private parties to cross-border 
relationships are generally better equipped to decide the law that is the most 
suitable to govern their contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationship 
than abstract choice-of-law rules.6 In addition, the choice made by private parties 
eliminates beforehand any uncertainty pertaining to the law governing the cross-
border relationship they are involved in7 which, in turn, protects their legitimate 
expectations.8 The freedom to choose the governing law allows private parties to 
foretell with accuracy, for instance, their contractual or non-contractual rights and 
obligations.9 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 ‘Appendix A: A Letter from Friedrich K Juenger to Harry C Sigman, Esq (23 June, 1994)’ 
(1995) 28 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 445, 449. 
4 Mo Zhang, ‘Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy’ (2008) 
41 Akron Law Review 123, 132. 
5 Mo Zhang, ‘Party Autonomy and Beyond’ (n 2) 552. 
6 H L E Verhagen, ‘The Tension between Party Autonomy and European Union Law: Some 
Observations on Ingmar GB Ltd v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.’ (2002) 51 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 135, 143. 
7 ibid. 
8 A. Thomson (n 2) 655. See also Christopher L Ingrim, ‘A Choice-of-law Clauses: Their Effect on 
Extraterritorial Analysis – A Scholar’s Dream, A Practitioners Nightmare’ (1994-95) 28 Creighton 
Law Review 663, 664; Mattias Lehmann, ‘Liberating the Individual from Battles between States: 
Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 381, 392; David Hricik, ‘Infinite Combinations: Whether the Duty of Competence Requires 
Lawyers to Include Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts They Drafted for Their Clients’ (2004) 12 
Willamette Journal of International Law & Dispute Resolution 241, 257-58. 
9 Mo Zhang, ‘Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion’ (n 4) 130-131. 
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2. Party autonomy in the Union legal order 
 
The freedom to choose the governing law is firmly entrenched not only in national 
legal systems, but also in the Union legal order.10 It is explicitly mentioned in 
Union secondary legislation that embodies unified choice-of-law rules.11 For 
instance, Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation provides that ‘a contract shall be 
governed by the law chosen by the parties’.12 The choice of the governing law is 
required to be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of a contract 
or the circumstances of the case.13 Private parties can also opt for the chosen law 
to be applicable to the whole or only part of a contract.14 The freedom to choose 
the governing law is also provided with regard to non-contractual obligations. For 
instance, according to Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation, ‘the parties may 
agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their choice’.15 In 
particular, the choice can be made either ‘by an agreement entered into after the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred’(ex post) or ‘where all the parties are 
pursuing a commercial activity, also by an agreement freely negotiated before the 
                                                 
10 Axel Flessner and Hendrik Verhagen, Assignment in European Private International Law: 
Claims as Property and the European Commission’s ‘Rome I Regulation (Sellier – European Law 
Publishers 2006) 21. See also Stefania Bariatti, ‘Restrictions resulting from the EC Treaty 
provisions for Brussels I and Rome I’ in Johan Meeusen, Marta Pertegás and Gert Straetmans 
(eds), Enforcement of International Contracts in the European Union. Convergence and 
divergence between Brussels I and Rome I (Intersentia 2004) 90. With regard to the principle of 
contractual freedom in the Union legal order, see Jürgen Basedow, ‘Freedom of Contracts in the 
European Union’ (2008) 6 European Review of Private Law 901. 
11 See Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I Regulation’) [2008] OJ L 177/6; Regulation 
(EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II Regulation’) [2007] OJ L 199/40; Regulation 
1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation (‘Rome III Regulation’) [2010] OJ L 343/10. 
12 Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation.  This provision reaffirmed the freedom to 
choose the governing law embodied in Article 3 of 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable 
to the contractual obligations (consolidated version) [1998]  OJ C 027/34. Hereafter the latter will 
be referred as ‘the Rome Convention’. 
13 Para 2 of Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation. 
14 ibid. 
15 Paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation. 
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event giving rise to the damage occurred’ (ex ante).16 The inclusion of this 
provision in the Rome II Regulation is crucial taking into account the fact that the 
principle of party autonomy emerged very slowly in the context of cross-border 
non-contractual relationships.17 Inherently linked to contractual freedom, the party 
autonomy principle was mainly associated with contractual relationships between 
private parties and had hardly anything to do with the relationships between 
private parties arising out of torts or other non-contractual obligations.18  
 
The principle of party autonomy is also included in the recently adopted the Rome 
III Regulation, which embodies a set of choice-of-law rules to determine the law 
governing divorce and legal separation. Thus, spouses can choose the law 
applicable to their divorce or legal separation, provided that it is one of the 
following: the law of the State where they habitually reside at the time the 
agreement is concluded; the law of the State where they were last habitually 
resident, if one of them still resides there at the time the agreement is concluded; 
the law of the State of nationality of either spouse at the time the agreement is 
concluded; and finally the law of the forum.19 
 
In addition to Union secondary legislation, one can also find a reference to the 
principle of party autonomy in the case law. Take for instance Alsthom 
                                                 
16 ibid. See also Thomas K Graziano, ‘General Principles of Private International Law of Tort in 
Europe’ in Jürgen Basedow, Harald Baum and Yuko Nishitani (eds), Japanese and European 
Private International Law in Comparative Perspective (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 250. 
17 Adeline Chong, ‘Choice of Law for Unjust Enrichment/Restitution and the Rome II Regulation’, 
(2008) 57 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 863, 874.  
18 See also Mo Zhang, ‘Party Autonomy in Non-Contractual Obligations: Rome II and its Impact 
on Choice of Law’ (2009) 39 Seton Hall Law Review 861, 864. 
19 Article 5 of the Rome III Regulation. 
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Atlantique.20 The issue in that case related the French rule that imposed strict 
liability on manufactures and traders for the supply of goods with latent defects. 
In particular, according to it, a vendor was liable for any latent defects, even if it 
was not aware of them, unless the exception from such liability was specifically 
stipulated. Alsthom Atlantique, a French company, sued Sulzer, another French 
company, on the ground that the latter provided malfunctioning engines for boats, 
which Alsthom Atlantique, in turn, supplied to Holland & America Tours, a 
Dutch company. The defendant argued that the application of the rule at issue was 
contrary to Article 35 TFEU, since a similar rule was not applied in other Member 
States. According to the defendant, this was capable of distorting competition and 
free movement of goods in the internal market. It is not clear from the facts 
whether the contracting parties at issue had included in their contract a clause 
specifying the choice of the applicable law. The Court found that this rule was not 
contrary to Article 35 TFEU.21 In this respect, the Court held that the French rule 
applied to all trade relations governed by French law and did not have the purpose 
or effect of restricting the patterns of export and thereby, favouring domestic 
production or domestic market.22 Furthermore, the Court also added in an obiter 
dictum that private parties to an international contract of sale were generally free 
to determine the law applicable to their contractual relationships and could 
therefore avoid being subject to French law.23 
 
                                                 
20 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v Compagnie de contruction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] 
ECR I-107. 
21 ibid para 16. 
22 ibid para 15 
23 ibid. 
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Similarly, the principle of party autonomy was also involved in Commission v. 
CO.DE.MI.24 The issue in that case related to the contract signed between the 
European Commission and CO.DE.MI, an Italian company, for the construction 
by the latter of two separate buildings within the precincts of the Ispra 
establishment. Due to a disagreement between the parties, CO.DE.MI stopped the 
work and closed the site. The Commission brought proceedings before the Court 
to declare the contract terminated and order CO.DE.MI to pay a compensation for 
the damaged caused. One of the issues raised before the Court was the 
applicability of the choice-of-law clause enshrined in the contract. According to 
this clause, the contract should be governed by Belgian law. The defendants 
argued that it did not accept that clause and it should be regarded as a derogation 
from Italian law, which was otherwise applicable, since the construction site was 
in Italy and the contract was signed there. The Court first held that the choice-of-
law clause was an integral part of the contract.25 The Court continued that neither 
certain references to the Italian Civil Code in the contract nor the alleged attitude 
of the parties could prevail over the word of the choice-of-law clause and permit 
the inference that the parties intended to be regulated by Italian law.26 
Furthermore, the Court also added that the place where a contract was signed 
could have no effect on the determination of the applicable law, since the 
‘contractual provisions expressing the common intention of the parties must take 
precedence over any other criterion which might be used only where the contract 
                                                 
24 Case 318/81 Commission v CO.DE.MI. SpA [1985] ECR 3693. 
25 ibid para 20. 
26 ibid. 
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is silent on a particular point’.27 On this basis, the Court concluded that Belgian 
law was the law governing the contract at issue.28 
  
3. Limitations to the principle party autonomy under Union law 
 
The freedom to choose the governing law is not, however, unrestricted. A general 
rule is that the law chosen by private parties cannot be applied if it is contrary to 
the mandatory rules of the forum or another country concerned; or the public 
policy of the forum. According to Article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation,29 the 
law chosen by private parties shall not prejudice the application of the provisions 
of the law of the country, where all other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time are located and which cannot be derogated by an agreement.30 This concerns 
a domestic contract – a contract, where all elements, except the choice of the 
governing law and the forum, are linked to one country.31 Such a contract, thus, 
falls within the scope of the mandatory rules of that country.32 In other words, 
contracting parties cannot ignore the mandatory rules of the country to which their 
contract is actually linked to by deliberately opting for the law of another country 
that has no link whatsoever with their contract. Article 3 (3) of the Rome I 
Regulation imposes a duty to apply not only mandatory rules of private law nature 
but also those of public law nature.33  
 
                                                 
27 ibid para 21. 
28 ibid para 22. 
29 The Rome I Regulation reaffirmed the same provision laid down in the Rome Convention. In 
this regard, see Michael Wilderspin, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Communitarisation and 
Modernisation of the Rome Conventions’ 9 ERA-Forum 2008. 
30 Paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation. 
31 Christopher Tillman, ‘The Relationship between Party Autonomy and the Mandatory Rules in 
the Rome Convention’ (2002) Journal of Business Law 45, 50.  
32 ibid. 
33 ibid 52. 
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The Rome I Regulation also ensures the application of Union mandatory rules in 
the context of purely intra-Union cross-border relationships.34 Article 3 (4) of the 
Regulation provides that: 
 
 if all other elements relevant to the situation are located in one or more 
Member States, the choice of the applicable law of the country other than 
that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of the provisions 
of [Union] law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of 
the forum, which cannot be derogated from by an agreement.35  
 
This was included to solve the problem related to the limited scope of Article 3 
(3) of the 1980 Rome Convention, which, in essence, was the same provision as 
Article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation.36  In particular, Union mandatory rules 
could not be applied pursuant to Article 3 (3) of the 1980 Rome Convention, if 
private parties had chosen the law of a third country, whilst all the elements of the 
cross-border contractual relationship at issue were linked to Member States 
only.37 As a result, Article 3 (4) of the Rome I Regulation ensures that contracting 
                                                 
34 Andrea Bonomi, ‘The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
Some General Remarks’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private International Law 165, 172. 
35 Paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation. See also Paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the 
Rome II Regulation, which provides that ‘where all the elements relevant to the situation at the 
time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs are located in one or more of the Member 
States, the parties’ choice of the law applicable other than that of a Member State shall not 
prejudice the application of provisions of [Union] law, where appropriate as implemented in the 
Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement’. 
36 Michael Wilderspin (n 29) 264. 
37 Andrea Bonomi (n 34) 172. For instance, the Gran-Canaria-Fälle cases decided by the German 
Federal Court of Justice, involved the right of a consumer to withdraw from a contract concluded 
outside business premises, provided by Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the 
consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises [1985]  OJ L 372/31. 
That right was invoked in the context of the timeshare agreement relating to an apartment in Gran 
Canaria signed between the German lessee and the lessor who was established at the Isle of Man. 
The choice-of-law clause in the contract referred the law of the Isle of Man. The German Federal 
Court of Justice upheld the validity of that clause. As a result, the lessee could not rely on the right 
to withdraw from a contract enshrined in the Directive, which had been implemented by Germany 
and Spain. See Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], 19 March 1997, IPRspr., 1997, n. 34. 
More on this case, see Jürgen Basedow, ‘Consumer Contracts and Insurance Contracts in a Future 
Rome I’ – Regulation’ in Johan Meeusen, Marta Pertegás and Gert Straetmans (eds), Enforcement 
of International Contracts in the European Union. Convergence and divergence between Brussels 
I and Rome I (Intersentia 2004) 276-277; Ole Lando, ‘The Eternal Crisis’ in Jürgen Basedow, 
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parties cannot escape the scope of the relevant mandatory rules under Union law 
by choosing the law of a third country as the law governing their contract when in 
fact their contract has no link whatsoever with that country.  
 
The Rome I Regulation also guarantees special protection for consumers and 
employees. Under Article 6 of the Regulation a choice-of-law clause in a contract 
signed with a consumer cannot deprive him/her of the protection afforded by the 
mandatory provisions of the law of the place of his/her habitual residence.38 
Similarly, Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation stipulates that a choice-of-law 
clause in an employment contract cannot deprive an employee of the protection 
afforded to him/her by the mandatory provisions of the law of the place which is 
applicable in the absence of the choice made by private parties.39 The rationale of 
these provisions lies in the fact that consumers and employees are in a weaker 
bargaining position from a socio-economic point of view.40 Articles 6 and 8 of the 
Rome I Regulation do not invalidate the choice made by private parties, but 
merely declares the relevant mandatory rules as applicable.41 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Klaus J Hopt and Hein Kötz (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag 
(Mohr Siebeck 1998) 370.  
38 Paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation. This provision does not concern a contract 
signed between two consumers. See in this respect Report on the Convention on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations by Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde [1980] OJ C 282.  In addition, this 
rule applies only with regard to a consumer who resides in a Member State. See in this respect 
Fausto Pocar, ‘Protection of Weaker Parties in the Rome Convention and the Rome I Proposal’ in 
n Jürgen Basedow, Harald Baum and Yuko Nishitani (eds), Japanese and European Private 
International Law in Comparative Perspective (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 129. 
39 Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation. This could be the law of the place in which 
or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his/her work in performance of a 
contract. If that law applicable cannot be determined by this rule, a contract is governed by the law 
of the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated. 
However, if a contract is more closely connecting to the national law other that the two mentioned 
above, it should subject to that law. 
40 Christopher Tillman (n 31) 53. 
41 Jens Rinze, ‘The Scope of Party Autonomy under the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ (1994) Journal of Business Law 412, 422 and 424. 
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Furthermore, pursuant to Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation mentioned in the first 
chapter, for instance, the choice of the governing law can also be limited, giving 
effect to the so-called overriding mandatory provisions. These provisions apply 
irrespective of the governing law chosen by private parties.42 According to Article 
9 (2) of the Rome I Regulation, effect can be given to the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law of the forum. Under Article 9 (3) of the Rome I Regulation, 
in turn, this also applies to the overriding mandatory rules of a third country. 
However, this is confined to the country where the obligations arising out of a 
contract have to be or have been performed and which render the performance of 
a contract as unlawful.43 Overriding mandatory provisions are also mentioned in 
the Rome II Regulation. According to Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation in the 
context of non-contractual obligations the otherwise applicable national 
substantive law should not restrict the application of the provisions of the law of 
the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to non-contractual obligations.44 
 
Apart from mandatory rules, the application of the governing law chosen by 
private parties can also be limited on the basis of the public policy exception. 
Article 21 of the Rome I Regulation provides that ‘the application of a provision 
of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such 
application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (order public) of the 
                                                 
42 Susanne Knofel, ‘Mandatory rules and Choice of Law: A Comparative Approach to Article 7 (2) 
of the Rome Convention’, (1999) Journal of Business Law 239, 245. See also Jens Rinze (n 41) 
426. 
43 Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. 
44 Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation. 
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forum’.45 Under this provision, the governing law chosen by private parties can be 
held to be inapplicable. This provision is usually used in extraordinary cases, 
where the fundamental issues of the public policy of the forum are involved.46 For 
instance, pursuant to the similar reference under the Rome II Regulation, the 
otherwise applicable national substantive law that requires the award of excessive 
non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages may be regarded as being 
contrary to the public policy of the forum.47 
 
4. The principle of party autonomy in light of the ordo-liberal 
approach 
 
The principle of party autonomy firmly established in the Union legal order is 
defined as one of the cornerstones of the Union system of choice-of-law rules in 
matters relating to cross-border contractual, non-contractual and other civil law 
obligations.48 Considering its role in facilitating cross-border relationships,49 one 
might wonder how the freedom available to private parties engaged in cross-
border contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships to choose the 
governing law relates to the Treaty free movement rights. 
 
                                                 
45 See also Article 25 of the Rome II Regulation, which states that ‘The application of a provision 
of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum’. Article 12 of the 
Rome III Regulation that stipulates that the ‘application of a provision of the law designated by 
virtue of this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with 
the public policy of the forum’ (italics added). 
46 Jens Rinze (n 41) 430. 
47 Recital 32 of the Rome II Regulation. 
48 Preamble 11 of the Rome I Regulation. 
49 See in this respect Axel Flessner and Hendrik Verhagen, Assignment in European Private 
International Law: Claims as Property and the European Commission’s ‘Rome I Regulation 
(Sellier European Law Publishers 2006) 21. 
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There is a lack of consensus in the academic literature in this respect. The 
proponents of the ordo-liberal ideas on the European integration process argue 
that the Treaty free movement rights guarantee and extend the freedom to choose 
the governing law across borders.50 According to this approach, the Treaty free 
movement rights are the basic tools in the process of the creation and completion 
of the internal market.51 This is because the latter was intended to be based on the 
activity of private parties,52 which have not only contractual freedom, but also the 
freedom to choose the governing law.53  
 
In light of this, national rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context are 
distinguished from other national rules for the purpose of scrutiny under the 
Treaty free movement provisions.54 In particular, according to this approach, only 
national rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context, which affect the 
exercise of contractual freedom and the freedom to choose the governing law 
could be regarded as an obstacle to free movement.55 These are the rules that 
could be caught, for instance, by Article 34 TFEU in light of Dassonville and 
                                                 
50 See eg Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Experiences from Europe: Legal Diversity and the Internal Market’ 
(2003-2004) 39 Texas International Law Journal 429, 440; See also Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, 
‘Basic Freedoms – Extending Party Freedom across Borders’ in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang 
Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal 
Market (Walter de Gruyter 2001); Stefan Grundmann, ‘The Concept of the Private Law Society: 
After 50 Years of European and European Business Law’ (2008) 16 European Review of Private 
Law 553. 
51 See Stefan Grundmann, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European 
Contract Law’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 269, 270.  
52 See Stefan  Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ (2001) 4 European Review 
of Private Law 505, 510. 
53 See Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds), ‘Party Autonomy and 
the Role of Information in the Internal Market – an Overview’ in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang 
Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds),  Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal 
Market (Walter de Gruyter 2001) 5. 
54 The difference between these rules is discussed in the first chapter. 
55 See Peter von Wilmowsky, Europäisches Kreditsicherungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 1996) 44. The 
starting point for the author is that the use of divergent connecting factors in different national 
choice-of-law rules increases uncertainty in cross-border transactions and restricts the freedom of 
private parties to choose the most efficient legal regime. However, this does not seem to be so in 
case of Union choice-of-law rules embodied, for instance, in the Rome I Regulation.  
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Cassis de Dijon.56 In contrast, other national rules that are mandatory only in a 
domestic context are not seen as limiting the freedom to choose the governing 
law, and, therefore, could hardly impede the exercise of the Treaty free movement 
rights.57 This is deduced from an extensive interpretation of the Court’s finding in 
Alsthom Atlantique,58 where the Court in the context of Article 35 TFEU, in an 
obiter dictum, held that the parties to an international contract of sale were 
generally free to determine the law applicable to their contractual relationship and 
could therefore avoid being subject to the national law at issue.59 Thus, in the 
context of scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions, the advocates of 
this approach place a particular emphasis on the discretion available to private 
parties engaged in cross-border relationships. In particular, national rules, which 
are not mandatory in an inter-State context, are less likely to restrict the exercise 
of the Treaty free movement rights, since private parties can avoid their scope by 
choosing the law of another Member State to govern their contract. As far as 
national rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context, the freedom available 
                                                 
56 See Stefan Grundmann ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ (n 52) 517. Case 8/74 
Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral 
AG v  Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
57 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Experiences from Europe’ (n 50) 443; Stefan Leible, ‘Fundamental 
Freedoms and European Contract Law’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed), Constitutional Values and 
European Contract Law (Kluwer Law International 2008) 69. 
58 See Stefania Bariatti (n 10) 90-91; Stefan Grundmann, ‘EC Consumer and EC Competition 
Law: How Related Are They? Examining the Existing EC Contract Law Sources’ in Hugh Collins 
(ed), The Forthcoming EC Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices: Contract, Consumer and 
Competition Law Implications (Kluwer Law International 2004) 212; Stefan Grundmann, 
‘Introduction’ in Massimo C Bianca and Stefan Grundmann (eds), EU Sales Directive: 
Commentary (Intersentia 2002) 26; Norbert Reich, ‘A Common Frame of Reference (CFR) – 
Ghost or Host for Integration?’ (2006) 7 ZERP-Diskussionspapie, 15-16 < 
www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/520228960.pdf> accessed 19 September 2011; Horatia Muir Watt, 
‘Experiences from Europe’ (n 50) 440; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The Challenge of Market Integration 
for European Conflicts Theory’ in Arthur Hartkamp, Martijn Hesselink, Ewoud Hondius and 
Others (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, Third fully revised and expanded edition (Kluwer 
Law International 2004) 199. 
59 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v Compagnie de contruction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] 
ECR I-107, para 15. The rule at issue was mandatory only in a domestic context. 
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to private parties is limited, since the applicability of these rules cannot be 
excluded by choosing the law of another Member State to govern a contract.60   
 
However, not all agree with this approach. There are others who disagree with the 
argument that the Treaty free movement rights themselves guarantee contractual 
freedom or the freedom to choose the applicable law across borders.61 This does 
not mean that the Treaty free movement rights have no connection with the 
principles of contractual freedom and party autonomy. They concur that these 
principles accepted in the national legal systems are taken for granted in the 
Union legal order.62 In particular, as Israël, for instance, points out, the Treaty free 
movement provisions do not, per se, guarantee the principle of party autonomy 
across borders, but the exclusion or restriction of the freedom to choose the 
governing law, however, could result in an obstacle to trade in the internal 
market.63  
 
In essence, those who disagree with the ordo-liberal approach do not share the 
same ideas with regard to the role of private parties in the process of the creation 
and completion of the internal market. This is one of the elements of the ordo-
                                                 
60 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Experiences from Europe’ (n 50) 443; Stefan Grundmann, ‘European 
Contract Law(s) of What Colour?’ (2005) European Review of Contract Law 185, 189; Martijn 
Hesselink, ‘Non-mandatory rules in European Contract Law’ (2005) 1 European Review of 
Contract Law 44, 75; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The Challenge of Market Integration for European 
Conflicts Theory’ (n 58) 199. 
61 See Jacobien W Rutgers, ‘The European Economic Constitution, Freedom of Contract and the 
DCFR’ (2009) 2 European Review of Contract Law 95, 97. 
62 ibid. The argument is presented in Nils Jansen and Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Restating the 
Acquis Communautaire? A Critical Examination of the “Principles of the Existing EC Contract 
Law” (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 505, 518. 
63 Jona  Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation: a Study of Regulation 1346/2000 
on Insolvency Proceedings in light of a Paradigm of Co-operation and a Comitas Europaea 
(Intersentia 2005) 127. 
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liberal perception of so-called ‘European economic constitution’.64  Developed 
after the Second World War,65 the ordo-liberal school of thought aims at ‘the 
creation of a free market, liberal economy, protected through constitutional 
principles’.66 As Maduro points out, ordo-liberals believe in a true market 
economy, where the power of a State is excluded, paving the way to voluntary 
market transactions and where constitutional protection prevents state intervention 
and protects undistorted competition.67 These are, in turn, the essential factors of 
so-called ‘private law society’ based on contractual freedom.68 On this basis, for 
ordo-liberals the Union has the aim of constitutionalising a free market economy 
with undistorted competition.69 Specifically, they consider the Treaty as 
establishing ‘a framework for a common market as a self-organising system’.70 
This system allows ‘an unimpeded self-coordination of economic actors through 
market transactions’ and ‘self-control of economic actors through competition’.71 
According to ordo-liberals, the Treaty free movement rights have the status of 
fundamental rights and are the cornerstones of ‘European economic 
                                                 
64 See Stefan Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ (n 52) 515; Jona Israël 
European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation: a Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings in light of a Paradigm of Co-operation and a Comitas Europaea (Intersentia 2005) 
126; Jacobien W Rutgers, International Reservation of Title Clauses: a Study of Dutch, French 
and German Private International Law in light of European Law (T. M. C. Asser Press 1999) 174; 
Jacobien W. Rutgers, ‘The European Economic Constitution’ (n 61) 98. 
65 See David J Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition 
Law and the “New” Europe’ (1994) 42 American Journal of Comparative Law 25. 
66 See Miguel P Maduro, ‘Reforming the Market of the State? Article 30 and the European 
Constitution: Economic Freedom and Political Rights’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 55, 61. 
67 ibid. 
68 See Wolf Sauter, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Union’ (1998) 4 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 27, 47. 
69 See Miguel P Maduro (n 66) 62; J. W. Rutgers, International Reservation of Title Clauses (n 64) 
174; More on ordo-liberalism, see Christian Joerges, ‘The Market without the State? The 
‘Economic Constitution’ of the European Union and the Rebirth of Regulatory Politics’ (1997) 1 
European Integration Online Papers < http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/1997-019.pdf> accessed 19 
September 2011. 
70 Manfred E Streit and Werner Mussler, ‘The Economic Constitution of European Union: From 
“Rome” to “Maastricht” (1995) 1 European Law Journal 5, 14. 
71 ibid. 
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constitution’.72 Thus, they play a major role in setting the limits imposed on the 
exercise of a State power and define the boundaries between public and private 
spheres.73 With regard to general competences, in the ordo-liberal point of view, 
the Union was granted supranational powers only to establish the common 
market.74 As a result, other Union sectoral policies, which go beyond pure market 
integration, are regarded as ‘flaws in the liberal economic constitution’.75  
 
It is rather difficult to decide whether to agree or disagree with the ordo-liberal 
approach that the Treaty free movement provisions extend the principle of party 
autonomy across borders. This is because of the significance attached by ordo-
liberals to the role of the Treaty free movement rights in the integration process. 
In particular, according to the ordo-liberal school of thought, the Treaty free 
movement provisions set strict constrains on state intervention in the internal 
market.76 One might certainly agree with this argument, but to what extent this is 
the case, however, is not quite obvious. One thing being that the actual scope of 
the Treaty free movement provisions has not been clearly defined yet. This 
specifically relates to the definition of the notion of non-discriminatory restriction 
that could be caught by the Treaty free movement provisions.77 For instance, in 
                                                 
72 See Miguel P Maduro (n 66) 62 and 64. 
73 ibid 64; See also Brigitta Lurger, ‘The Future of European Contract Law between Freedoms of 
Contract, Social Justice, and Market Rationality’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 442, 
452. 
74 See Wolf Sauter (n 68) 51. 
75 ibid 51. 
76 On this point of view, see Wolf Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU 
(Clarendon Press 1997), 42; Miguel P Maduro (n 66) 63. 
77 More on non-discriminatory restrictions in the context of free movement of persons, see Case C-
19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663; Case C-415/93 Union royale 
belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v 
Jean-Marc Bosman and Others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v 
Jean Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 
Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and 
Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96) [1999] ECR I-8453; Case C-
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the context of free movement of goods, Dassonville broadly defines the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU and there are recent rulings such as Commission v Italy and 
Mickelsson and Roos that raise questions over whether Keck is still good law.78 
Similarly, in case of services, one, for instance, could mention Gebhard, which 
broadened the scope of Article 56 TFEU, extending it to include non-
discriminatory barriers that prohibit or further impede the activities of service 
providers established in other Member States.79 The position taken by the Court in 
these rulings could be understood as reflecting the ordo-liberal argument 
concerning strict constrains imposed on state intervention in the internal market. 
At the same time, however, not all observers, for instance, agree that Commission 
v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos should be seen as a departure from the limited 
discrimination test under the Keck jurisprudence.80 Similarly, there still remains 
uncertainty about the actual scope of Article 56 TFEU. In contrast to Gebhard, in 
Mobistar and Viacom, for instance, the Court took a rather limited Keck-esque 
approach by excluding a national tax from the scope of Article 56 TFEU, since it 
                                                                                                                                     
108/96 Criminal proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen, Derek Pouton, Carla Godts, Youssef 
Antoun and Grandvision Belgium SA, being civilly liable, intervener: Union professionnelle belge 
des médecins spécialistes en ophtalmologie et chirurgie oculaire [2001] ECR I-837; Case C-60/00 
Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279; Case C-294/00 
Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfahren GmbH v Kurt Gräbner [2002] ECR  I-6515; 
Case C-79/01 Payroll Data Services (Italy) Srl, ADP Europe SA and ADP GSI SA [2002] ECR I-
8923; Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France v Ministère de l'Économie, des. Finances et de l'Industrie 
(CaixaBank) [2004] ECR I-8961. 
78 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (motorcycle trailers) [2009] ECR I-519, para 58; Case C-
142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273, para 28; Case C-
265/06 Commission v Portugal (tinted film) [2008] ECR I-2245, para 31-36. See in this respect, 
Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Leaving Keck behind? The free movement of goods after the rulings in 
Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos’ (2009) 34 European Law Review  914; Jukka Snell, 
‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
437; Luca Prete, ‘Of Motorcycle Trailers and Personal Watercrafts: the Battle over Keck’ (2008) 
35 Legal Issues of Economic Integration  133; Peter Pecho, ‘Good-bye Keck?: A Comment on the 
Remarkable Judgment in Commission v Italy, C-110/05’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 257. 
79 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, para 37. 
80 See eg Pal Wenneras and Ketil Boe Moen, ‘Selling arrangements, keeping Keck’ (2010) 35 
European Law Review 387. 
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equally affected domestic and foreign providers of services.81 This, in turn, seems 
to demonstrate the relatively limited scope of these Treaty free movement 
provisions. In particular, as much as the ability of Member States to legislate 
might be limited under Dassonville, Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos, 
pursuant to Keck, Mobistar and Viacom, they are still free to enact rules as long as 
domestic and foreign providers of goods and services are treated equally in law 
and in fact. 
 
That said, one thing is clear that the exercise of the Treaty free movement rights is 
very much interlinked with the exercise of contractual freedom and the freedom to 
choose the governing law. Any limitations of the latter would restrict free 
movement in the internal market. For instance, providers of goods and services 
would find it difficult to engage in cross-border activities between Member States 
without the freedom to decide whether to enter into a contractual relationship or 
agree specific contractual terms or clauses. In this respect, therefore, it is 
necessary to consider whether the discretion of private parties to choose the 
governing law can have any effect on scrutiny under the principle of equal 
treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl v Giotto Immobilier SARL [2005] ECR I-1167, para 37-38; 
Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar SA v Commune de Fléron and Belgacom Mobile 
SA v Commune de Schaerbeek [2005] ECR I-7723, para 29-31. 
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supplies goods or provides services, is not in favour of the application of a 
particular rule of the chosen law because of its allegedly discriminatory effect. 
 
Prior to going into the possible role of the principle of party autonomy in the 
present context, it is necessary, first, to address the applicability of the principle of 
equal treatment under Articles 34 and 56 TFEU in each of these scenarios. This 
specifically concerns scenario 3. In contrast to other two, in this scenario, one 
could question whether the contractual relationship at issue would actually fall 
within the Treaty to come within the scope of Articles 34 and 56 TFEU, giving 
the fact that there is no cross-border element other than the choice-of-law clause 
agreed by the contracting parties. Without the parties’ choice of the law of a 
different Member State, their contractual relationship would constitute a purely 
internal situation and, therefore, would not itself trigger the Treaty free movement 
provisions.84 Despite that, however, in light of Article 3 (4) of the Rome I 
                                                 
84 With regard to free movement of goods, see eg Case 286/81 Criminal proceedings against 
Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 4575, para 9; Case 355/85 Mr Driancourt, 
Commissioner of Police, Thouars, carrying out the duties of Public Prosecutor v Michel Cognet 
[1986] ECR 3231, para 11; Joined Cases C-321/94, C-322/94, C-323/94 and C-324/94 Criminal 
proceedings against Jacques Pistre (C-321/94), Michèle Barthes (C-322/94), Yves Milhau (C-
323/94) and Didier Oberti (C-324/94) [1997] ECR I-2343, para 44; Case C-448/98 Criminal 
proceedings against Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663, para 20; Case C-71/02 Herbert 
Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GmbH [2004] ECR I-3025, para 19. It is 
necessary to mention that in the context of Article 34 TFEU, an important factor is the existence of 
an impediment to intra-Union trade. More on this, see Alina Tryfonidou, ‘The outer limits of 
Article 28 EC: Purely internal situations and the development of the Court's approach through the 
years’ in at Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Law 
(Hart Publishing 2009); Peter Oliver and Stefan Enchelmaier, ‘Free movement of goods: Recent 
developments in the case law’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 649. With regard to free 
movement of persons, see eg Case 115/78 J. Knoors v Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
[1979] ECR 399, para 24; Case 175/78 La Reine v Vera Ann Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, para 11; 
Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Marc J.VC. Debauve and Others [1980] ECR 443, paragraph 9; 
Joined Cases 35 and 36/82 Elestina Esselina Christina Morson v State of the Netherlands and 
Head of the Plaatselijke Politie within the meaning of the Vreemdelingenwet; Sweradjie Jhanjan v 
State of the Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723, para 16; Joined Cases C-54/88, C-91/88 and C-14/89 
Criminal proceedings against Eleonora Nino and Others [1990] ECR I-3537, paragraph 10; Case 
C-332/90 Volker Steen v Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9; Case 204/87 
Criminal proceedings against Guy Bekaert [1988] ECR 2029, paragraph 10-12; Case C-266/96 
Corsica Ferries France SA v Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del porto di Genova Coop. arl, 
Gruppo Ormeggiatori del Golfo di La Spezia Coop. arl and Ministero dei Trasporti e della 
Navigazione [1998] ECR I-3949, para 40; Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van 
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Regulation, the choice of the governing law appears to be sufficient for the 
application of the relevant Union rules.85 In particular, under this provision, it 
seems that a forum court, sitting for instance in the Member State of the 
contracting parties’ establishment, can actually refuse to enforce the law of a 
different Member State, if it contradicts the relevant provisions under Union law. 
Even though Article 3 (4) of the Rome I Regulation only mentions provisions of 
Union law ‘implemented’ by the forum, it seems rather illogical to confine it to 
Union secondary legislation and exclude Union primary law from its scope. 
Therefore, it is fair to argue that in all three scenarios a forum court can, at least 
theoretically, invoke the principle of equal treatment against the application of a 
rule of the law chosen by the contracting parties. 
 
This, in turn, brings us to another important issue in the present context, which is 
the likelihood of a rule that is part of the chosen law to be discriminatory in nature 
or effect. In contrast to scenario 1, in scenarios 2 and 3 the law of Member State C 
would not be applicable if not the choice made by the contracting parties. In this 
respect, considering the remoteness of the link between the contract at issue and 
the chosen law, it is rather difficult to envisage how a rule that is part of that law 
can, for instance, directly or indirectly discriminate against contracting party X on 
grounds of nationality. In other words, it is questionable how a forum court would 
                                                                                                                                     
Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141, para 30; Case C-108/98 RI. SAN. Srl v Comune di Ischia, Italia 
Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente SpA. [1999] ECR I-5219, paragraph 23; Case C-70/95 Sodemare 
SA, Anni Azzuri Holding SpA and Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-
3395, para 37. 
85 This in a certain way finds support in the case-law, according to which national courts can 
request a preliminary ruling concerning the law of another Member State. See in this respect, Case 
20/64 SARL Albatros v Société des pétroles et des combustibles liquides (Sopéco) [1965] ECR 29, 
p 34; Case 261/81 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA [1982] ECR I-3961, para 9; 
Case C-150/88 Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Eau de Cologne & Parfümerie-Fabrik, 
Glockengasse n. 4711 v Provide Srl. [1989] ECR I-3891, para 12; Case C-47/90 Établissements 
Delhaize frères et Compagnie Le Lion SA v Promalvin SA and AGE Bodegas Unidas SA [1992] 
ECR I-3669, para 9. 
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establish the possible discriminatory effect of a rule of the Member State at issue 
when there is no actual connection with its territory through the exercise of any 
Treaty free movement right. Party X might face a certain disadvantage as a result 
of the application of a rule of the chosen law, which might not be the case, for 
example, if the law of the Member State where it is established was applied. This, 
however, does not appear to be sufficient to be caught under the Treaty free 
movement provisions.  
 
This concerns discrimination both on grounds of nationality and movement. On 
the one hand, such a disadvantage simply seems to be the result of a mere 
difference in substance between the rules applied in two Member States. As the 
Court reiterated on several occasions, not every difference in treatment constitutes 
discrimination contrary to the Treaty free movement provisions.86 Contracting 
party X, thus, would simply have to accept any disadvantage, which directly 
emanates from the exercise of the freedom to choose the governing law. On the 
other hand, more importantly, because of the absence of the actual exercise of any 
Treaty free movement right involving the territory of the Member State at issue, 
the effect of a rule of that Member State on free movement in the internal market 
is also most likely to be considered to be too uncertain and indirect.87  
                                                 
86 See eg Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, para 13; Case 
1/78 Patrick Christopher Kenny v Insurance Officer [1978] ECR 1489, para 18; Cases 185/78 to 
204/78 Criminal proceedings against J. van Dam en Zonen and Others [1979] ECR 2345, para 10; 
Case 155/80 Summary proceedings against Sergius Oebel [1981] ECR 1993, para 10; Case 308/86 
Criminal proceedings against R. Lambert [1988] ECR 4369, para 22; Joined Casec C-251/90 and 
C-252/90 Procurator fiscal, Elgin v Kenneth Gordon Wood and James Cowie [1992] ECR I-2873, 
para 19; Case C-379/92 Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 
34; Case C-177/94 Criminal proceedings against Gianfranco Perfili [1996] ECR I-161, para 17. 
87 See eg Case 69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and 
Netherlands State [1990] ECR I-583, para 11; Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v Pelin 
Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009, para 12; Case C-379/92 Criminal proceedings against Matteo 
Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 24; Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v Spedizioni 
Marittima del Golfo Srl [1995] ECR I-2883, para 41; Joined Cases C-418/93, C-419/93, C-420/93, 
C-421/93, C-460/93, C-461/93, C-462/93, C-464/93, C-9/94, C-10/94, C-11/94, C-14/94, C-15/94, 
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This, however, cannot be said with regard to scenario 1. The probability of a rule 
that is part of the chosen law (Member State B) to be discriminatory contrary to 
Articles 34 or 56 TFEU cannot be discarded. This is obviously because of the fact 
that there is the actual exercise of a Treaty free movement right involving the 
territory of that Member State, the rule of which is under consideration. In this 
context is where the question of the possible role of the party autonomy principle 
over scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment becomes relevant.  
 
5.1. Mandatory rules of the chosen law  
 
In the context of scenario 1, let us first consider rules that are mandatory in an 
inter-State context. These rules can be of public and private law nature.88 
Mandatory rules of public law nature are rules the main purpose of which is a 
                                                                                                                                     
C-23/94, C-24/94 and C-332/94 Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco (C-
418/93), Semeraro Mobili SpA v Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco (C-419/93), RB Arredamento Srl 
v Sindaco del Comune di Stezzano (C-420/93), Città Convenienza Milano Srl v Sindaco del 
Comune di Trezzano sul Naviglio (C-421/93), Città Convenienza Bergamo Srl v Sindaco del 
Comune di Stezzano (C-460/93), Centro Italiano Mobili Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Pineto (C-
461/93), Il 3C Centro Convenienza Casa Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Roveredo in Piano (C-
462/93), Benelli Confezioni SNC v Sindaco del Comune di Capena (C-464/93), M. Quattordici Srl 
v Commissario straordinario del Comune di Terlizzi (C-9/94), Società Italiana Elettronica Srl 
(SIEL) v Sindaco del Comune di Dozza (C-10/94), Modaffari Srl v Sindaco del Comune di 
Trezzano sul Naviglio (C-11/94), Modaffari Srl v Comune di Cinisello Balsamo (C-14/94), 
Cologno Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Cologno Monzese (C-15/94), Modaffari Srl v Sindaco del 
Comune di Osio Sopra (C-23/94), M. Dieci Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Madignano (C-24/94) 
and Consorzio Centro Commerciale "Il Porto" v Sindaco del Comune di Adria (C-332/94) [1996] 
ECR I-2975, para 32; Case C-134/94 Esso Española SA v Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias 
[1995] ECR I-4223, para 24; Joined Cases C-140/94, C-141/94 and C-142/94 DIP SpA v Comune 
di Bassano del Grappa, LIDL Italia Srl v Comune di Chioggia and Lingral Srl v Comune di 
Chiogga [1995] ECR I-3257, para 29; Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France SA v Gruppo 
Antichi Ormeggiatori del porto di Genova Coop. arl, Gruppo Ormeggiatori del Golfo di La Spezia 
Coop. arl and Ministero dei Trasporti e della Navigazione [1998] ECR I-3949, para 31; C-412/97 
ED Srl v Italo FenocchioCase [1998] ECR I-3845, para 11; Case C-44/98 BASF AG v Präsident 
des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR I-6269, para 16; Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v Filzmoser 
Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493, para 25; Case C-211/08 Commission v Kingdom of Spain 
[2010] ECR I-5267, para 72. 
88 George A Bermann, ‘Public Law in the Conflicts of Laws’ (1986) 34 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (Supplement) 157, 164-165; More on this see eg Kurt Lipstein, ‘Conflict of 
Public Laws – Vision and Realities’ in Ronald H Graveson, Karl F Kreuzer, Andre Tuncand 
Others  (eds), Festschrift für Imre Zajtay (Mohr Siebeck 1982). 
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State’s direct regulation in the public interest of various aspects of its social or 
economic policies.89 This category includes, among others, rules on antitrust, 
securities, export controls, products liability and environmental regulation.90 The 
importance of these rules with regard to public welfare and economic order has 
extended them to relationships between private parties.91 Mandatory rules of 
private (contract) law nature, in turn, are rules that promote fairness in the context 
of relationships between private parties and, therefore, protect their interests. 92  
For instance, these rules are referred to in Articles 6 and 8 of the Rome I 
Regulation that provide special protection for consumers and employees.93  
 
In Arblade,94 though not specifically in the context of contractual relationships, 
the Court ruled that national mandatory rules are also required to comply with 
Union law. In particular, the Court held that the classification of a particular rule 
as public-order legislation did not mean that it was exempt from the requirement 
to comply with Treaty provisions.95 According to the Court, if this was indeed the 
                                                 
89 George A. Bermann (n 88) 162. 
90 Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of 
Political Economy’ (2002-2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383, 384; George A 
Bermann (n 88) 162. 
91 Frank Vischer (n 2) 150. 
92 See George A Bermann (n 88) 162. 
93 See Jens Rinze (n 41) 421 and 424. See also Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo 
Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero (C-240/98) and Salvat Editores SA v José M. Sánchez 
Alcón Prades (C-241/98), José Luis Copano Badillo (C-242/98), Mohammed Berroane (C-243/98) 
and Emilio Viñas Feliú (C-244/98) [2000] ECR I-49401, para 25. 
94 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and 
Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-
376/96) [1999] ECR I-8453.  
95 ibid para 31. This finding was also confirmed in Case C-165/98 Criminal proceedings against 
André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, as the party civilly liable, third parties: 
Eric Guillaume and Others [2001] ECR I-2189. See in this respect Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The 
Challenge of Market Integration for European Conflicts Theory’ (n 58) 199. The compatibility of 
national mandatory rules with the Treaty free movement provisions was also examined by the 
Court, for instance, in Case C-36/01 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs v 
Oberbürgermeisterin der Budesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-960; Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien 
Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-505. 
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case, the primacy and uniform application of Union law would be undermined.96 
Thus, it is clear that national mandatory rules both of public and private law 
nature can also fall within the scope of the principle of equal treatment. Those that 
impose discriminatory treatment would be incompatible with the principle of 
equal treatment and, therefore, require objective justification.  
 
In this respect, one could question, however, whether this outcome could be any 
different, if such a discriminatory rule is part of the law chosen by private parties. 
The choice of the governing law made by private parties to a contract is hardly 
likely to be taken as a basis for the application of a discriminatory mandatory rule. 
Otherwise, it would be contrary to the very objective of the principle of equal 
treatment. As mentioned earlier, a particular rule falls within the scope of the 
principle of equal treatment because of its effect on free movement in the internal 
market.97 In this regard, the fact that a rule is applicable by virtue of a choice-of-
law clause stipulated in a contract cannot exempt it from being caught by the 
principle of equal treatment. After all, a rule does not cease to be discriminatory 
just because it is part of the governing law chosen by private parties.  
 
The principle of party autonomy also does not appear to be a sufficient ground for 
objective justification. This is because whether contracting parties had exercised 
the freedom to choose the governing law could not make any difference in the 
present context, if a rule is mandatory in an inter-State context and is applicable 
                                                 
96 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and 
Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-
376/96) [1999] ECR I-8453, para 31. 
97 Jacobien W Rutgers, ‘Free Movements and Contract Law’ (2008) 3 European Review of 
Contract Law 474, 476. See also Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville 
[1974] ECR 837; Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard 
Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
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on its own terms. In particular, the contracting parties in scenario 1 would simply 
be obliged to meet the requirements imposed by a mandatory rule of Member 
State B, even without choosing the law of that Member State as the law governing 
their contract. This is because, the rule is part of the national law to which the 
cross-border relationship at issue is linked. Thus, it seems correct to argue that the 
principle of party autonomy could hardly play any role in the context of the 
scrutiny of mandatory rules under the principle of equal treatment, due to the fact 
that they would be in any way applicable to a given a cross-border contractual 
relationship, based on a factor other than a choice-of-law clause agreed by private 
parties.   
 
5.2. Default rules of the chosen law 
 
Default rules are not mandatory in an inter-State context. These are private 
(contract) law rules enacted to facilitate private parties in their contractual 
relationships. These rules do not pursue any public interest.98 Among others, one 
could mention, for instance, rules that define the quality expected from a service 
provider; rules that detail reasons why a party may terminate a contractual 
relationship; or rules that determine the consequences of a late delivery.99 These 
rules aim to reduce costs incurred in the context of contractual relationships.100 In 
particular, they save time and expenses when private parties negotiate specific 
                                                 
98 Sandrine Clavel, ‘Regulatory Function of Choice of Law Rules Applying to Contracts for 
Services in the European Union’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt (eds), The Regulatory 
Function of European Private Law (Edward Elgar 2009) 67. 
99 Martijn W Hesselink, ‘Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’ in Jan M Smits and 
Sophie Stijns (eds.), Inhoud en werking van de overeenkomst naar Belgisch en Nederlands recht 
(Intersentia 2005) 101. See also Martijn W Hesselink, ‘The Principles of European Contract Law: 
Some Choices Made by the Lando Commission’ (2001) 1 Global Jurist Frontiers 1, 54. 
100 Ugo Mattei, ‘Efficiency and Equal Protection in the New European Contract Law: Mandatory, 
Default and Enforcement Rules’ (1998-1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 527, 538. 
See also Sandrine Clavel (n 98) 67. 
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contractual terms.101 Unlike mandatory rules, default rules do not apply on their 
own terms. They are applicable to a contract pursuant to a choice-of-law rule or a 
choice-of-law clause agreed by private parties.102 Thus, only default rules of the 
law chosen by contracting parties would be applicable to their contract.103  
 
Private parties are free to opt out of a default rule of the chosen law.104 This 
means that when agreeing a choice-of-law clause, private parties can exclude a 
contract from the scope of a default rule that is part of the chosen law.105 Once 
excluded, this rule is usually replaced by a specific contractual term. Since a 
default rule of the chosen law is not applicable on its own terms, it is not binding 
upon contracting parties.106 However, if contracting parties have not set aside it, it 
is binding as part of the governing law.107 Thus, in contrast to mandatory rules, 
the applicability of default rules of the chosen law is subject to a wider discretion 
available to private parties in the context of contractual relationships. 
 
                                                 
101 See Martijn W Hesselink, ‘Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’ (n 99) 102; See 
also Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘The Theory of Contracts’ in Peter Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract 
Law: New Essays (Cambridge University Press 2001) 227. 
102 This also concerns rules that are mandatory only in a domestic context, i.e. situations where all 
factors except a choice-of-law clause agreed by private parties are related to one country. 
103 Jacobien W. Rutgers, ‘The Rule of Reason and Private Law or the Limits to Harmonization’ in 
Annette Schrauwen (ed), The Rule of Reason: Rethinking Another Classic of European Law 
(Europa Law Publishing 2005) 152. 
104 See Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law: Part I and II, 
Combined and Revisited, Prepared by the Commission of European Contract Law (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 101. See also Christopher R Drahozal, ‘Contracting Around: Default Rules, 
Mandatory Rules and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards’ (2002-2003) 3 Pepperdine Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal 419, 420. 
105 See Souichirou Kozuka, ‘The Economic Implications of Uniformity in Law’ in Jürgen 
Basedow, Toshiyuki Kono and Giesela Ruhl (eds), An Economic Analysis of Private International 
Law (Mohr Siebeck 2006) 84. See also Matthias E Storme, ‘Freedom of Contract: Mandatory and 
Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’ (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 
233, 237. 
106 Martijn W Hesselink, ‘Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’ (n 99) 101. 
107 See John O’Brien and Raymond Smith, Conflict of Laws (2nd end, Cavendish Publishing 1999) 
336. See also Christopher A Riley, ‘Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent, 
Conventionalism, and Efficiency’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 367, 367. 
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5.2.1. Ordo-liberal approach and default rules 
 
According to the ordo-liberal approach discussed earlier, default rules are not 
subject to scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions.108 The proponents 
of this approach, putting a particular emphasis on the role of the principle of party 
autonomy in the internal market,  point out that in a contractual context only the 
compatibility of national rules that are mandatory in an inter-State context is 
scrutinised in light of the Treaty free movement provisions.109 In contrast, default 
rules, which are not mandatory in an inter-State context, can escape scrutiny under 
the Treaty free movement provisions.110  This is because the mere application of 
these rules to a given contract is a direct consequence of the choice made by 
private parties.111 In particular, the reason is that if contracting parties have not set 
aside these rules, the Treaty free movement provisions cannot be used to correct 
parties’ choice.112 
 
In light of this, one could argue that because of their specific nature, default rules 
are not subject to scrutiny and, therefore, caught by the principle of equal 
treatment enshrined in the Treaty free movement provisions. It could be 
understood that these rules are not scrutinised under the principle of equal 
                                                 
108 See eg Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Experiences from Europe’ (n 50) 440; Jürgen Basedow, ‘A 
Common Contract Law for the Common Market’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 1169, 
1174; Stefan Grundmann, ‘EC Consumer and EC Competition Law: How Related Are They? 
Examining the Existing EC Contract Law Sources’ in Hugh Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC 
Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices: Contract, Consumer and Competition Law 
Implications (Kluwer Law International 2004) 212; Oliver Remien, Zwingendes Vertragsrecht und 
Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertrages (Mohr Siebeck 2003) 186-192. 
109 See Stefan Grundmann, ‘European Contract Law(s) of What Colour?’ (n 60) 188-189. 
110 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of 
Political Economy’ (2002-2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383, 390-391; Stefan 
Leible (n 57) 68. See also Stefan Grundmann, ‘European Contract Law(s) of What Colour?’ (n 60) 
189.  
111 See Stefan  Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ (n 52) 513-514. 
112 ibid 514. 
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treatment, giving the fact that contracting parties are able to avoid falling within 
their scope. On the flip side, this also seems to suggest that contracting parties 
would not be able to invoke the principle of equal treatment against the 
application of a default rule that is part of the national law they have chosen to 
govern their contract without explicitly opting out of the scope of that rule. In this 
way, a default rule of the chosen law would be binding on contracting parties, 
regardless of the possible consequences its application might entail. 
 
5.2.2. Default rules are also subject to scrutiny  
 
At the same time, however, there are compelling reasons one might be tempted to 
disagree with such a conclusion. To begin with, it is fair to argue that national 
default (or non-mandatory) rules themselves falling within the Treaty can 
obviously come within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions. In 
particular, putting aside the role of private parties over their scope for a moment, a 
national default rule regulating a given cross-border relationship, for instance, 
pursuant to a choice-of-law rule can also be subject to scrutiny under the principle 
of equal treatment.113 Similar to other national rules, an important factor in this 
respect is its effect on free movement in the internal market, regardless of its 
domestic classification.114  
 
                                                 
113 See Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v Compagnie de contruction mécanique Sulzer SA 
[1991] ECR I-107, Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, footnote 15.  According to 
Advocate General Van Gerven, the effect of Article 35 TFEU cannot vary whether the rule is 
mandatory or not.  
114 See Case 82/71 Ministère public de Italian Republic v Società agricola industria latter (SAIL) 
[1972] ECR I-119, para 5; Case C-20/92 Anthony Hubbard (Testamentvollstrecker) v Peter 
Hamburger [1993] ECR I-3777, para 19. This also finds support in Case 106/77 Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629, para 17. 
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Now, let us consider whether this could also be said, specifically, about a default 
rules that is part of the chosen law. The issue in this context certainly appears to 
be more complex, since the applicability of a particular default rule to a given 
cross-border relationship is very much dependent on the discretion available to 
private parties. Two issues, however, could be raised here.  
 
On the one hand, it is doubtful whether the freedom granted to private parties in a 
cross-border relationship could play a role in finding the discriminatory effect of a 
default rule that is part of the chosen law. In particular, the mere question of 
whether a default rule is discriminatory does not seem to be affected by the fact 
that the application of that rule is subject to the discretion available to private 
parties over its scope. An essential factor, here, is the effect of the rule at issue on 
free movement in the Union, rather than in what way it is applied.115 A 
discriminatory effect of a rule is not confined to specific factual circumstances, 
though it is often established based on them. That is to say, if a rule is found to be 
discriminatory, it would not cease to be so in a slightly different context. 
Considering that, a rule would not be less or no longer discriminatory just because 
private parties are free to exclude their contract from its scope. This certainly 
concerns direct discrimination on grounds of nationality, but could also be 
extended to indirect one. However, having said that, it is necessary to mention that 
finding whether a rule at issue is indirectly discriminatory on grounds of 
nationality is not always as straightforward as it is the case with rules that are 
directly discriminatory on grounds of nationality. This could be affected, for 
                                                 
115 For further analysis of a discriminatory effect of national rules, see Nicolas Bernard, 
‘Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law’ (1996) 45 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly 82. 
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instance, as mentioned earlier, by the fact that not every difference in treatment is 
considered by the Court to be contrary to the principle of equal treatment. 
 
On the other hand, it is also questionable whether the party autonomy principle 
can be taken as a justifying factor for the application of, for example, an indirectly 
discriminatory default rule that is part of the chosen law.116 Private parties are free 
to choose the governing law and they normally agree to do so, based on their own 
considerations. This also applies to the exercise of the discretion to exclude or not 
to exclude a contract from the scope of any given default rule of the chosen law. 
Having consented to the choice of the governing law without the exercise of this 
discretion, they are regarded as bound by the contract they have agreed.117 As a 
general rule, the will of private parties is usually taken as a main factor by a forum 
court hearing a dispute in holding them to the promises they have made.118  Thus, 
the conclusion one could draw here is that contracting parties are simply required 
to accept the consequences arising therefrom.  
 
However, at the same time, to hold that the mere choice by private parties not to 
set aside an allegedly discriminatory default rule is a sufficient justifying factor 
for its application also does not seem to be persuasive enough. To start with, this 
might in a certain way imply that a party to a cross-border contractual relationship 
itself would have to assess the actual effect of the relevant default rules and act 
upon it. Certainly, at this stage, a party would expectedly be more concerned with 
the question of whether in general the application of a given default rule is or not 
                                                 
116 Direct discrimination on grounds of nationality is justified only based on express Treaty 
derogations, which is why it is difficult to see how the principle of party autonomy could play any 
role in this respect. 
117 Christopher A Riley (n 107) 370. 
118 ibid. 
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in its interest, rather than the specific question of whether it is compatible or not 
with the relevant Union rules. If a default rule does not serve its interest, a party 
might simply opt out of it. This would mean that the otherwise applicable default 
rule would have to be replaced with a specific contractual term instead, which 
would obviously require the consent of another party (or parties) to the same 
cross-border contractual relationship. But, this could not be an easy task, since, as 
it is pointed out by the scholarship, in practice it is often very difficult for parties 
to find an agreement on the law governing their contract and, in particular, the 
exclusion of certain default rules.119 Thus, one could easily subject the absence of 
a special arrangement with regard to default rules of the chosen law to the mere 
lack of a consensus between contracting parties. Furthermore, a party could also 
be in a weaker bargaining position in comparison to the other one and, as a result, 
could be offered a contract already including a choice-of-law clause without any 
special arrangement with regard to default rules of the chosen law. Taking the 
above-mentioned into consideration, it is doubtful whether the absence of a 
special contractual term setting aside a given default rule of the chosen law indeed 
reflects the actual intention of contracting parties. 
 
It is also important to mention that the issue of the compatibility of a default rule 
of the chosen law could arise at a later stage - not necessarily when a choice-of-
law clause is agreed by contracting parties. In this respect, if a contract has not 
been excluded from the scope of a given default rule, it is not reasonable to expect 
a party to accept every possible disadvantage arising as a result of the application 
of that rule, regardless of the discretion available to it pursuant to the party 
                                                 
119 Christian Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law (Routledge Cavendish 2008) 
24. See also Brigitta Lurger, Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in der 
Europäischen Union (Springer 2002) 274. 
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autonomy principle. In a similar vein, it is also appears to be inconsistent with the 
internal market rationale to preclude any possibility to raise before a forum court 
sitting in a Member State the issue of the compatibility of a given default rule 
with the relevant Treaty free movement provisions and, if necessary to ask the 
court to request a preliminary ruling on the matter. This finds support in the 
general argument that otherwise a number of national rules would easily escape 
scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions, when they actually have an 
adverse effect on free movement in the internal market.120 
 
On this basis, it is fair to argue that default rules of the chosen law can be subject 
to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment. The right of a forum court to 
give effect to the latter emanates from Article 3 (4) of the Rome I Regulation and 
the obligation of loyal cooperation under Article 4 TEU. 
 
5.2.3. Alsthom Atlantique and default rules 
 
As far as the Court’s obiter dictum in Alsthom Atlantique is concerned, it can 
hardly be accepted as an unequivocal confirmation of the fact that default rules of 
the chosen law can escape scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions. 
First of all, it is not clear how the obiter dictum was of any relevance with regard 
to the factual background in Alsthom Atlantique.121 The case involved a French 
rule on liability, which was applied in the context of the contractual relationship 
between two French companies. This rule was mandatory only in a domestic 
                                                 
120 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and the 
Exception of Mutual Recognition’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 56. 
121 Jan Smits, The Making of European Private Law: Towards a Ius Commune Europaeum as a 
Mixed Legal System (Intersentia 2002) 10. 
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context.122 Thus, the contracting parties at issue could not set aside the rule at 
issue. The Court’s obiter dictum, in turn, however, concerns the freedom to 
choose the governing law in the context of a cross-border contract of sale.123 
 
Furthermore, it seems less convincing to apply the obiter dictum to Article 34 
TFEU. The obiter dictum in Alsthom Atlantique was held in the context of the 
compatibility of a national contract law rule with Article 35 TFEU, the scope of 
which is very narrow in comparison with Article 34 TFEU. The Court has not 
reiterated it with regard to Article 34 TFEU or other Treaty free movement 
provisions.124 For instance, in CMC Motorradcenter,125 the issue concerned the 
comparability with Article 34 TFEU of the German rule that required a party to 
disclose to the other one all the necessary information that might affect their 
contractual relationship. This rule was applied to CMC Motorradcenter, an 
unauthorised motorcycle dealer, which sold to Mrs Baskiciogullari a motorcycle 
purchased from the German importer. CMC Motorradcenter did not inform Mrs 
Baskiciogullari that German authorised dealers generally refused to repair 
motorcycles that had been the subject of parallel imports. The Court found that the 
German rule on compulsory disclosure of information was compatible Article 34 
TFEU.126 In particular, the Court held that the application of this rule was not 
liable to hinder trade between Member States, since its effect was too uncertain 
and indirect.127  
                                                 
122 For the mandatory nature of the rule, see Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v Compagnie 
de contruction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] ECR I-107, para 4. From paragraph 15 of the 
judgment, it can be inferred that the rule was not internationally enforced. 
123 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v Compagnie de contruction mécanique Sulzer SA 
[1991] ECR I-107, para 15. 
124 See Christian Twigg-Flesner (n 119) 24; Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen (n 120) 54. 
125 Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v Pelin Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009. 
126 ibid para 13. 
127 ibid para 12. 
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Similar to Alsthom Atlantique, on the one hand, the issue in CMC Motorradcenter 
concerned the application of a non-mandatory rule of contract law nature and. on 
the other hand, there was no choice of the governing law agreed by the parties 
involved.128 Despite that, in contrast to Alsthom Atlantique, the Court did not 
touch upon the principle of party autonomy in its reasoning. However, in light of 
the similarities between these two cases, it would seem reasonable to expect the 
Court, at least, to mention the principle of party autonomy, especially assuming 
that in Alsthom Atlantique it was indeed given a special role in the context of 
scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions as argued by the proponents 
of the ordo-liberal approach.129 
 
6. Contractual term agreed by private parties 
 
As mentioned earlier, when private parties opt out of a default rule of the chosen 
law, it is usually replaced by a specific contractual term. In this respect, it might 
also be relevant to consider the relationship between a contractual term and the 
principle of equal treatment.130 This might further shed some light on the role of 
the principle of contractual freedom, in turn, in the context of scrutiny under the 
Treaty free movement provisions.  
 
                                                 
128 The rule at issue was ‘non-mandatory’ in the sense it would not be applied if the parties to a 
contract had chosen the law of another State as the governing law. 
129 Apostolos Gkoutzinis, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EC Treaty and the Law of 
Contractual Obligations Relating to Banking and Financial Services’ (2004) 41 Common Market 
Law Review 119, 128. 
130 As will be demonstrated below, Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU seem to produce a horizontal 
direct effect. 
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The applicability of a contractual term and a default rule of the chosen law could 
be compared in terms of the discretion granted to private parties. This is in a sense 
that the applicability of both is very much subject to the will of private parties. In 
other words, it is up to contracting parties to opt out of a particular default rule of 
the chosen law and, in a similar way, agree on having a specific term in a contract. 
At the same time, however, they are substantially different in terms of scrutiny 
under the Treaty free movement provisions. In case of a default rule, regardless of 
the discretion available to private parties over its scope, it is in essence a national 
rule that is scrutinised. In contrast, contractual terms are a result of the exercise of 
contractual freedom - i.e. these are, for instance, specific conditions or obligations 
designed by private parties themselves without any involvement of national rules. 
This, in turn, requires a specific approach, since the greater is scrutiny under the 
Treaty free movement provisions, the more limitations could be imposed on the 
exercise of contractual freedom. 
 
6.1. Horizontal direct effect 
 
When dealing with contractual terms, first of all, it is necessary to distinguish 
between, on the one hand, Article 34 TFEU and, on the other hand, Articles 45, 49 
and 56 TFEU. This is because, in accordance with the existing case-law, a 
horizontal direct effect seems only possible in the context of the latter.  
 
In Sapod Audic,131 the Court excluded a contractual term from the scope of Article 
34 TFEU. The issue in this case concerned the French rule that required producers 
                                                 
131 Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v Eco-Emballages SA. [2002] ECR I-5031. 
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and importers to contribute to or organise the disposal of their packaging waste. 
To this end, they were obliged to enter into a contract with a body officially 
entrusted to handle the disposal of waste. Such a contract had to stipulate the 
estimated volume of waste to be taken, the fee and, in particular, the way the 
packaging would be identified. With regard to the latter condition, however, the 
rule did not require the use of any specific symbol, mark or label. In order to 
comply with this rule, Sapod Audic, a company marketing poultry, signed an 
agreement with Eco-Emballages, an officially entrusted body. It was stipulated in 
the agreement that Sapod Audic would use the ‘Green Dot’ logo to identify its 
packaging. One of the questions referred to the Court concerned the compatibility 
of that contractual term with Article 34 TFEU.132 In this respect, the Court held 
that the general requirement to identify the packaging under the rule at issue had 
taken the form of an obligation to mark the packaging with the ‘Green Dot’ logo 
stipulated in the contract between the parties at issue.133 The Court then continued 
that since it was a contractual term binding the parties, the obligation to use the 
‘Green Dot’ logo could not be regarded as a barrier to trade under Article 34 
TFEU. This is because, according to the Court, it was not imposed by a Member 
State, but agreed between individuals. 134 In this way, the Court confirmed its 
finding in the previous case-law that only public measures, i.e. measures taken by 
Member States, are caught by Article 34 TFEU.135  
 
                                                 
132 In this respect, Sapod Audic argued that because of Eco-Emballages’s monopoly, foreign 
producers were obliged to use the ‘Green Dot’ logo, which incurred substantial difficulties and 
rendered it difficult to import products to France. 
133 Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v Eco-Emballages SA. [2002] ECR I-5031, para 74. 
134 ibid. 
135 See eg Case 311/85 ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v ASBL Sociale Dienst van de 
Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR I-3801, para 30. See also Joined 
Cases 177 and 178/82 Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV 
[1984] ECR I-1797, para 12. See also Case C-325/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9977, 
para 14-21. 
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In contrast to Article 34 TFEU, one would not face such an issue, if a particular 
contractual term is scrutinised under the principle of equal treatment enshrined in 
the other Treaty free movement provisions, in particular, Articles 45, 49 and 56 
TFEU. It appears that actions or measures taken by private parties could also be 
caught by these Treaty provisions.136 
  
Walrave is the first case,137 where the Court hinted at the possibility of these 
Treaty free movement provisions to be invoked against another private party.138 
One of the questions raised was whether Articles 18, 45 and 56 TFEU could be 
invoked against the rules adopted by the International Cycling Union. In this 
regard, the Court held that ‘prohibition of such discrimination does not only apply 
to the action of public authorities but extends likewise to rules of any other nature 
aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment and the provision 
for services’.139 The Court further added that the objective in ensuring free 
movement in the internal market would be compromised, if national barriers could 
                                                 
136 See eg Case 36/74 B.N.O Walrave and L.J.H. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405; 
Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139; Case 
C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] ECR I-
11767; Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-94/07 Andrea Raccanelli 
v Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV [2008] ECR I-5939. 
137 Case 36/74 B.N.O Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405. 
138 The horizontal direct effect of a Treaty provision means that this provision regulates the 
relationship between individuals. Specifically, an individual in order to safeguard its rights can 
rely on it against another individual before national courts. The vertical direct effect of a Treaty 
provision, in turn, means that this provision regulates the relationship between a State and an 
individual. The latter in order to safeguard its rights can rely on this Treaty provision against 
public authorities before national courts. See in this respect Case 223/86 Pesca Valentia Limited v 
Ministry for Fisheries and Forestry, Ireland and the Attorney General [1988] ECR 83, para 20. 
See also Eva J Lohse, ‘Fundamental Freedoms and Private Actors – towards and ‘Indirect 
Horizontal Effect’ (2007) 13 European Public Law 159. 
139 ibid para 17. This finding was reiterated by the Court in Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario 
Mantero [1976] ECR I-1333, para 17; Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football 
association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and Others 
and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-
4921, para 82. 
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be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by 
associations or organisations, which did not come under public law.140 Although 
the Court applied Articles 18, 45 and 56 TFEU to the rules of an international 
sporting association, which is distinct from public authorities, it remained unclear 
as to what extent private parties could be liable under these provisions. 
 
A hint at the possible horizontal direct effect of Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU 
could also be observed in Haug-Adrion.141 The issue in that case concerned the 
clause stipulated in the insurance contract between Mr Haug-Adrion, a German 
national and the German insurance company. According to that provision, Mr 
Haug-Adrion was provided with a third-party liability insurance cover without the 
highest rate of no-claims bonus, because his car was registered under a customs 
registration plate. According to the Court, this contractual term was compatible 
with the principle of equal treatment under Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU, since the 
type of insurance offered was not based on grounds of nationality.142 
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached by the Court, the ruling seems to be 
important in the present context. The contractual term between two private parties 
was subject to scrutiny under Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. If the clause was 
found to be discriminatory, it would be caught by the principle of equal treatment 
under these Treaty provisions. This argument finds backing in the Court’s 
reasoning in Haug-Adrion, where it held that the principle of equal treatment is 
intended ‘to eliminate all measures which (...) treat a national of another Member 
State more severely or place him in a situation less advantageous, from a legal or 
                                                 
140 ibid para 18. 
141 Case 251/83 Eberhard Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] ECR I-4277. 
142 ibid para 16. 
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factual point of view, than that of one of the Member State’s own nationals in the 
same circumstances’.143  
 
The scope of the principle of equal treatment as regards private parties was further 
clarified in the seminal case of Angonese.144 Mr Angonese, an Italian national, 
whose mother tongue was German, was resident in the province of Bolzano. 
Having studied in Austria, he decided to take part in a competition for a post in a 
private bank in Bolzano. The bank refused to consider his application for the 
employment on the ground that he did not possess a certificate of bilingualism 
issued in the province of Bolzano. Mr Angonese challenged this requirement 
before the national court, which referred a question to the Court concerning its 
compatibility with Article 45 TFEU. Prior to dealing with this issue, the Court 
considered the question of whether Article 45 TFEU could be applied to private 
parties. In this respect, the Court recalled its finding in Walrave and Defrenne.145 
In the latter case, the Court held that Article 157 TFEU, which prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of sex, applied to contracts between private parties, 
even if the provision was formally addressed to Member States.146  The Court 
stated that ‘this, a fortiori, applies to Article 45 TFEU, which constitutes a 
specific application of the general prohibition of discrimination contained in 
Article 18 TFEU’.147 On the basis of that the Court found that ‘the prohibition of 
                                                 
143 ibid para 14 (italics added).  
144 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139. 
145 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] 
ECR 455. 
146 ibid para 39. Article 157 TFEU embodies the principle of equal treatment on grounds of sex. 
147 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmo di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139, para 
35. 
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discrimination laid down in Article 45 TFEU must be regarded as applying to 
private persons as well’.148  
 
The issue of the horizontal direct effect of the Treaty free movement provisions 
once again came before the Court in cases of Viking and Laval.149 In both cases, 
the Court ruled on the question of whether Articles 49 and 56 TFEU could be 
invoked against trade unions. At the outset, the Court reiterated its previous 
finding that ‘obstacles to freedom of movement of persons and freedom to provide 
services would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be 
neutralised by resulting from the exercise, by associations or organisations not 
governed by public law, of their legal autonomy’.150 In Laval, merely based on 
this,151 the Court found that the right of trade unions to take collective action was 
liable to make it less attractive or more difficult for undertakings established in 
                                                 
148 ibid para 36. 
149 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. In this case, the issue concerned 
the industrial action planned by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) and the 
Finish Seamen’s Union of (FSU) against Viking, a company established in Finland. Viking 
operated several vessels, including the Rosella, which under the Finish flag, plied the route 
between Tallinn and Helsinki. So long as the Rosella was under the Finish flag, Viking was 
obliged to pay the crew wages applicable in Finland. Since the vessel was running at a loss, Viking 
sought to re-flag it by registering it in Estonia, where crew wages were lower than those paid in 
Finland. The Rosella’s crew were members of the FSU, which was affiliated to the ITF. One of the 
main policies of the ITF is the policy on the use of flags of convenience. It aims to establish a 
genuine link between the flag of a ship and the nationality of the owner. In light of it, the ITF and 
the FSU opposed Viking’s re-flagging plans. The ITF requested its affiliated unions to refrain 
from entering into negotiations with Viking, while the FSU threatened to take an industrial action 
against it. The compatibility of these actions with Article 49 TFEU was raised before the Court. 
Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] 
ECR I-11767.The issue in this case, in turn, concerned the collective action taken by the Swedish 
builders’ union against a Latvian company, which had posted some of its Latvian workers to 
renovate a school in Vaxholm, Sweden. The Swedish builders’ union started negotiations with 
Laval in order to extend the collective agreement to the posted workers. Since the negotiations 
failed, the Swedish builders’ union blockaded Laval’s building site. As a result, Laval’s Swedish 
subsidiary went into bankruptcy. Relying on that, Laval brought an action before the Swedish 
court, claiming that the actions taken by the Swedish builders’ union were contrary to freedom to 
provide services under Article 56 TFEU. 
150 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] 
ECR I-11767, para 98; Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish 
Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, para 57. 
151 In contrast to Viking, the Court did not provide a detailed reasoning in Laval. 
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other Member States to provide services.  Therefore, it constituted a restriction 
under Article 56 TFEU.152 In Viking, however, the Court reiterated that: 
 
the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the 
Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same 
time on any individual who has an interest in compliance with the 
obligations thus laid down, and, second, that the prohibition on prejudicing 
a fundamental freedom laid down in a provision of the Treaty that is 
mandatory in nature, applies in particular to all agreements intended to 
regulate paid labour collectively.153 
 
The Court found that Article 49 TFEU could be replied upon by a private 
undertaking against a trade or an association of trade union,154 and the scope of 
that Treaty provision was not confined to associations or organisations, exercising 
regulatory tasks or having quasi-legislative powers.155 
 
Viking and Laval demonstrate that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU could be relied upon 
by a private party against a trade union. In this way, it seems that the Court further 
extended the scope of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. In Wouters,156 the Court already 
found that the rules enacted by the Dutch Bar Council fell within the scope of 
these Treaty provisions. In particular, the Court held that the compliance with 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU was necessary in the context of rules that were not 
                                                 
152 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] 
ECR I-11767, para 99. 
153 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, para 58. 
154 ibid para 66. More on the reasoning and conclusion of the Court in these cases, see eg Taco van 
Peijpe, ‘Collective Labour Law after Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Commission v Luxembourg’ 
(2009) 25 International Journal of Comparative Law and Industrial Relations 81; Jonas Malmberg 
and Tore Sigeman, ‘Industrial Actions and EU Economic Freedoms: The Autonomous Collective 
Bargaining Model Curtailed by the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law 
Review 1115; A C L Davies, ‘One step forward, two steps back? The Viking and Laval cases in 
the ECJ’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 125. 
155 ibid para 65. 
156 Case C-309/99 J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV 
v Algemene Raad  van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies de 
Europese Gemeenschap [2002] ECR I-1577. 
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public in nature, but were designed ‘to regulate, collectively, self-employment and 
the provision of services’.157 Due to the regulatory role of the Dutch Bar 
Council,158 the Court’s finding has not been regarded as establishing the 
horizontal direct effect of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, but rather the extension of the 
vertical direct effect of these provisions.159 In Viking, however, the Court ruled 
that a trade union was also bound by Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, even if there was 
no apparent regulatory role performed by it.160 This was also backed by the 
finding of the Court that these Treaty provisions did not apply to associations or 
organisations, exercising regulatory tasks or having quasi-legislative powers.161 
As a result, one could argue that actions taken by trade unions, which have no 
regulatory roles, might also be incompatible with Articles 49 and 56 TFEU.  
 
In contrast to Advocate General Maduro,162 the Court, however, did not explicitly 
state that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU could produce a horizontal direct effect. 
Instead, the Court’s reasoning was based on Walrave, Bosman and Wouters, 
which concerned non-public law bodies, regulating in a collective manner gainful 
employment and the provision of services. The Court did not mention its finding 
in Angonese,163 which raises a question of whether this could be regarded as a 
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change in the Court’s approach concerning the horizontal direct effect of the 
Treaty provisions on free movement of persons. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Angonese was not referred to by the Court in Laval 
and Viking, it could be argued that the Court’s reasoning in the latter has no 
bearing with respect to its finding in Angonese.  To begin with, the situation 
involved in Viking and Laval was different than that in Angonese. In the former, 
the private parties in the proceedings were trade unions, which participate in the 
drawing up of collective agreements to regulate paid work collectively.164 
However, this was not the case in Angonese. Although, the action taken by the 
private bank at issue was based on the National Collective Agreement of Savings 
Banks, it exercised its freedom to choose the way to recruit its staff and, most 
importantly, it acted individually. This might be one of the reasons why the Court 
in Viking and Laval referred to Walrave, Bosman and Wouters, rather than 
Angonese.  
 
More substantially, one also could point out that Viking did not involve 
discriminatory treatment, which however had a crucial role in the Court’s 
reasoning in Angonese. Furthermore, the difference might also be the result of the 
possible differential approach taken by the Court with regard to, on the one hand, 
and Article 45 TFEU, on the other hand, Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. It could be 
argued that the Court was ready to establish the horizontal direct effect of the 
principle of equal treatment laid down under Article 45 TFEU, because of then 
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specific nature of the field concerning free movement of workers.165 A great 
majority of workers falling within the scope of Article 45 TFEU are employed in 
the private sphere. Thus, they could be disadvantaged if the protection against 
discrimination on grounds of nationality was confined to the public or quasi-
public sphere.166 In addition, it could also be pointed out that those who fall within 
the scope of Article 45 TFEU are in a much weaker bargaining position in 
comparison to, for instance, those who fall within the scope of Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU. This line of reasoning, in a certain way, finds support in the case of 
Raccanelli, which concerned Article 45 TFEU. The Court’s reasoning in this case 
was built upon Angonese. 
 
In Raccanelli,167 the Court replied first by reiterating that that principle of equal 
treatment on grounds of nationality was worded in general terms and was not 
addressed specifically to Member States or bodies governed by public law.168 In 
this respect, the Court referred to its finding in Walrave that the principle of equal 
                                                 
165 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v 
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treatment on grounds of nationality applied not only to the actions taken by public 
authorities but also rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in a collective 
manner gainful employment and the provision of services.169 Similar to the 
reasoning in Angonese, the Court then continued that the principle of equal 
treatment under Article 45 TFEU applied equally to all agreements intended to 
regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals.170  
 
6.2. Scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment 
 
In light of the above-mentioned, a contractual term cannot be altogether excluded 
from the scope of Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU.171 It is possible that a given 
contractual term is caught by these Treaty provisions, because it either imposes 
discriminatory treatment on grounds of nationality or place of residence, or results 
in a difference in treatment on grounds of movement. However, it is reasonable to 
expect this to only occur in specific circumstances, taking into account the 
contractual nature of such differences in treatment and, specifically, the freedom 
of a party to agree or not any contractual term. In particular, one could distinguish 
two interlinked factors in this regard, in case of which a given contractual term is 
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170 ibid para 45. Defrenne and Angonese were cited in this respect. 
171 In this respect, one could also mention Article 20 of the Services Directive (Directive 
2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in 
the internal market (‘Services Directive’) [2006] OJ L 376/36). It provides that ‘Member States 
shall ensure that the general conditions of access to a service, which are made available to the 
public at large by the provider, do not contain discriminatory provisions relating to the nationality 
or place of residence of the recipient, but without precluding the possibility of providing for 
differences in the conditions of access where those differences are directly justified by objective 
criteria’. Even though Directives do not produce a horizontal direct effect, the effect of that 
provision on private parties through the doctrine of an incidental direct effect cannot be excluded. 
See in this respect, Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel 
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most likely to be subject to scrutiny under the Treaty provisions on free 
movement of persons. 
 
First, finding discriminatory treatment might depend on the bargaining position of 
both parties to a contractual relationship. That is to say, the likelihood of a 
particular contractual term to be found to be discriminatory increases, if the 
discriminated party is in a comparatively weaker bargaining position within a 
contractual relationship and has to accept the contractual terms put forward by the 
other party. Good examples here are contracts involving consumers, service 
recipients or employees. Even though this seems to be an important factor, it itself 
might not be sufficient in finding discriminatory treatment contrary to the Treaty 
provisions on free movement of persons. It is also necessary that there are no 
other equivalent possibilities in the market that the otherwise discriminated party 
can choose from. Thus, the second important factor here is the number of 
alternative offers in the market that allow the otherwise discriminated party to 
actually exercise its contractual freedom in agreeing or not the discriminatory 
contractual term imposed. Such freedom might be limited if either the other party 
is in a monopolistic position or because the discriminatory contractual term 
imposed is a common practice in the market.172 Having no alternative choice, the 
otherwise discriminated party would have to agree the contractual term imposed, 
in which case the latter would produce the same effect as a discriminatory 
mandatory national rule.173 
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Thus, in the absence of these two factors, it is very unlikely and even unnecessary 
that a particular contractual term agreed by two private parties is subject to 
scrutiny under the Treaty provisions of free movement of persons. This is 
because, in light of the principle of contractual freedom, on the one hand, 
contracting parties are free to put forward any contractual terms they deem 
necessary and, on the other hand, it is also up them to agree any contractual terms 
offered within a specific contract based on their own considerations. In the latter 
case, if a given contractual term is not in its interest, a party is under no obligation 
to agree to it and, consequently, comply with it. In this way, the principle of 
contractual freedom itself appears to be an effective solution to deal with any 
disadvantages that could otherwise be imposed in the context of contractual 
relationships including those of cross-border nature.  
 
This argumentation might at first sight seem to be relevant with regard to default 
rules, since as mentioned earlier, they are comparable to contractual terms based 
on the discretion available to private parties. However, there are two substantial 
reasons that require two different approaches in this respect. First, in contrast to 
default rules, the wider is the scope of the Treaty provisions on free movement of 
persons as regards contractual terms, the greater are the limitations imposed on 
contractual freedom. In particular, otherwise, this would mean that every 
contractual term in fact could be subject to scrutiny under the Treaty provisions 
on free movement of persons.174 This cannot be said about default rules, which are 
national rules and irrespective of their domestic classification, in any way, come 
within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions, provided that they fall 
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within the Treaty. Second, in contrast to default rules, there are no national rules 
involved in the context of contractual terms. Therefore, there is no risk that the 
extensive role given to contractual freedom in the context of the latter might result 
in the outright exclusion of a number of national rules from the scope of the 
Treaty free movement provisions.175 
7. Interim conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the discussion was centred on the possible effect of the principle 
of party autonomy in the context of scrutiny under the principle of equal 
treatment. It was argued that the law chosen by private parties to govern their 
contract can also come within the scope of the principle of equal treatment and  
cannot be applied if it imposes discriminatory treatment. In this respect, the fact 
that private parties have exercised their freedom to choose the governing law can 
hardly make any difference. What is important in the present context is the effect 
of the law on free movement in the Union rather than the discretion available to 
private parties. This conclusion concerns not only mandatory rules but also default 
rules of the chosen law.  In particular, with regard to mandatory rules, the issue is 
rather straightforward. This is because, due to their nature, they could be 
applicable on their own terms, if they are part of the law that a cross-border 
contractual relationship is linked to based on a factor other than a choice made by 
private parties. As far as default rules of the chosen law are concerned, the issue 
seems to be more complex, mainly because their applicability is very much 
subject to the freedom available to private parties to opt out of the scope of these 
rules. However, in this regard it was submitted that default rules of the chosen law 
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could also be subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment, 
irrespective of the fact that it is up to private parties to decide whether these rules 
are applicable to their contact. This could also be extended to contractual terms, 
but only if there are factors that restrict the possibility to exercise contractual 
freedom. Otherwise, the principle of contractual freedom itself appears to be an 
adequate means to deal with any disadvantages imposed in the context of 
contractual relationships. 
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Chapter IV  
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT AS A CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
 
So far I have examined the interaction of the principle of equal treatment with 
choice-of-law rules and the principle of party autonomy. It was argued that 
applicable substantive and choice-of-law rules can fall within the scope of the 
principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 18 TFEU and in the Treaty free 
movement provisions. This is specifically based on the fact that rules are 
scrutinised in light of the principle of equal treatment because of their effect on 
free movement in the Union. Their nature, the reason of their applicability or the 
discretion available to private parties to cross-border relationships as such does 
not appear to play a role in this respect. Now, what remains to be explored is 
whether the role of the principle of equal treatment in the context of a cross-
border relationship is confined to the scrutiny of the applicable substantive and 
choice-of-law rules or whether it goes beyond that. In particular, the question here 
is whether the functioning of the principle of equal treatment could be in any way 
compared to that of a choice-of-law rule.  
 
In this chapter I examine the functioning of the principle of equal treatment in 
three different contexts approaching it from a choice-of-law perspective. I will 
start by briefly looking at the commonly occurring situations where those coming 
from other Member States are deprived of advantages available to their in-state 
equivalents, then moving to double burden situations, and finally, concluding with 
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the situations where a choice-of-law rule is at issue (Garcia Avello, Bosmann, 
Boukhalfa will be examined in this respect). 
 
1. No advantages for those coming from other Member States 
 
The substantive law of a Member State is usually subject to scrutiny under the 
principle of equal treatment, if providers of goods or services, service recipients, 
employed or self-employed persons and, in general, Union citizens coming from 
other Member States are treated differently than their in-state equivalents. In 
particular, this takes place when, for instance, pursuant to the rules applied in a 
Member State those coming from other Member States are deprived of certain 
advantages (i.e. rights, freedoms, privileges or benefits) available to their in-state 
equivalents.1 In such a scenario, the principle of equal treatment requires similar 
treatment of those coming from other Member States and their in-state 
equivalents.2 In other words, according to the principle of equal treatment, a 
Member State must provide national treatment to those coming from other 
Member States, unless there are objective justifications for not doing so. In 
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addition, the principle of equal treatment also obliges a Member State to 
guarantee different treatment, if they are not in a comparable situation vis-a-vis 
domestic ones.3 
 
In the present context, the principle of equal treatment only opposes the 
application of a discriminatory national rule. It simply excludes the application of 
a rule that imposes discriminatory treatment. However, at the same time, the 
application of the principle of equal treatment does not result in the substitution of 
the law of a Member State with the law of another Member State, for instance, the 
Member State of origin. The cross-border situation at issue remains subject to the 
law of the first Member State. The absence of the substitutive effect is an essential 
aspect here, since it differentiates the principle of equal treatment from a choice-
of-law rule. In contrast to the latter, the principle of equal treatment does not in 
any way lead to the application of another national law. Its effect is confined to 
the requirement that the applicable law is not discriminatory in nature or effect.4 
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2. Double burden on providers of goods and services 
 
National rules that are caught by the Treaty free movement provisions are not 
only those that deprive, for instance, providers of goods or services, or employed 
and self-employed persons,  companies and in general Union citizens coming 
from other Member States of certain advantages available to their in-state 
equivalents. National rules, which impose requirements that bear more heavily on 
providers of goods or services coming from other Member States, are also subject 
to scrutiny under the Treaty free movement provisions. In essence, these national 
rules are equally applicable to in-state and out-of-state providers of goods or 
services. However, the compliance with these rules is likely to put foreign 
providers of goods or services at a disadvantage. This is because, in contrast to 
domestic ones, they have already complied with similar rules imposed in the 
Member State of origin. In such a case, those who exercise the Treaty free 
movement rights face a double regulatory burden by being subject to the rules of 
the Member State of origin and that of destination (hereafter ‘double burden 
situations’).5 
 
In the context of free movement of goods, these are the rules that impose 
additional product requirements on goods imported from other Member States. A 
leading case in this respect is Cassis de Dijon.6 The ruling demonstrates that if 
any given product has already satisfied the similar rules of the Member State of 
                                                 
5 Eleanor Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: towards a (Non-) Economic European 
Constitution’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 743, 745. 
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origin, it cannot be subject to the rules of the Member State of destination, unless 
this is justified under the Treaty express derogations or mandatory requirements. 
Otherwise, this would lead to a double burden imposed on imported products, 
since they would have to satisfy both the rules of the Member State of origin and 
those of the Member State of destination.7  
 
A similar line of reasoning also applies to services. For instance, in Webb,8 the 
issue concerned the Dutch rule that required a license for the provision of 
manpower in the Netherlands. This rule was applied to Webb, an English 
company, which held a licence under UK law for the provision of such a service. 
The Court found that the application of that rule would be excessive to the aim 
pursued, since the requirements to which the issue of a licence was subject 
coincided with the proofs and guarantees required in the Member State of origin.9 
According to the Court, in light of Article 56 TFEU, a Member State was required 
to take into account the evidence and guarantees already furnished by a service 
provider for the pursuit of its activities in the Member State of establishment.10 
Similarly, in Vlassopoulou,11 the subject of the contention was the refusal by the 
German authorities to allow a Greek national to be admitted as a lawyer, based on 
the fact that she did not have the necessary qualification according to German law. 
According to the Court, a Member State was required to recognise the 
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10 ibid. 
11 Case C-340/89 Iréne Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz. Bundes- und 
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qualification obtained in another Member State, if it was equivalent to that 
required to access a profession.12 
 
National rules that impose additional requirements on providers of goods or 
services coming from other Member States can be regarded to be indirectly 
discriminatory contrary to Articles 34 and 56 TFEU.13 This is because, their 
application bears more heavily on foreign providers of goods or services that have 
already met the similar requirements under similar rules in the Member State of 
origin. In this respect, it appears that in light of the principle of equal treatment, 
the scope of the law of the Member State of destination becomes limited 
specifically as regards to a product or service itself, which is being subject to the 
law of the Member State of origin. Relying on this, one may wonder whether the 
functioning of the principle of equal treatment in this context could be analogised 
to that of a choice-of-law rule. In particular, it could be questioned whether the 
principle of equal treatment itself indirectly operates as a rule that limits the scope 
of the law of the Member State of destination and, at the same time, renders the 
law of the Member State of origin as applicable instead. 
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From a choice-of-law perspective, double burden situations have been interpreted 
differently by the scholarship. According to some, Articles 34 and 56 TFEU rule 
out the application of the law of the Member State of destination, but at the same 
time do not render the law of the Member State of origin as applicable.14 Under 
this approach, the Member State of destination is required to take into account (or 
recognise) the rules complied with in the Member State of origin. Others, 
however, advocate a different approach.15 Grundmann, for instance, argues that 
the inapplicability of the law of the Member State of destination based on the fact 
that a given product or service has already satisfied the law of the Member State 
of origin contains a rule on the (sole) applicability of the latter.16 In particular, 
according to the author, the supplier acts on the basis of the law of the Member 
State of origin and from the inapplicability of the law of the Member State of 
destination it follows that the former remains the only applicable law.17 A similar 
argument has also been put forward by Basedow,18 though in his view the law of 
the Member State of destination can be applicable, if it is more liberal than that of 
the Member State of origin.19 To take any side of the debate specifically with 
                                                 
14 See eg Michel Tison, ‘Unravelling the General Good Exception: The Case of Financial 
Services’ in Mads Andenas and Wulf-Henning Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law 
(Oxford University Press 2002) 370-371; Michel Van Huffel, ‘The Legal Framework for Financial 
Services and the Internet’ in Niamh Nic Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the Internal Market (Edward 
Edgar 2006) 159. More on this approach, see Jan Wouters, ‘Choice-of-law and the Single Market 
for Financial Services’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 161, 288-
290. 
15 See eg Stefan Grundmann, ‘Internal Market Choice-of-law: From Traditional Choice-of-law to 
an Integrated Two Level Order’ in Angelika Fuchs, Horatia Muir Watt, Etienne Pataut and Others, 
Les conflits de lois et le système juridique communautaire (Dalloz-Sirey 2004); Luca G Radicati di 
Brozolo, ‘L’influence sur les conflits de lois des principles de droit communautaire en matière de 
liberté de circulation’ (1993) 82 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 401; Jürgen 
Basedow, ‘Der Kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfeiheiten im Europäischen Binnenmarkt: 
Favor offerentis’ (1995) 59 Rabels Zeitschrift für Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht 1. 
16 Stefan Grundmann, ‘Internal Market Choice-of-law’ (n 15) 9.  
17 ibid. 
18 Jürgen Basedow (n 15) 13-15. 
19 ibid 13. More on the debate, see eg Jacobien W Rutgers, International Reservation of Title 
Clauses: A Study of Dutch, French and German Private International Law in light of European 
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 1999) 204-205; Jona Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency 
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regard to the possible choice-of-law effect of the principle of equal treatment in 
the context of double burden situations, two factors must be considered. 
 
2.1. Delimiting national laws 
 
To start with, similar to a choice-of-law rule, in the context of double burden 
situations, the principle of equal treatment could indeed be regarded as a 
mechanism for solving conflicts of national laws. When a given product produced 
in or a given service authorised in a Member State is put on the market in another 
Member State, it would constitute a cross-border situation, linked to the law of 
both Member States. The law of each Member State might be applicable to the 
cross-border situation at issue.20 The first Member State would require that its 
relevant rules are complied with, since the product is produced in or the service is 
authorised in its territory. Similarly, based on the fact that the product or service is 
offered in its territory, the second Member State might wish to apply its own 
rules. However, the cumulative application of both sets of national rules in the 
present context would be contrary to the internal market rationale.21 Since the 
application of the law of the second Member State might disadvantage foreign 
providers of goods or services, its applicability in light of the principle of equal 
treatment with respect to a product or service itself appears to be excluded, unless 
it can be justified on objective grounds. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Regulation: a Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings in light of a Paradigm of 
Co-operation and a Comitas Europaea (Intersentia 2005) 124-127; Jan Wouters (n 14) 284-288. 
20 Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 16. 
21 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and the 
Exception of Mutual Recognition’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 46. 
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In this way, similar to a choice-of-law rule, the principle of equal treatment could 
be seen as delimiting the scope of national laws, i.e. the law of the Member State 
of origin and that of destination. However, it is necessary to mention, first, that 
such an effect produced by the principle of equal treatment is essentially confined 
to national rules that are of public law nature. In particular, these are the rules 
concerning product requirements, prudential supervision or administrative 
authorisation.22 The application of these rules by the Member State of destination 
imposes a double regulatory burden on foreign providers of goods or services, 
since they have already complied with similar rules in the Member State of origin. 
Thus, in essence, scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment in the present 
context does not seem to concern other national rules, specifically those of private 
law nature regulating contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationships, 
the applicability of which is usually regulated by choice-of-law rules. The 
application of these rules is less likely to result in a double burden imposed on 
foreign providers of goods or services, since it would most probably be the first 
time they are required to comply with this type of rules.23 Second, as discussed in 
                                                 
22 Jan-Jaap Kuipers, ‘Cartesio and Grunkin Paul: Mutual Recognition as a Vested Rights Theory 
Based on Party Autonomy in Private Law’ (2009) 2 European Journal of Legal Studies 66, 77. See 
also Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Introduction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir 
Watt (eds), Making European Private Law: Governance Design (Edward Elgar 2008) 17. 
23 As discussed in the first chapter, this type of rules can also come within the scope of the 
principle of equal treatment, provided that they fall within the Treaty. In particular, in the context 
of Article 34 TFEU, assuming that Keck is still good law, some national private law rules could 
also fall within the category of selling arrangements, though it is fair to argue that this only 
concerns rules that regulate the circumstances of marketing and distribution of products. See in 
this respect, Michael Schillig, ‘The Interpretation of European Private Law in light of Market 
Freedoms and EU Fundamental Rights’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 285, 290. Others, however, could also be regarded as products requirements. 
For instance, one could mention a national rule on non-conformity or hidden defects in sales, 
which notwithstanding its contract law nature could be caught under Article 34 TFEU. This is 
because of a specific requirement that could be imposed on an imported product in light of it. See 
in this respect, Martijn W  Hesselink, ‘Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’ in Jan M 
Smits and Sophie Stijns (eds.), Inhoud en werking van de overeenkomst naar Belgisch en 
Nederlands recht (Intersentia 2005) 74. Those national private law rules that cannot be regarded as 
product requirements and do not relate to selling arrangements would fall within the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU as part of a third category of rules, which are referred to as ‘residual’ rules. See 
in this respect, Case C-473/98 Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-5681; Case 
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the first chapter, a choice-of-law rule delimiting national substantive laws, for 
instance, is intended to provide certainty over the applicable law,24 which, 
however, cannot be said about the principle of equal treatment under Articles 34 
and 56 TFEU. The latter, in turn, guarantees free movement of goods and services 
across borders.25 In particular, in double burden situations the principle of equal 
treatment ensures that foreign providers of goods or services are not dissuaded 
from the exercise the Treaty free movement rights by the additional requirements 
imposed by the Member State of destination.26 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
C-350/97 Wilfried Monsees v Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für Kärnten [1999] ECR I-2921; 
Case C-55/99 Commission v France [2000] ECR I -11499; Case C-320/03 Commission of v 
Austria [2005] ECR I-9871; Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE, 
formerly Trofo Super-Markets AE and Carrefour Marinopoulos AE v Elliniko Dimosio, 
Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Ioanninon [2006] ECR I-8135. See also Anthony Arnull, Alan 
Dashwood, Michael Dougan and Others, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2006) 601. As residual rules, these rules would fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU 
according to the broad Dassonville formula (if they affect, ‘directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially’, intra-Union trade). See in this respect, Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Leaving Keck behind?’ The 
free movement of goods after the rulings in Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos’ (2009) 
34 European Law Review 914, 920. Under the Dassonville formula, national private law rules as 
residual rules would need to be objectively justified. However, this is not the case if their effect on 
intra-Union trade is ‘too uncertain and indirect’. See in this respect, Case C-69/88 H. Krantz 
GmbH & Co. v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Netherlands State [1990] ECR I-583, para 
11; Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v Pelin Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009, para 
12; Case C-379/92 Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 24; 
Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Srl [1995] ECR I-
2883, para 41; C-412/97 ED Srl v Italo FenocchioCase [1998] ECR I-3845, para 11; Case C-44/98 
BASF AG v Präsident des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR I-6269, para 16. 
24 Lorna E Gillies, Electronic Commerce and International Private Law: A Study of Electronic 
Consumer Contracts (Ashgate Publishing 2008) 7; James J Fawcett, ‘Products Liability in Private 
International Law: a European Perspective’ (1993) 238 Recueil des Cours 9, 132. See also Paul H 
Neuhaus, ‘Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Choice-of-law’ (1963) 28 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 795. 
25 Joined Cases 92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mHbH and Patricia 
Im- und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI Electrol a GmbH 
[1993] ECR I-5145, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para 9. 
26 For instance, in Cassis de Dijon, in light of the German rule at issue, a liqueur lawfully produced 
and marketed in France according to French law could be sold on the German market only if the 
product was called something else than a liqueur and had a new packaging. See in this respect Per 
Norberg, ‘Non-discrimination as a Social and a Free Market Value’' in Ann Numhauser-Henning 
(ed), Legal Perspectives on Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination (Kluwer Law International 
2001) 73. 
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2.2. Application of the law of the Member State of origin  
 
As mentioned above, a choice-of-law rule delimits national substantive laws and 
does so by designating a particular national substantive law as applicable to a 
cross-border contractual, non-contractual or other civil law relationship. For 
instance, a choice-of-law rule could determine the law of the State where the work 
is performed (State of employment) as the law governing an employment contract. 
This contract could be linked to other national laws, i.e. the law of the State of the 
employee’s residence or that of the employer’s establishment, either of which 
could theoretically be applicable to it. However, pursuant to the choice-of-law 
rule at issue, only the law of the State of employment would be applied to the 
contract. In this way, the choice-of-law rule delimits the scope of the national 
laws to which the employment contract at hand is linked. 
 
From this perspective, the principle of equal treatment in the context of double 
burden situations can hardly be compared to a choice-of-law rule. Although the 
principle of equal treatment can indeed limit the scope of the law of the Member 
State of destination, unlike a choice-of-law rule it does not, even indirectly, render 
the law of the Member State of origin as applicable. This is based on the very 
meaning of the term ‘application of law’. In general, as Wróblewski points out, 
the term lacks any precisely fixed meaning either in legal language or in other 
languages associated with law.27 However, from a choice-of-law perspective, the 
term ‘application of law’ is understood as a process whereby the legal standing of 
a cross-border legal relationship is considered by a forum court in light of the 
                                                 
27 Jerzy Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law (Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick 
ed, Kluwer Academic Publisher 1992) 1. 
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relevant rules valid in a national legal system.28 In double burden situations, when 
the rule, specifically that of public law nature, of the Member State of destination 
is found to impose an additional burden since a foreign supplier of goods or 
services has already complied with the law of the Member State of origin, the 
latter is not meant to be actually applied with regard to a product or service itself. 
Otherwise, the authorities in the Member State of destination would be in a 
position to consider whether a product or service has indeed complied with the 
law of the Member State of origin. This, in turn, would be inconsistent with the 
free movement of goods and services rationale in the internal market. 
 
This line of reasoning seems to find support in the case of Wirtschaft v 
Weinvertriebs.29 The issue in that case related to the import ban imposed by the 
German authorities on the vermouth imported from Italy, the alcoholic content of 
which was less than 16 %. Italian law required that the vermouth marketed in Italy 
had at least 16 % of alcoholic content. As an exception, the vermouth with less 
than 16 % of alcohol could be made for export. Under German law, as a general 
rule, no minimum alcoholic requirement was imposed. However, foreign wine-
based beverages could only be imported to Germany if they complied with the 
law of the country of origin and could be marketed there. The question considered 
by the Court was whether it was compatible with Article 34 TFEU to ban the 
import of the Italian vermouth pursuant to the German rule, which, in turn, 
referred to Italian law, the law of the Member State of origin. The Court found 
that the import ban was discriminatory contrary to Article 34 TFEU, since the rule 
                                                 
28 John O’Brien and Raymond Smith, Choice-of-law (2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing 1999), 24; 
Jerzy Wróblewski (n 27) 1-2. 
29 Case 59/82 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v Weinvertriebs-GmbH [1983] 
ECR 1217. 
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at issue was only applied with regard to foreign wine-based beverages.30 
According to the Court, this outcome was not affected by the fact that the German 
rule referred to Italian law, because the discriminatory effect should be 
determined on the basis of the law of the Member State of destination, where the 
marketing of the product had taken place.31 
 
The conclusion reached by the Court appears to demonstrate that the principle of 
equal treatment under Article 34 TFEU does not, even indirectly, result in the 
actual application of the law of the Member State of origin. If this was indeed the 
case, then in Wirtschaft v Weinvertriebs, not only German law that referred to 
Italian law as regards the minimum alcoholic requirement, but also the actual 
application of the latter by the German authorities would not be incompatible with 
Article 34 TFEU. In other words, the law of the Member State of destination 
would enshrine the outcome allegedly envisaged by the principle of equal 
treatment. Therefore, in double burden situations, what the authorities of the 
Member State of destination are required, however, is to recognise the fact that a 
product or service has already satisfied the relevant rules in the Member State of 
origin. According to Union secondary legislation and the Court’s case-law, any 
doubts in this respect should be dealt by the Member State of origin.32 For 
                                                 
30 ibid para 8. 
31 ibid para 9. 
32 With regard to goods, this seems to find support in Case 59/82 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in 
der Wirtschaft v Weinvertriebs-GmbH [1983] ECR 1217. See also Case 94/83 Criminal 
proceedings against Albert Heijn BV [1984] ECR 3263. With regard to services, this seems to find 
support in Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market (‘Services Directive’) [2006] OJ L 376/36. According to 
Article 35 taken in conjunction with Article 18 of the Services Directive, a Member State willing 
to take measures relating to the safety of services provided in its territory is required first to ask the 
Member State of establishment to take measures with regard to the provider, supplying all relevant 
information on the service in question and the circumstances of the case. 
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instance, in Biologische Producten,33 the Court held that a product could not be 
subject to an unnecessary technical or chemical analysis or laboratory test under 
the law of the Member State of destination where a similar analysis or test had 
already been carried out in the Member State of origin and its results were 
available to the authorities of the Member State of destination or might be placed 
at their disposal upon request.34 Therefore, in light of Articles 34 and 56 TFEU, in 
order to avoid a double burden imposed on foreign providers of goods or services, 
a Member State must take into consideration the law of another Member State, if 
it wishes to apply its own law. The latter factor, i.e. the intention of a Member 
State to apply its own rules, is also essential in the present context. A Member 
State is obliged to take into account the law of another Member State only when it 
desires to take a measure with respect to an imported product or service pursuant 
to its own law.35 That is when the measure becomes subject to scrutiny under the 
Treaty free movement provisions. If that is not the case, then no question of the 
recognition of the law of another Member State would arise.  
 
3. National and Union choice-of-law rules at scrutiny 
 
The analysis so far has concerned the role of the principle of equal treatment taken 
in the context of double burden situations and those where those coming from 
other Member States are deprived of the advantages available to their in-state 
                                                 
33 Case 272/80 Criminal proceedings against Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische 
Producten BV [1981] ECR 3277. The issue in that case related to the Dutch rule that prohibited the 
sale, storage or use of a plant protection product, which had not been approved pursuant to Dutch 
law. The rule was applied to the product imported from France, where it was lawfully marketed. 
See also Case C-293/94 Criminal proceedings against Jacqueline Brandsma [1996] ECR I-3159; 
Case 25/88 Criminal proceedings against Esther Renée Bouchara, née Wurmser and Norlaine SA 
[1989] ECR 1105; Case C-184/96 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-6197. 
34 Case 272/80 Criminal proceedings against Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische 
Producten BV [1981] ECR 3277, para 14. 
35 Jona Israël (n 19) 129. 
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equivalents. In both contexts, the principle of equal treatment does not appear to 
require the substitution of the ‘discriminatory’ law of a Member State with the 
law of another Member State. In other words, it does not result in the actual 
application of the law of a different Member State. This could be taken as a 
general conclusion with regard to the question of the possible effect of the 
principle of equal treatment from a choice-of-law perspective. Having said that, 
however, it is also necessary to again touch upon Garcia Avello, Bosmann, 
Boukhalfa,36 where only the mere application of a particular national law pursuant 
to a choice-of-law rule was subject to scrutiny under the principle of equal 
treatment.  The question here is whether the role of the principle of equal 
treatment in this context can make any difference with regard to the conclusion 
expressed above. 
 
3.1. Garcia Avello 
 
At first sight, the principle of equal treatment could be seen to produce a 
substitutive effect in Garcia Avello. This means that in light of it, not only the 
Belgian rule, the application of which resulted in discriminatory treatment, is 
required to be set aside, but also, the relevant Spanish customary rule should be 
applied instead. In other words, the principle of equal treatment could be 
understood as precluding the application of Belgian law to the situation at hand 
and at the same time leading to the actual application of Spanish law to determine 
the name of the children at issue. Upon the careful analysis, however, this does 
not appear to be the case. The principle of equal treatment does not actually 
                                                 
36 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v État belge [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-214/94 Ingrid 
Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I-2253; Case C-352/06 Brigitte Bosmann v 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Familienkasse Aachen [2008] ECR I-3827. 
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require the Belgian authorities to apply Spanish law, but merely recognise the 
name given under Spanish law and tradition. Two essential factors are necessary 
to mention in this regard. First, according to the facts of the case, before the 
matter came before the Belgian authorities, the children had already been 
registered under the name ‘Garcia Weber’ with the consular section of the Spanish 
embassy in Belgium. The refusal by the Belgian authorities to recognise that name 
in this respect led to disadvantageous treatment. In particular, this is where the 
issue of practical difficulties of having different names under the law of two 
Member States referred to by the Court comes to the forefront. It is quite possible 
that the children at issue might at some point decide to reside in Spain and it 
would be inconvenient for them to have, for instance, their educational 
qualification issued in the name different than that officially registered there.37  
 
Second, a crucial factor in the present context appears to be the choice made by 
the parents for their children to bear a name according to Spanish law and 
tradition. As mentioned in the second chapter, the Court in the present ruling 
resorted to the party autonomy oriented approach with regard to names.38 This 
means that there is no general obligation imposed on the authorities of a Member 
State to recognise the acts or decisions taken by those of another Member State 
concerning names similar to the system under the Brussels I Regulation.39 Instead, 
there is a specific obligation, whereby a Member State is required to allow a 
person to make a choice between the conflicting decisions taken by the authorities 
                                                 
37 Eleanor Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union (n 12) 124. 
38 Jan-Jaap Kuipers (n 22) 84. 
39 Regulation 44/2001of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1. 
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of the Member States concerned.40 Pursuant to that choice, a Member State is 
obliged to recognise the name given under the law of another Member State. 
Thus, if the situation in Garcia Avello had been the reverse, the Spanish 
authorities would also have been bound to recognise the name given under 
Belgian law.  
 
The emphasis on the choice made by a person could also be observed in the 
subsequent case of Grunkin Paul,41 which not only confirms the obligation of 
Member States to respect the choice made by a person in a cross-border situation 
involving names, but also demonstrates its wider scope. The obligation is not 
confined to situations where there is discrimination on grounds of nationality, but 
also concerns those involving discrimination on grounds of movement.42 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to have a cross-border situation involving a 
person with dual nationality. Instead, the obligation also applies, if a person, a 
national of Member State A, habitually resides in Member State B and if these 
Member States use nationality and habitual residence as a connecting factor to 
determine the law governing names, respectively.  
 
However, notwithstanding the importance attached to it in Garcia Avello and 
Grunkin Paul, the obligation of a Member State to respect the choice made by a 
person in the present context is not without exception. First, as Sayn-Wittgenstein 
clearly illustrates, the refusal by a Member State to recognise a name registered in 
                                                 
40 Matthias Lehmann, ‘What’s in a Name? Grunkin Paul and Beyond’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of 
Private International Law 135, 159. 
41 Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR 
I-7639. 
42 See, Case C-353/06 Proceedings brought by Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] 
ECR I-7639, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, paras 68 and 69. 
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another Member State could be justified on public policy grounds.43 In this case, 
the Austrian authorities refused to recognise a name, which included a title of 
nobility, used by an Austrian national residing in Germany. The person at issue 
had been using that name in her professional life during 15 years. Similar to 
Garcia Avello and Grunkin Paul, having acknowledged the possible practical 
difficulties the person could face, the Court, however, found that the refusal by the 
Austrian authorities could be justified pursuant to the Austrian law on abolition of 
nobility.44 Second, as the Court held in Runevič-Vardyn,45 the national authorities 
of a Member State are under the obligation to recognise the name given under the 
law of another Member State only if there is a risk of ‘serious inconvenience’ 
caused to those concerned at administrative, professional and private levels.46 
Thus, for instance, the Court did not consider the registration of the Polish name 
‘Łukasz Paweł’ by the Lithuanian authorities as ‘Lukasz Pawel’ without a 
diacritical mark, which is not used in the Lithuanian language, as likely to cause 
actual and serious inconvenience for the person concerned.47 
 
3.2. Bosmann 
 
In Bosmann, the principle of equal treatment could be seen as going beyond its 
traditional effect by rendering German law applicable to the situation involving 
Mrs Bosmann.  The application of German law was possible in order to eradicate 
                                                 
43 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien (CJEU, 22 December 
2010). Another possible ground for objective justification is the protection of a national language. 
See in this respect Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus 
miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others (CJEU, 12 May 2011).  
44 ibid para 94. 
45 Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto 
savivaldybės administracija and Others (CJEU, 12 May 2011). 
46 ibid para 76. 
47 ibid para 81. 
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the difference in treatment. It might seem that recourse to the principle of equal 
treatment indirectly resulted in the application of the national law that was not 
applicable in accordance with the lex loci laboris rule.  
 
Even though German law could be applied in light of it, Bosmann hardly tells 
anything about the role of the principle of equal treatment from a choice-of-law 
perspective. To begin with, there was no actual change of the law governing Mrs 
Bosmann’s social security protection. This is evident from the position taken by 
the Court in respect of the relationship between the Treaty provisions on free 
movement of workers and the lex loci laboris rule enshrined in Regulation 
1408/71.  Since the application of the lex loci laboris rule was held to be 
incompatible with Articles 48 TFEU, it was required to be set aside in so far as 
the case at hand was concerned. This opened up the possibility for the application 
of the national law other than that designated by the lex loci laboris rule. Despite 
that, however, this does not imply that German law replaced Dutch law as the law 
governing Mrs Bosmann’s social security protection. The latter remained 
governed by the relevant rules under Dutch law. German law, in turn, was allowed 
to be applied simultaneously with Dutch law only in so far as the benefit at issue 
was concerned. 
 
More generally, notwithstanding the possible far-reaching effect of the Court’s 
reasoning in Bosmann, the simultaneous application of German and Dutch law did 
not create a legal problem. The latter, as mentioned in the first chapter, could 
occur, if, for instance, two different national substantive laws applied to the same 
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factual background contradict each other yielding conflicting results.48 In the 
present context, it is true that German and Dutch law were different in substance 
in terms of the availability of a benefit for children aged over 18. However, the 
application of German law to Mrs Bosmann even though she was generally 
subject to Dutch law concerning her social security protection did not create a 
conflict. On the one hand, this is because of the fact that the possibility to receive 
the benefit pursuant to German law did not affect the applicability of Dutch law. 
On the other hand, the application of German law did not create any additional 
obligation imposed on either the German or Dutch authorities. In particular, the 
Dutch authorities were not required to apply German law nor pay a benefit that 
was not available under Dutch law. Similarly, the German authorities simply 
needed to pay the benefit, which Mrs Bosmann was entitled to under the 
conditions attached to it. 
 
3.3. Boukhalfa 
 
The careful analysis of Boukhalfa might reveal how the principle of equal 
treatment itself, though indirectly, seems to determine the governing law in the 
context of the cross-border situation at issue. The German choice-of-law rule was 
discriminatory on grounds of nationality, since pursuant to it, nationals of other 
Member States were treated differently than German nationals. In light of Article 
45 TFEU, such directly discriminatory treatment cannot be accepted and possible 
justification based on one of the Treaty express derogations would be of no help. 
                                                 
48 J Georges Sauveplane, ‘Renvoi’ in Ulrich Drobnig and Konrad Zweigert (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Instalment 26 ( Mohr Siebeck 1990) 12; Mireille van Eechoud, 
Choice of Law in copyright and related rights: Alternatives to the Lex Protectionis (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 106. 
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As a result, Algerian law could not be the law governing Ms Boukhalfa’s 
employment contract. However, the implication of the principle of equal treatment 
in the present context does not appear to be confined to that. In light of it, it 
appears that not only the applicable national law under scrutiny should be set 
aside, but the legal issue at hand should be governed by a different national law. 
In particular, in order to eradicate the difference in treatment, Ms Boukhalfa’s 
employment contract should also be subject to German law similar to that of the 
staff having German nationality. Giving effect to the principle of equal treatment, 
German law was required to be the applicable national law. This, in turn, 
demonstrates the substitutive effect produced by the principle of equal treatment.  
 
This effect, however, is not surprising, taking into consideration the fact that the 
rule under scrutiny in Boukhalfa was a choice-of-law rule. The rule designated the 
law applicable to the employment contracts of the staff working in German 
diplomatic representations. Based upon nationality as a connecting factor, the rule 
distinguished between those who had German nationality and those who had other 
nationalities in terms of the law applicable to their employment contracts, which 
was directly discriminatory contrary to the principle of equal treatment. To 
eradicate it, therefore, the law applicable to the employment contracts of German 
nationals was required to be applied to that of nationals of other Member States as 
well. In this respect, the principle of equal treatment, in essence, dealt with the 
choice-of-law rule at issue rather than the question of the applicable law as such. 
In other words, only the question of what choice-of-law rule could be applied to 
determine the applicable law was addressed under the principle of equal 
treatment. The substitutive effect produced by the principle of equal treatment 
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appears to be a direct consequence of the fact that Algerian law could not be 
applicable pursuant to the discriminatory choice-of-law rule. In such a context, if 
a difference in treatment is imposed through the application of a different national 
law designated by a choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a connecting 
factor, the substitution of that national law with the national law applicable to a 
comparably placed situation would be imminent. However, that is not to say that 
the substitution of the otherwise applicable national law would always occur 
whenever a choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a connecting factor is at 
scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment.49 
 
Furthermore, one could be rather hesitant to draw any general conclusion taking 
into account the specific factual circumstances in Boukhalfa, to which the effect 
produced by the principle of equal treatment appears to be confined. The choice-
of-law rule at issue was enshrined in the German legislation on diplomatic service 
and aimed to regulate the employment conditions of the staff working in the 
embassies or consulates abroad. Since it concerned a State institution, the rule was 
meant to preserve the benefit of the application of German law to German 
nationals only. In this respect, it is questionable whether a similar situation could 
occur, for instance, in a private sector – i.e. in a branch located in a third country 
of a company having its headquarters in a Member State and, more importantly, in 
a branch located in a Member State of a company established in another Member 
State. This is because of the fact that an individual employment contract under 
Union law is not regulated by a choice-of-law rule based on nationality as a 
connecting factor. According to the Rome I Regulation, which has a universal 
                                                 
49 This is more likely to depend on the specific factual background of a case at hand.  
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application,50 private parties to an employment contract are free to choose the 
governing law.51 If they have not done so, the employment contract is governed 
by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee 
habitually carries out his/her work in performance of the contract.52 The same 
provision was also enshrined in the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations which has been replaced by the Rome I Regulation.53 
As a result, as far as the applicable law is concerned, directly discriminatory 
treatment on grounds of nationality can hardly occur in a private sector similar to 
Boukhalfa.  
 
4. Interim conclusion 
 
The principle of equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free 
movement provisions requires the applicable substantive and choice-of-law rules 
to be non-discriminatory in nature and effect. This, however, is not sufficient to 
compare its effect to that of a choice-of-law rule. The principle of equal treatment 
does not explicitly or implicitly designate the applicable law in the sense 
understood from a choice-of-law perspective. The analysis of its functioning in 
the context of cross-border situations reveals that only the question of what 
designated or chosen national substantive law, or designating choice-of-law rules 
can be applied in the Union is addressed under the principle of equal treatment. If 
the designated or chosen national law or designating choice-of-law rule is caught 
                                                 
50 According to Article 2, ‘any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is 
the law of a Member State’. 
51 Article 6 (1) of Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I Regulation’) [2008] OJ L 177/6. 
52 Article 6 (2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
53 Article 6 of 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to the contractual obligations 
(consolidate version) [1998] OJ C 027/34. 
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by the principle of equal treatment, the latter does not create an opening for the 
application of the law of a Member State other than that that is subject to scrutiny. 
This is based on the fact that in contrast to a choice-of-law rule, the principle of 
equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions 
does not contain even an implicit reference to a particular national law that always 
becomes applicable whenever one has recourse to it. This, in turn, is a clear 
indicator of the difference between the functioning of the principle of equal 
treatment and that of a choice-of-law rule. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis aimed to provide a different perspective to the study of the principle of 
equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty free movement provisions 
by examining its scope and functioning from a choice-of-law perspective. It was 
aimed to be a follow up the studies conducted by Michaels on the functioning of 
the country of origin principle in light of the vested right theory,1 and Fallon and 
Meeusen on the possible choice-of-law effect of the mutual recognition principle.2 
 
The general conclusion of this thesis is that the principle of equal treatment does 
not explicitly or implicitly designate the applicable law in the sense understood 
from a choice-of-law perspective. The requirement that all rules should be non-
discriminatory in nature and effect itself does not, even indirectly, address the 
general question of what national law is governing a cross-border relationship. 
Even from a choice-of-law perspective, the principle of equal treatment does not 
create an opening for the application of the law other than that that is subject to 
scrutiny. This is explained by the fact that in contrast, to a choice-of-law rule the 
principle of equal treatment does not contain even an implicit reference to a 
particular national law that always becomes applicable whenever one has recourse 
to it. Although, its effect in Boukhalfa was different, this can hardly make any 
difference, taking into consideration the specific factual background and the fact 
that it was a national choice-of-law rule that was subject to scrutiny in that case.  
 
                                                 
1 Ralf Michaels, ‘EU Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin 
Principle as Vested-Rights Theory’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 195. 
2 Marc Fallon and Johan Meeusen, ‘Private International Law in the European Union and the 
Exception of Mutual Recognition’ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37. 
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Therefore, in the context of the determination of the applicable law in the Union, 
the effect of the principle of equal treatment merely functions as an additional 
check on the operation of the designated or chosen national substantive law and 
choice-of-law rules themselves. 
 
If the national substantive law designated by a choice-of-law rule is found to be 
discriminatory, it would not apply to a given cross-border relationship, unless 
there are objective justifications. Even though the principle of equal treatment 
substantially differs from mandatory rules or the public policy exception, a forum 
court has a right and even obligation to invoke it in light of the Union public 
policy exception. The applicability of the national substantive law pursuant to a 
choice-of-law rule cannot justify the application of the discriminatory rule. 
National or Union choice-of-law rules declare national substantive rules as 
applicable, but they do not ensure their automatic compliance with the principle of 
equal treatment.  
 
The same argument could also be made as regards the national law chosen by 
private parties to a cross-border contractual relationship. Private parties are 
certainly bound by a choice-of-law clause. This however does not mean that the 
chosen law cannot be scrutinised in light of the principle of equal treatment. 
Similarly, it can hardly be accepted as a sufficient ground for objective 
justification. This concerns both mandatory and default rules that are part of the 
chosen law. In case of mandatory rules, the discretion available to private parties 
does not appear to affect their scrutiny under the principle of equal treatment, 
mainly because of the fact that these rules could be applicable to a given cross-
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border relationship even without any choice-of-law clause. As regards default 
rules, it is true that private parties have more discretion, since they are free to 
exclude their contract from the scope of these rules. However, it does not seem 
reasonable to hold, for instance, that a private party discriminated by a default rule 
should accept any possible consequences arising as a result of not exercising such 
a discretion. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the absence of any 
specific contractual arrangement by private parties might not represent their actual 
intention and. On the other hand, it also appears to be inconsistent with the 
internal market rationale not to allow the otherwise discriminated party to raise 
before a forum court the compatibility of a given default rule with Treaty free 
movement provisions. Thus, since in case of default rules it is a national rule that 
is, in essence, subject to scrutiny, the discretion available to private parties over 
their scope does not appear itself to be an effective means to deal with any 
possible disadvantages that one might face in a contractual context. 
 
In addition to the designated or chosen national substantive law, national and 
Union choice-of-law rules also come within the scope of the principle of equal 
treatment, regardless of their specific nature, i.e. the fact that they only determine 
the applicable law without dealing with matters of substance.  
 
As far as national choice-of-law rules are concerned, a possible difference in 
treatment in terms of the applicable law arising in light of them would be 
compatible with the principle of equal treatment, as long as nationality and 
territoriality that these rules are usually based upon are only used as neutral 
connecting factor to determine the applicable law. This is less likely to be the 
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case, for instance, if the use of nationality as a connecting factor in fact results in a 
preference given to one nationality over the other; if nationality or a territorial 
connecting factor is given preference over another equivalent connecting factor. 
This could be incompatible with the principle of equal treatment and require 
objective justification. 
 
As regards Union choice-of-law rules, because of the single neutral connecting 
factors they are based upon any possible difference in treatment in terms of the 
applicable law arising in light of these rules is only likely to trigger the principle 
of equal treatment on grounds of movement. In this respect, the application of the 
Bosmann-esque approach with regard to Union choice-of-law rules adopted under 
Article 81 TFEU seems problematic. The clear subordination of these rules to the 
principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement because of a possible 
disadvantage imposed on those who have exercised the Treaty free movement 
rights is questionable. These rules are intended to ensure certainty over the 
applicable law and predictability of litigation in the context of cross-border 
relationships between private parties. Therefore, setting aside these rules pursuant 
to the principle of equal treatment on grounds of movement because of the effect 
they produce in a specific case could impact upon the effectiveness in achieving 
their aim, which is crucial for private parties engaged in cross-border contractual, 
non-contractual or other civil law relationships. One certainly cannot deny that the 
mere application of the designated national substantive law in accordance with 
these rules might place one of the parties at a disadvantage. Despite that, it is 
doubtful whether such a disadvantage could trigger the principle of equal 
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treatment on grounds of movement and, even if it is the case, it is reasonable to 
expect that these rules are justified in light of their aim.  
 
This thesis is limited to the study of the outcome of Union choice-of-law rules 
adopted under Article 81 TFEU being subject to scrutiny under the principle of 
equal treatment on grounds of movement. A similar study conducted outside the 
confines of a university setting on the outcome of these rules being subject to the 
restriction-based test under the Treaty free movement provisions could be further 
helpful in understanding the interaction between these rules and the Treaty free 
movement provisions. For instance, under the Rome II Regulation, the lex loci 
damni rule is the main choice-of-law rule, according to which the law applicable 
to liability arising out of cross-border torts is the law of the country where the 
damage occurs.3 The lex loci damni rule could designate the law of a Member 
State as applicable in the context of cross-border tort litigation between private 
parties, the application of which, in turn, could be subject to the restriction-based 
test under the Treaty free movement provisions. In this respect, the focus would 
be on the broader understanding of the notion of restriction,4 even though the 
market access test would also be considered.5 This research would seek to 
                                                 
3 Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation. 
4 See eg Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, para 32; 
Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, para 37; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against 
Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup 
and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96) [1999] ECR I-8453, para 33; Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279, para 39; Case C-442/02 
CaixaBank France v Ministère de l'Économie, des. Finances et de l'Industrie (CaixaBank) [2004] 
ECR I-8961, para 11-13; Case C-518/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-3491, para 66.  
5 See eg Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and Others and Union des associations 
européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para 99-100; Case C-
134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl v Giotto Immobilier SARL [2005] ECR I-1167, para 37-38; Joined 
Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar SA v Commune de Fléron and Belgacom Mobile SA v 
Commune de Schaerbeek [2005] ECR I-7723, para 29-31; Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy 
(motorcycle trailers) [2009] ECR I-519, para 58; Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson 
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address, for instance, the question as to whether the aim of a Union choice-of-law 
rule adopted under Article 81 TFEU in ensuring certainty over the applicable law 
and predictability of litigation could be taken as a ground for objective 
justification, if the mere application of the national law designated pursuant to 
that rule is found to impose a restriction. 
                                                                                                                                     
and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273, para 28; Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal (tinted 
film) [2008] ECR I-2245, para 31-36. 
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